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Prelude 
The inimitable sci-fi story Altruizine, or A True Account of How Bonhomius the Hermetic Hermit 
Tried to Bring About Universal Happiness, and What Came of It written by the Polish writer 
Stanislaw Lem narrates the manifold ways in which good intended attempts to create 
a better society by disseminating a pioneering psychopharmacological substance can 
backfire (Lem, 2014 [1965]). In this story, the robot Bonhomius leaves the cave he has 
spent over sixty years meditating in to help his fellow creatures: “it dawned on me 
that to spend a life in solitude was wrong, for truly, did all my exceedingly profound 
thoughts and strivings of the spirit ever keep one rivet from falling, and is it not writ-
ten that thy first duty is to help thy neighbour and not to tend to thine own salvation” 
(Lem, 2014 [1965], p. 246).
Bonhomius is accompanied by his mentor Klapaucius, a ‘constructor’ with exceptional 
engineering skills. They turn to Gnost, a hesitant supercomputer “able literally to 
contain the Universe itself within its innumerable memory banks” (Lem, 2014 [1965], 
p. 256) and ask him to help them find a way to eliminate misery and bestow happiness 
on everyone. Despite his considerable scepticism – numerous earlier attempts have 
failed miserably – the supercomputer eventually complies and prints them a recipe for 
‘Altruizine’, a drug that triggers profound empathy1 by replicating the emotional states 
of others in one’s vicinity. Its workings are detailed below:
ALTRUIZINE. A metapsychotropic transpitting agent effective for all sentient 
homoproteinates. The drug duplicates in others, within a radius of fifty yards, 
whatever sensations, emotions and mental states one may experience. Operates 
by telepathy, guaranteed however to respect one’s privacy of thought. Has no ef-
fect on either robots or plants. The sender’s feelings are amplified, the original 
signal being relayed back in turn by its receivers and thereby producing resonance, 
which is as a result directly proportional to the number of individuals situated 
in the vicinity. According to its discoverer, ALTRUIZINE will insure the untram-
melled reign of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Compassion in any society, since 
the neighbours of a happy man must share his happiness, and the happier he, the 
happier perforce they, so it is entirely in their own interest that they wish him 
nothing but the best. Should he suffer any hurt, they will rush to help at once, so 
1 A word about concepts here. In the multidisciplinary field of empathy research, the concept of empathy 
is used in a variety of ways, to refer to a range of distinct but related (emotional, motivational, and cog-
nitive) psychological phenomena (Batson, 2009; Decety & Cowell, 2014). Arguably, the kind of empathy 
experienced as a result of Altruizine, resembles what in the literature is termed “emotional contagion”: 
experiencing the feelings of those in your immediate vicinity.
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as to spare themselves the pain induced by his. Neither walls, fences, hedges, nor 
any other obstacle will weaken the altruizing influence. The drug is water-soluble 
and may be administered through reservoirs, rivers, wells and the like. Tasteless 
and odourless. One millimicrogram serves for one hundred thousand individuals. 
We assume no responsibility for results at variance with the discoverer’s claims. 
Supplied by the Gnost. Computerized representative of the Highest Poss. Lev. Devel. 
(Lem, 2014 [1965], pp. 267-268)
Bonhomius sets off to a planet inhabited by humans and diffuses the Altruizine drug. 
Chaos ensues. Overwhelmed by the one-on-one transmission of other peoples’ emo-
tions and sensations, people start to roam around in mob-like hordes and to violently 
attack each other. 
By dawn the Altruizine effect was so strong, that if one nostril itched, the entire 
neighbourhood for a mile on every side would respond with a shattering salvo of 
sneezes; those suffering from chronic migraines were abandoned by their families, 
and doctors and nurses fled in panic when they approached – only a few pale mas-
ochists would hang around them, breathing heavily. And then there were the many 
doubters who slapped or kicked their compatriots, merely to ascertain whether 
there was any truth to this amazing transmission of feelings everyone spoke of, nor 
were these compatriots slow in returning the favour, and soon the entire city rang 
with the sounds of slaps and kicks. (Lem, 2014 [1965], pp. 271-272)
Bonhomius’ and Klapaucius’ honest attempt to bring about a better society by radically 
enhancing people’s empathy, has failed. 
‘Introduction to the introduction’
One could easily dismiss this pessimistic and rather gloomy story about the use of 
a pharmacological agent to increase human empathy as rather farfetched, and an 
interesting thought experiment at best. Nonetheless, one of the most lively and vehe-
mently debated issues in the bioethical literature of the last decade concerns closely 
related proposals. Since 2008, the so-called ‘moral enhancement debate’ asks whether 
we should actively pursue the development of moral enhancement technologies, and 
whether it would be permissible – or even obligatory – to put them to use, provided 
that these interventions would be effective and safe?
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Whereas ‘traditional methods’ of moral betterment (such as upbringing, socialization 
and education) are arguably as old as humanity itself, the debate on moral bioenhance-
ment focuses on the desirability of methods based on novel or emerging biomedical 
insights, or the use of biomedical methods. The debate follows a significant rise in 
fundamental research on the (neuro)biological and genetic underpinnings of human 
(and animal) morality – moral emotions, moral cognition, moral judgment, moral 
behaviour. Potential interventions that are being discussed in the literature on moral 
bioenhancement range from various types of psychopharmaceuticals, neurostimula-
tion, and genetic selection and engineering.
Central topics of debate have been how to understand and define moral enhancement; 
whether (safe and effective) moral enhancement technologies should be mandated; and 
the question whether means matter morally, i.e. whether there are inherent ethical dif-
ferences between biomedical and nonbiomedical means of moral enhancement. Just as 
earlier human enhancement debates (dealing with the ethical desirability of enhancing 
beauty, sports, mood, cognition and memory), the debate on moral enhancement is 
highly polarized. Proponents argue that moral enhancement is our only hope in avert-
ing disaster, while opponents fear that moral enhancement would provoke disaster. 
However, until now, the theoretical debate on moral (bio)enhancement has a strong 
speculative character and mostly precedes and runs ahead of realistic scientific pos-
sibilities. Moreover, to date, the debate risks lacking focus and real world impact, as 
different commentators fail to agree on how to understand and define moral enhance-
ment, and on what kind of examples would constitute cases of moral enhancement. 
This under-examination of potential practices of moral enhancement is significant because 
without specifying intended users, contexts of implementation, and the goals and 
objectives of developing and applying potential biomedical possibilities for optimizing 
morally relevant capacities, it is not clear who should be concerned about this debate. 
At the same time, existing or emerging practices that already contain elements of 
‘moral enhancement’ but as yet lack ethical attention and ethical scrutiny, risk staying 
out of sight. 
In order to address this problem, this thesis focuses on (present and emerging) moral 
enhancement practices, in order to identify ethical issues that are not necessarily part 
of the current debate on moral enhancement. Rather than distinguishing in a blanket 
fashion desirable from undesirable moral enhancement technologies, this thesis intends 
to formulate conditions and ethical requirements for ethically justifiable moral en-
hancement practices.
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Setting the scene: The new sciences of morality and the debate 
on moral bioenhancement
The promises of the new sciences of morality
For the last couple of decades, a growing body of research into the so-called “new 
sciences of morality” studies neurobiological and behavioural genetic models of hu-
man morality (Slaby, 2013; Yoder & Decety, 2017). A plethora of scientific disciplines, 
including social and behavioural neuroscience, biology, evolutionary psychology, ex-
perimental psychology, and primatology, study phenomena moral philosophers have 
examined conceptually for ages.
Primatologists study our evolutionary ancestors, mainly great apes like bonobos and 
chimpanzees, in order to identify potential continuities between these species and 
ours. Frans de Waal for example argues that we can find a kind of “proto-morality” in 
these apes, in the form of empathy, reciprocity, and a sense of fairness that can rightly 
be called he thinks “the building blocks of morality” (de Waal, 1996, 2009; de Waal & 
Sherblom, 2018). 
In the field of evolutionary and cognitive psychology theorists look upon morality as an 
evolutionary adaptation and ask how something morality-like might have been advan-
tageous, that is fitness enhancing, for our ancestors (Katz, 2000; Nichols, 2005; Kitcher, 
2007). Their research gives way to discussions about whether (and if so, how much of ) 
human morality should be considered ‘innate’. Some hypothesize that humans come to 
this world with an innate capacity for moral judgments already in place (Hauser, 2006). 
Others go even further and speculate about specific moral judgments being innate, in 
the form of for example a universal bias against ‘unauthorized killing’ that forms a 
necessary precondition for close knit communities to live and work together.
In the early 2000’s, in various ‘morality labs’, the first neuroscientific experiments 
were set up, aimed at mapping the neural circuits that are involved in moral thinking 
and moral judging and to find perhaps a specialized moral centre in the human brain 
(Damasio, 2000; Greene, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). These experiments 
raised questions about the role played by emotion and cognition in moral judgments, 
and stirred discussions about which of these two should be considered as a more 
decisive factor. Later, attention shifted from trying to uncover “domain-specific moral-
ity”, i.e. identifying brain regions specifically dedicated to morality, to mapping more 
domain-general processes, such as theory of mind (Young & Dungan, 2012).
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In the meantime, a rich landscape of studies on the ‘emerging neurosciences of’ has 
appeared, ranging from the emerging neuroscience of justice motivation and justice 
sensitivity (Decety & Yoder, 2017), empathy (Marsh, 2018), intergroup relations (Cikara 
& Van Bavel, 2014), social decision-making (Yoder & Decety, 2017), violence (Miczek 
et al., 2007), to pro-social behaviour (Yamasue et al., 2012), etc. etc. The same goes 
for (behavioural) genetic studies on for example violence and aggression (Baum, 2013; 
Asherson & Cormand, 2016), and antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy (Vid-
ing et al., 2005; Tracy et al., 2010).
In criminological research a previously improbable interest in biological and social 
underpinnings of antisocial behavior is visible (Raine, 2013, pp. xii-xiii; Glenn & Raine, 
2014). Bio-social criminology stresses the interplay between social and biological fac-
tors: “What is important about this new line of research is that it is not a reification of 
the outdated nature versus nurture debate, but rather an entirely new perspective that 
highlights the dual influences of genetic and environmental factors in the etiology of 
crime and delinquency” (Beaver et al., 2015, p. 109). 
Moreover, these biological, ‘brain-based’ explanations of (im)morality2 have given rise 
to related debates on the relevance of this growing body of knowledge for a variety 
of domains (Blank, 2007; Levitt & Manson, 2007; Mendez, 2009; Zik & Roberts, 2015). 
In the field of ‘Neurolaw’ for example, the meaning and implications of neuroscience 
for the law and legal practices is investigated (Meynen, 2014, p. 819; Morse, 2017). 
Neuroscientific information and techniques are already being used in court (de Kogel & 
Westgeest, 2015). This research has also stirred debate about the question whether in 
the future brain imaging could be used to (aid in) accurately predicting future violence 
and other forms of antisocial behaviour (Poldrack, 2017; Poldrack et al., 2018), and help 
in tailoring treatment to individual needs.
Although single genes only contribute to a small proportion of the overall variance 
in antisocial behaviour, identifying genes that confer risk may aid in the develop-
ment of treatment methods that could potentially be tailored to specific risk factors 
of the individual. In addition, it may improve our understanding of the biological 
pathways that lead to antisocial behaviour. (Glenn et al., 2013, p. 4)
The promises of these new sciences of morality thus go beyond improved understand-
ing of biological underpinnings of morality. As moral (and immoral) behaviour are 
2 In The Anatomy of Violence, Adrian Raine argues that criminals have “broken brains, brains that are physi-
cally different from those of the rest of us” (Raine, 2013, p. 180).
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explained in terms of (disordered) brain functions, commentators have also speculated 
about how insights from neuroscience could benefit conflict resolution and foster 
peace (Bruneau, 2015) or even ways in which potential neurobiological interventions 
could be used to correct potential “social or moral dysfunction”: 
Understanding the functional anatomy of moral judgment and the anatomical and 
functional differences between social and antisocial brains is a prerequisite for 
developing socially and morally acceptable neurosurgical interventions that treat 
social or moral dysfunction. (de Ridder et al., 2009, p. 156)
In short, the new sciences of morality not only add to and challenge previous pre-
dominantly non-biological scientific understandings of human morality (Abend, 2013), 
but go a step further as well, and suggest novel methods to deal with behavioural 
problems, such as pharmacological means, neurostimulation, or even neurosurgical 
interventions as mentioned in the quote above. As Adrian Raine writes in his book 
The Anatomy of Violence: “It’s a bitter pill for many criminologists and psychologists to 
swallow, but medications do work in controlling and regulating aggression in children 
and adolescents” (Raine, 2013, p. 292). Current techniques still fall short however, and 
a range of methodological and ethical challenges remain to be met.
There are of course historical predecessors to these biological approaches to moral and 
immoral behaviour. Felix Schirmann narrates in what ways the moral brain has been 
an object of scientific study before, and the 19th century ways of “thinking of immoral 
persons in terms of disordered brains altered what it means to be immoral. Though 
contested, the immoral persons discussed were conceived of as viable objects for brain 
science, psychiatry and medicine: their misdoings were observed on a behavioral level, 
their actions were evaluated with ethical standards and they were punished according 
to the law. Observation, evaluation and reprimand were part of the social purview, 
yet the respective experts sought the causes for their misconduct in their neurobiol-
ogy.” (Schirmann, 2013a, p. 43; 2013b) Notorious is the identification of ‘human types’, 
among which ‘the born criminal’, by the Italian physician and anthropologist Cesare 
Lombroso, whose ideas were influential in the first half of the twentieth century (for 
example in the eugenics movement). During the second half of the twentieth century, 
biological explanations for criminal or immoral behaviour were strongly resisted. 
For instance, in The Netherlands, professor in criminology Wouter Buikhuisen was 
deterred from doing research on biological features of criminals, next to social factors 
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(Berkvens, 2009; de Haan, 2009; Oosterhuis, 2014).3 Now, however, renewed attention 
for genetic and biological risk factors for criminality has emerged.
Interest in the neuroscience of morality has not been confined to the academic world, 
but has attracted considerable interest from the general public and from policy makers 
as well. Popular science books abound, both about the moral (Hauser, 2006; Church-
land, 2011) and the immoral brain (Fallon, 2013; Raine, 2013), and about empathy or 
lack thereof (Baron-Cohen, 2011). Fascination with psychopathic or criminal genes and 
brains is reflected in considerable attention in the media (Kahn, 2012; Dennett, 2013; 
Frentz et al., 2015; Levy, 2015a; Hagerty, 2017), although resistance to the advance of 
so-called ‘brain culture’ is visible as well (Dehue, 2011; Bloemink, 2013; Dehue, 2014; 
de Vrieze, 2017; Koelewijn, 2017).
Also here, attention goes beyond fascination with biological explanations of moral and 
immoral behaviour, and the question is asked whether we can put this new knowledge 
about the underpinnings of human moral and immoral behaviour to good use. For 
example, can we teach people (e.g. our children, or medical doctors) to have more 
empathy (Boodman, 2015; Krznaric, 2015; Eerkens, 2017), for example by using virtual 
reality (Polak, 2015; Berdik, 2017)? Or, one step further, by means of a simple pill? 
Plentiful op-eds about the desirability of so-called ‘morality pills’ have been published 
(Kahane, 2011; Singer & Sagan, 2012; Crockett, 2014b; Levy, 2015b; Dubljevic´, 2017; 
Mandelbaum, 2017; Rampton, 2017; Tremonti, 2017) and on various online forums 
people have been discussing the possibility and desirability of developing, propagating, 
and using such pills (Pellissier, 2012; Aeon, 2015).4
3 “by the 1970s it became sociological common sense that fatalism, determinism, reductionism, sexism 
– a naturalization and legitimation of existing relations of power – would follow inescapably from any 
engagement with the reality of human biology – as either an ontological question – what were humans 
really like? – or as an epistemological one – what can biology tell us about the forms of life that humans 
have made for themselves? Human biology was relevant only in that it provided the preconditions 
for language, meaning and culture, whose form and content must be accounted for in non-biological 
terms.” (Rose, 2013, p. 10)
4 Fascination with potential ways to improve people morally, including taking a pill, is evident in the 
television series The Good Place as well (Goddard et al., 2016). In one of the first episodes, protagonist 
Eleanor Shellstrop needs a quick and dirty way to improve herself morally in order to extend her place 
in The Good Place: “It is time to make me good, partner! How do we do it? Is there a pill I could take, or 
something I could vape?” But instead of giving her a pill her partner Chidi, a former professor of moral 
philosophy, decides to teach her philosophy as a means to become a better person. 
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The bioethical debate on moral enhancement
In the current academic debate on moral bioenhancement it has been suggested that 
biomedical interventions will aid in solving a number of pressing societal issues, such 
as crime and violence, or will aid in solving climate change - either by enhancing pro-
social tendencies and emotions or by inhibiting anti-social tendencies and emotions. 
The debate started in 2008, with the publication of two articles advocating moral en-
hancement in the Journal of Applied Ethics (Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2008).5
In his first paper on moral enhancement, Thomas Douglas main intention is to de-
bunk what he calls the Bioconservative Thesis (Douglas, 2008). It posits that “Even if 
it were technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical 
enhancement, it would not be morally permissible for them to do so” (Douglas, 2008, 
pp. 228-229), because, the bioconservative argument goes, although the enhancement 
might be good for the individual, it might be bad for others. Douglas then presents 
moral enhancement as a type of enhancement that is not necessarily disadvantageous 
for others, and can even benefit others (and not necessarily yourself ). A good target for 
moral enhancement according to Douglas, are the “counter-moral emotions”: 
I have in mind those emotions which may interfere with all of the putative good 
motives (moral emotions, reasoning processes, and combinations thereof ) and/or 
which are themselves uncontroversially bad motives. Attenuating such emotions 
would plausibly leave a person with better future motives, taken in sum. (Douglas, 
2008, p. 231)
The central question Douglas poses is whether it would be ethically permissible for 
individuals to morally enhance themselves. 
In a book and in a series of articles, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued 
that there is an urgent need to explore the possibility of using the emerging science of 
morality to develop means to improve - enhance - moral dispositions (Ingmar Persson & 
Savulescu, 2008, 2012; Savulescu & Persson, 2012). Later they synthesized these ideas in 
a book: Unfit for the Future: The need for Moral Enhancement (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2012). They argue that people’s moral capacities are essentially ‘flawed’, and that there 
5 During the course of this research project, the amount of journal articles, books, academic conferences, 
and media attention for moral enhancement has risen significantly. A systematic literature review we 
performed at the beginning of this project (up until April 2014) yielded 85 academic articles discuss-
ing moral (bio)enhancement (see chapter 2). The amount of publications on moral enhancement now 
(spring 2018) is nearing 300.
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exists a fundamental mismatch between our moral psychology and today’s conditions 
of human life (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2013). In addition there is, they posit, a 
considerable and growing potential for “a significant improvement of various aspects 
of human cognition by biomedical means”, the risk that a small but potent minority 
will acquire the power to do great harm, grows (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008). To 
counter this risk, they argue, “cognitive enhancement would have to be accompanied 
by a moral enhancement which extends to all of us, since such moral enhancement 
could reduce malevolence” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 166). An extensive 
moral enhancement of humankind, in conclusion, is our only hope in averting “ulti-
mate harm.”6 
They ask whether we could, through our knowledge of “the new sciences of behavioural 
control”, strategically influence people’s moral dispositions and behaviour (Savulescu 
& Persson, 2012), and discuss a range of lines of research that they feel could provide 
new and effective means of influencing human choices, such as priming (affecting 
choice by unconscious stimuli) and nudging (influencing individual choice by changing 
the choice architecture of the environment). In addition, they discuss how a series of 
currently used pharmacological substances may be used to affect moral behaviour as 
a side effect. 
Persson and Savulescu have defended mandatory programs if people fail to morall 
enhance themselves voluntarily:
If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe 
that their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since 
those who should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. (Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 174; 2011see also: ; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 
2014b; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2016)
More recently, they have argued that people even have a moral duty to morally enhance 
themselves (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2017).
The God Machine
In a thought experiment not much different from Lem’s futuristic story about Altruizine 
this chapter started with, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson entertain the idea of 
6 The concept of Ultimate Harm reminds of research on so-called existential risks (or x-risks); risks that 
could lead to human extinction or civilizational collapse (Bostrom, 2013), studied for example in the 
University of Cambridge based Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (https://www.cser.ac.uk/).
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an all-powerful, self-learning, self-developing bioquantum supercomputer, named The 
God Machine that would intervene in human action to prevent “great harm, injustice 
or other deeply immoral behaviour from occurring” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012, p. 
413):
The God Machine would monitor the thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions of 
every human being. It was capable of modifying these within nanoseconds, without 
the conscious recognition by any human subjects. (Savulescu & Persson, 2012, pp. 
412-413)
Without the person involved being consciously aware, the God Machine would ‘change 
his mind’, for example by altering his intention to murder an innocent person. The 
machine is designed to ensure maximum individual freedom, Savulescu and Persson 
maintain: people’s choices to do the morally right thing remain fully autonomous. 
It is only when a person is about to act in a clearly immoral way that the machine 
intervenes. Yet, the person in question would never be aware if the intervention, and 
as such she would still experience a life of complete freedom. 
Would this God Machine be a bad idea, Savulescu and Persson ask, and, why would 
it be? The God Machine now makes impossible what in ‘the old days’ was prohibited 
by law, on pain of punishment. People are not free to murder now. Surely this small 
infringement of a person’s autonomous choice is preferable to physical incarceration, 
or worse? 
The primary purpose of this thought experiment has been to counter an objection by 
one of moral enhancement most outspoken critics, philosopher and bioethicist John 
Harris. He reasons that moral bioenhancement forms a fundamental threat to human 
freedom and autonomy, in particular to what he has called “the freedom to fall”, the 
ability to choose based on reason and argument, and the ability to make an ethical choice 
(Harris, 2011, 2013a, 2014):
Ethics is for those occasions on which altruism fails; or for those people who fail to 
think and feel, and/or who are not disposed to do as they should! Moral reasoning 
is needed to identify the appropriate objects for sympathy, empathy and the sort 
of generalized love that is the conclusion of a moral argument and which is often 
expressed as ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’. We will, I believe, always need to use 
moral reasoning to act as a guide to our emotions and as a way of checking that we 
are having appropriate feelings in appropriate circumstances and for appropriate 
objects. (Harris, 2013a, p. 171)
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Michael Hauskeller’s critique on the God Machine focuses on the aspect of external 
manipulation and control the God Machine impersonates. 
We treasure human freedom, not the metaphysical one that very likely is a mere illu-
sion, but the social, relational one. It defines what we are, our very humanity. From 
that perspective even the God machine poses a threat because the problem would 
still be that we are being controlled by a machine that has been designed with the 
explicit goal of controlling us. Whether we are actually aware of the manipulation 
or not is not relevant, or is not the main problem. The main problem is the fact that 
we are being controlled by, per definition, somebody else’s will, and the fact that 
the purpose of our being controlled is that we conform to certain moral standards 
does not make it any better, but rather the contrary, because instead of being ends 
in ourselves, we thereby become means to the end of morality, which ultimately 
makes morality itself pointless because we no longer have a good reason to treat 
each other as ends if we are in fact nothing but means. (Hauskeller, 2017, p. 375)
The difficulty of defining moral enhancement
From the beginning, the debate on moral enhancement has been characterized by 
profound disagreements about the way the concept of moral enhancement should be 
defined. An exchange between neuroscientist Molly Crockett and ethicists John Harris 
and Sarah Chan can serve as an example (Crockett et al., 2010a, 2010b; Harris & Chan, 
2010; Chan & Harris, 2011). According to Crockett et al., enhancing the neurotransmit-
ter serotonin in the brain influences moral judgment and moral/pro-social behaviour, 
as their study shows that it diminishes the willingness to harm another person; it 
increases harm aversion: “our subjects were less likely to endorse personal moral harms 
and less likely to punish unfairness in the UG [Ultimatum Game]” (Crockett et al., 
2010b, p. 17436). John Harris and Sarah Chan present an opposing view, and argue that 
serotonin seems to preclude and cloud moral judgment, rather than improving it.7 
7 Harris Wiseman makes a similar point, mentioning both hesitations about the safety and efficacy of us-
ing SSRI’s as a moral enhancement intervention, and concerns about whether SSRI’s are “worthy of the 
name” of moral enhancement: “It is hard to imagine a serious moral outlook that can equate chemically 
induced pacification of behavior with a genuine moral improvement of the individual in question. Add 
to this that SSRIs cannot be made to work in a contextual fashion, as they are “all-or-nothing,” brute 
agents that require periods of building up and tapering off, and that the only justifiable “populations” 
they might be effective in treating, assuming no abreaction occurs, are those with more serious mental 
health issues, in which case, it is more likely that stronger antipsychotics or sedatives will be used 
rather than SSRIs.” (Wiseman, 2014b, p. 27).
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It is not clear that ‘enhancing aversion to personally harming others’ is something 
that would promote either moral behaviour in the public at large or indeed, harm 
reduction more generally, unless it was capable of much more nuanced effects 
than seems evident from the reported research. Thus, if serotonin affects moral 
behaviour, it does so adversely by impairing moral judgment, subjugating it to 
emotional instinct. We should be wary of assertions claiming that serotonin has a 
role in moral judgment; the opposite seems to be the case. It may enhance aversion 
to violence, but it does not enhance moral behaviour; it can increase, rather than 
diminish, harm to others and bypass the use of moral reasoning. (Harris & Chan, 
2010, p. E183) 
Underlying these disputes often lie profound philosophical battles about what con-
stitutes morality. Harris believes that true moral growth can be achieved through 
cognitive means, by employing reason; he is a rationalist (Baertschi, 2014). Directly 
manipulating moral emotions, as advocated by for example Douglas (Douglas, 2008, 
2013), would according to Harris lead to moral decline, not moral growth. 
Although both emotion and reasoning thus affect moral decisions, of the two, it 
must be reasoning that pulls in the direction of morality. A moral agent is not just 
someone who performs actions with moral consequences, she is a person who cares 
about doing the right thing. Such a person must have a way of deciding whether 
what her emotions prompt her to do, what strikes her as the right thing to do, 
really is the right thing to do. She will need to think things through, identify the 
relevant principles she accepts, the values she holds and the moral objectives she 
believes are right, and apply them to the present circumstances; and to do this she 
must use moral reasoning. (Chan & Harris, 2011, p. 130)
Taxonomy of definitions of moral enhancement, and their normative 
implications
In the following quotes, John Shook calls attention to the wide variety of definitions 
given:
Too many discussions are proceeding as if both the meaning and the possibility of 
moral enhancement were already widely understood and agreed upon. (…) Asking 
such questions, and offering answers, depend on assigning some sense or another 
to “moral enhancement.” However, clear and precise definitions of “moral enhance-
ment” are not to be found; what has been called “moral” enhancement ranges 
from feeling empathic concern to increasing personal responsibility all the way to 
heightening respect for global fairness. (Shook, 2012, p. 3)
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And:
anyone using the term ‘moral enhancement’ as if everyone knows what is meant 
must either be simplifying matters to the point of negligence, or trying to speak 
only to those already in local moral consensus. (Shook, 2012, p. 4)
We identified different definitions of moral (bio)enhancement that have been given 
in the literature, and developed a taxonomy of different definitions and uses of the 
concept of moral (bio)enhancement as well as their normative implications (Raus et 
al., 2014).8
Some commentators provide a specific definition of moral enhancement. Thomas 
Douglas for example defines moral enhancement as:
interventions that will expectably leave an individual with more moral (viz. morally 
better) motives or behaviour than she would otherwise have had. (Douglas, 2008, 
p. 229)
Other commentators do not offer such an explicit definition, and for the purpose of 
this taxonomy we therefore had to reconstruct the way the concept was used by the 
different authors. 
Focus on the intervention or on the individual
The first distinction concerns different interpretations of the question what is moral 
enhancement? Whereas some definitions focus on the intended effect of a particular 
intervention or technology (i.e., “interventions that are intended to improve our moral 
capacities such as our capacities for sympathy and fairness” (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 361)), 
other definitions focus on questions about when an individual can be considered to 
have been morally enhanced, or what it means to say that an individual is morally 
enhanced. James Hughes for example argues that moral enhancement goes beyond 
“the jacking up of virtue with neurochemicals”, but that it should be conceived more 
broadly, in terms of “taking conscious control of our lives to build the kind of character 
we want to have” (Hughes, 2011).
8 This paragraph draws on a paper by Kasper Raus et al., of which I am a co-author: Raus, K., Focquaert, 
F., Schermer, M. H. N., Specker, J., & Sterckx, S. (2014). On defining moral enhancement: A clarifica-
tory taxonomy. Neuroethics, 7(3), 263-273. When discussing the different definitions and uses of moral 
enhancement in this paragraph, ‘we’ refers to the authors of this paper.
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Broad versus more specific interventional means
Another relevant distinction we found concerns broad versus more specific definitions. 
Some authors prefer a more restrictive definition of moral enhancement that focuses 
on biomedical and genetic means only. These authors also tend to prefer the concept 
of moral bio-enhancement or genetic virtue (Walker, 2009, 2010). Others include any 
practice that brings about – or intends to bring about – positive changes in a person’s 
moral capacities, including practices such as (moral) education and (talk) therapy. 
Because genetic and biomedical interventions (for example pharmaceutically or by 
means of (deep) brain stimulation) are generally considered more invasive and more 
precarious than non-biomedical ones, it might be expected that using “the concept of 
moral enhancement for all interventions or only for those interventions that are (most) 
invasive, can serve to bias the normative debate towards or away from a conclusion of 
permissibility or desirability” (Raus et al., 2014, p. 265).
Enhancing individuals versus enhancing humanity
A further way in which definitions of moral enhancement differ, is based on the 
question who is considered the target of moral enhancement: individuals, or groups 
of persons? Thomas Douglas, especially in his earlier work on moral enhancement, 
explicitly focuses on individual persons, as illustrated by the previously mentioned 
definition. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu on the other hand, have advocated 
enhancing “the moral character of humanity” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008), and 
have defended mandatory moral enhancement programs, aimed specifically at those 
most in need of moral improvement. As we argued in the taxonomy, these definitions 
have profound normative implications. For justifying moral enhancement applied 
solely to individuals, justifications related to autonomy and personal benefit might 
suffice. However, in justifying moral enhancement on a societal level one would need 
to turn to other justifications such as issues of justice or of achieving a common good. 
Moreover, concerns about altering human nature would then come into view as well.
Moral treatment versus moral enhancement
A further distinction concerns the distinction between moral treatment and moral 
enhancement. Whereas some definitions understand moral enhancement to be any 
form of moral improvement, regardless of whether a person’s moral functioning 
before enhancement could be considered below average, average, or above average; 
other definitions clearly damarcate bringing people to an average or ‘normal’ level 
of moral functioning from enhancing beyond the average level. Improving towards 
average would be considered moral treatment, improving beyond average would be 
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considered enhancement.9 Yet, defining moral normalcy raises questions. As there is no 
objective way of determining what falls within the range of ‘normal’ moral behaviour 
or functioning of moral capacities, every classification is, necessarily, a normative one. 
John Shook and James Giordano have proposed an alternative classification between 
“moral (re)habilitation” (instilling or restoring some degree of moral capacity and re-
sponsibility in someone); “moral normalization” (an improvement of already-existing 
moral capacity towards society’s standard of good moral conduct); and “surpassing 
enhancement” (improvement above regular requirements of common morality) (Shook 
& Giordano, 2016b, 2016a, 2017).
Intended versus effective interventions
A further difference concerns definitions that focus on either the intention to enhance 
versus interventions that actually have a positive effect. John Harris for example under-
stands moral enhancement interventions to be those interventions that have an actual 
effect: “I do not define enhancements in terms of the intention or the motivation of 
those who produce them but rather in terms of their effect” (Harris, 2014, p. 372). On 
the other hand, the definition by Douglas given above, and the definition by David 
include intended or expected but failed interventions (Douglas, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014):
Interventions that are intended to improve our moral capacities such as our capaci-
ties for sympathy and fairness. (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 361) 
For them, what is important in determining whether an intervention is to be consid-
ered a moral enhancement is the intention with which the intervention is used, not its 
actual effect. This distinction between intended and actual effect is relevant for morally 
justifying moral enhancement. Because if an intervention can only be labelled a moral 
enhancement if it has a positive effect, then one important reason to oppose moral 
enhancement is eliminated. All problematic cases where no enhancement is reached 
or a person is left less moral than before the intervention, would not be considered 
cases of moral enhancement at all. A consequence of this way of justifying moral 
enhancement is that it would avoid debate concerning potential risks and side-effects 
of interventions. 
9 As Dorothee Horstkotter and colleagues argue: “if there is a health problem, medical treatment is 
the reasonable reaction, while enhancement, either moral or otherwise, does not arise.” (Horstkötter, 
Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012)
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Capacities-oriented versus behaviour-oriented interventions
Some commentators in the moral enhancement debate label a certain intervention a 
moral enhancement depending on its (real or intended) effect on a person’s behaviour. 
Others see moral enhancements as interventions that target or are intended to target a 
person’s capacities of moral reflection. In the taxonomy, we have referred to this difference 
as the difference between a behaviour-oriented and a capacities-oriented intervention.
If moral enhancement interventions can target a person’s behaviour or their capacities 
of moral reflection, any intervention can have one of four results. It can result in a 
person (1) reflecting the same, and acting the same; (2) reflecting the same, but acting 
differently; (3) reflecting differently, but acting the same; and (4) reflecting differently, 
and acting differently. Definitions of moral enhancement differ as to the question 
which of these should be considered cases of moral enhancement. In identifying which 
interventions can be labelled moral enhancements, some commentators rely heavily 
or solely on the intervention’s achieved (or intended) effect on a person’s behaviour 
[e.g. (Douglas, 2013)]. For those commentators, moral enhancement occurs only when 
a person, because of an intervention, acts differently. According to them, if a person 
reflects differently, but acts the same because of an intervention, this should not be 
considered a case of moral enhancement. A range of other authors do not think that 
the requirement for successful behaviour change suffices to label an intervention a 
moral enhancement, and instead categorise them as a form of behaviour control (e.g. 
Harris) or moral therapy (e.g. Agar):
I take moral enhancement to involve enhancing our ability to think ethically (...), 
not manipulating the probability of some reacting in ways that others deem ethical. 
(Harris, 2014, p. 373)
While the manipulation of moral emotions might change the behaviour of an 
individual, it does not provide any content, for example, norms or values to guide 
one’s behavioural response. (Jotterand, 2011, p. 6)
(i) forcing agents to act rightly, (ii) preventing agents from acting wrongly, and (iii) 
making it harder for moral agents to act wrongly fail to constitute genuine moral 
enhancement. (Simkulet, 2012, p. 17)
For these commentators, as well as for those who use similar lines of argumentation 
(e.g. (Lev, 2012; Baertschi, 2014)), the criterion for whether an intervention constitutes 
a moral enhancement is not (only) behaviour, but rather whether the intervention 
(also) affects or improves an individual’s capacities for moral reflection. In the quote 
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below, Harris appears to embrace the most ambitious and restrictive definition of 
moral enhancement; acting differently and reflecting differently:
It seems to me that moral enhancement, properly so called, must not only make 
the doing of good or right actions more probable and the doing of bad ones less 
likely, but must also include the understanding of what constitutes right and wrong 
action. (Harris, 2014, p. 172)
Active involvement versus passive receiving
A final distinction is that between a process of moral enhancement in which the indi-
vidual is actively involved, versus a process in which the person is a passive recipient. 
This distinction does not concern the target of a moral enhancement, but rather the way 
in which the enhancement is achieved. A moral enhancement by way of active involvement 
would then be an enhancement requiring conscious mental processes in the subject as 
a means to achieve its result. Moral education would be a classical example. In contrast, 
moral enhancement involving passive receiving would either be enhancement in an 
immediate way where no active involvement was possible (e.g. a pill with immediate 
effect) or enhancement by way of a process that required no deliberate involvement of 
the recipient (e.g. classical conditioning). 
This distinction is relevant since, for some authors, the goal of moral enhancement is 
for individuals to become more virtuous, and often these authors follow Aristotle in 
claiming that becoming virtuous is always a conscious and deliberate process, where 
the way to becoming virtuous is just as essential as the result (being virtuous). Chris 
Zarpantine talks about “the thorny and arduous path of moral progress” (Zarpentine, 
2013, p. 141), while Jotterand states:
Virtue is a behavioral habit under the supervision of reason that can be taught and 
learned. The control and manipulation of moral emotions by technological means 
reduce the human mind to neurochemical processes and threaten the very essence 
of moral agency, that is, autonomy. (Jotterand, 2011, p. 7)
The distinction is used to argue for the idea that the means by which moral enhance-
ment is achieved matter morally (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015). Interventions where the 
individual is passive (more likely in the case of interventions that work directly on the 
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brain), Focquaert and Schermer argue, are more likely to compromise autonomy and 
disrupt identity than interventions in which the individual is an active participant.10
Conclusion: Definitions are not normatively neutral
As discussed above, definitions of moral enhancement vary widely – Harris Wiseman 
speaks of the “tremendous plurality the term conceals” (Wiseman, 2017, p. 398) – and 
have important normative implications. The chosen definition conveys which practices 
an author considers more or less ethically desirably. Moreover, the concept of moral 
enhancement sometimes appears to assume that improving a person’s morality is un-
problematically good – why else would it be called moral enhancement? Finally, as the 
sciences of morality are evolving, it is not yet clear what will be possible in the future, 
what kind of moral enhancement technologies will be developed, and how people will 
react to and interact with them. 
Therefore, to a certain extent, this thesis takes the moral enhancement debate itself as 
the main unit of investigation. It asks in what ways the concept of moral enhancement 
is used, what kind of reasons participants in this debate have given for or against its 
desirability, what kind of interventions they have proposed, and what kind of problems 
they think it will solve. To be able to analyse these aspects, it is unhelpful to have a 
pre-defined notion of what ‘moral enhancement’ is or should be.
In this thesis the concept of moral enhancement is used to refer to attempts to influ-
ence, change, or optimize moral capacities, and limit immoral capacities, with the 
aim of changing a person’s moral emotions, moral reasoning, or moral behavior. 
This includes instances where someone (e.g. a practitioner or policy maker) discusses 
or implements interventions that have an effect on a person’s moral capacities, but 
that person does not necessarily discuss those interventions in explicitly moral terms. 
Finally, this working definition is not limited to biomedical interventions but also 
includes nonbiomedical, traditional means.
This thesis: Commitment to practices
With the ambition of counterbalancing the highly polarized debate and offering a 
more nuanced vision of what moral enhancement entails, this thesis focuses on (pres-
ent and emerging) moral enhancement practices. The ultimate goal of doing so is to 
10 Whether means matter morally has been a topic of intense debate (see chapter 2 and 6). See also Reich-
lin (Reichlin, 2017), and Bublitz (Bublitz & Merkel, 2014; Bublitz, 2015, 2016).
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identify ethical issues that are not necessarily part of the current debate on moral 
enhancement. 
Similarly, Harris Wiseman has advocated a ‘practical-realities first’ approach to po-
tential moral bioenhancement interventions, implying that speculation about moral 
bioenhancement should account for “the specific practical realities to be found on 
the ground level, which are not at all incidental but the very realities around which 
the abstractions of the debate must be made to shape themselves (not the other way 
around)” (Wiseman, 2016, p. 13). A focus on practices can function as a correction to 
overly wild11 scenarios, and at the same time call attention to practices where elements 
of stimulating moral betterment are visible. Much of what is being discussed is not 
possible yet, if ever (bringing some authors to question whether moral enhancement 
should be considered science fiction, rather than science fact (Dubljevic´, 2017; Du-
bljevic´ & Racine, 2017)).12
Arguably, in previous enhancement debates, one of the central ethical questions 
concerned the desirability of expanding upon current, therapeutic interventions or 
practices, and to use them “beyond therapy” (Kass, 2003) or to go “beyond what is 
necessary to sustain or restore good health” (Juengst, 1998, p. 29). The quite extensive 
literature about the desirability of the non-medical use of prescription drugs meant to 
treat ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) can serve as an example (Greely 
et al., 2008; Schermer, 2014). In the case of moral enhancement, it is often far less 
clear what that current practice is, and in what way the proposals made would impact 
11 There is no straightforward answer to the question on how to decide whether a certain scenario should 
indeed be considered overly wild, or, alternatively, represents an important thought experiment. Argu-
ably, imagination is key for scientific discovery (de Mey, 2006) and ethical analysis alike. At the same 
time, an important normative function of thought experiments might be to stimulate imagining of 
“possible usages and desirabilities” (van de Werff et al., 2016, p. 98) in order to expose and elucidate 
relevant ethical issues. An overly wild or speculative scenario arguably “violates conditions of intel-
ligibility, squanders the scarce and valuable resource of ethical concern, and misleads by casting remote 
possibilities or philosophical thought-experiments as foresight about likely technical developments. In 
effect, it deflects consideration from the transformative technologies of the present” (Nordmann, 2007, 
p. 31, and see chapter 3). Björn Hofmann proposes to introduce a so-called hype test, which reads as 
follows: “What is special with this technology (e.g., gene editing), compared to existing methods, that makes it succeed 
in improving human social characteristics to make the world a better place for all?” (Hofmann, 2018).
12 As Stephan Schleim argues: “notwithstanding the influences of neuro-collaborations and related funding 
schemes within academia, we scholars indeed collectively overestimate the practical and translational 
social impact of this research so far. The communicated promises as well as the scholarly and public 
attention given to these possibilities are, in my view, in no way justified by the scientific possibilities” 
(Schleim, 2014, p. 3), also see (Crockett, 2014b).
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on that practice. Oftentimes, what an author considers relevant practices remains 
implicit, or is discussed in very general terms only. 
For example, one domain that is often implied, but not made explicit, is the field of 
forensic psychiatry. Participants in the moral enhancement debate have discussed the 
use of neuro-interventions for offenders or forensic patients who are suffering from 
various cognitive, motivational and emotional impairments as examples of moral en-
hancement. As such impairments may involve risk factors for various kinds of immoral 
behaviour (e.g., sexual crimes, violence, and racism), proponents argue that moral bio-
enhancement could provide new ways to achieve successful recidivism reduction and 
rehabilitation (Douglas, 2008; S. Carter, 2016). 
However, the diversity of definitions of moral enhancement that are available suggests 
that not everyone will agree that psychiatric treatments that address neurobiological 
risk factors for deviant behaviour should be understood as proper instances of moral 
enhancement (Raus et al., 2014; Reichlin, 2017). Nonetheless, outspoken proponents of 
moral bioenhancement Persson and Savulescu have argued that a number of psychiat-
ric disorders can be characterized as “moral defects”, and therefore, that treating these 
disorders should indeed be understood as moral enhancement (Savulescu & Persson, 
2012). 
The opposite of promoting another’s interests is damaging another’s interests. 
Traits which increase harm to others cause immoral behaviour. The paradigm is 
psychopathic personality disorder, but other personality disorders such as antisocial 
personality disorders, borderline personality disorder and narcissistic personality 
disorder can cause great harm to those who come into contact with these individu-
als. The reduction in these tendencies are thus moral enhancements. (Savulescu & 
Persson, 2012, p. 410)
Likewise, DeGrazia has characterized the treatment (or prevention) of antisocial 
personality disorder as a uncontroversial example of moral enhancement (DeGrazia, 
2014), and Douglas has discussed institutions of criminal justice as institutions that are 
arguably “already engaged in a kind of moral enhancement” (Douglas, 2014c, p. 1245). 
To conclude, intended users, contexts of implementation, and the goals and objectives 
of developing and applying potential biomedical possibilities for moral improvement 
are often not specified. In order to expose and elucidate relevant ethical issues con-
cerning moral enhancement, as well as to formulate ethical requirements, this thesis 
focuses on potential practices of moral enhancement.
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The following questions have been guiding my research: 
1. What is the debate on moral bioenhancement about?
 a.  What do participants in this debate understand moral bioenhancement to be? 
How do they define and demarcate moral bioenhancement?
 b.  What is the rationale proponents give for the need for moral bioenhancement 
and what are the main ethical arguments given for and against moral bioen-
hancement?
 c.  What ethical issues are most prominent in the debate? 
2. What is a sensible way to approach the question of the ethical desirability of moral 
bioenhancement?
 a.  From where should normative analysis start?
 b.  For which professional practices and for whom is the debate on moral bioen-
hancement relevant? Who should care about/ participate in the debate?
 c.  Can a focus on potential practices of moral enhancement help identify ethical 
issues that are relevant, but left out or under examined in the debate so far?
3. What are conditions and ethical requirements for ethically justifiable moral en-
hancement practices?
Methodology
In order to answer these research questions, in this thesis, a variety of research methods 
is employed. In order to get a better grasp of potential practices of moral enhancement, 
in this thesis I have employed a mixed methods approach, making use of empirical re-
search methods such as qualitative interviews and vignette studies, as well as of more 
traditional philosophical methods such as conceptual and argumentative analysis. 
In his book Experiments in ethics Kwame Anthony Appiah warns against considering 
anything experimental as alien to philosophy (Appiah, 2008). Philosophy nowadays is 
mostly defined in terms of what it is not – psychology, physics, anthropology. Appiah 
argues against this crude and a-historical view on what philosophizing consists of, and 
consisted of in the past: the cliché of a separate group of ‘professional thinkers’ that 
look down on anything not purely theoretical and “confined themselves to the realm 
of unsullied abstraction” (Appiah, 2008, p. 9). Doing so misrepresents the interests and 
fascinations of many of the canonical philosophers: “what’s novel isn’t the experimen-
tal turn; what’s novel was the turn away from it” (Appiah, 2008, p. 6).
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Also (bio)ethics has witnessed what has been called “an empirical turn” (Hope, 1999; 
Molewijk et al., 2004; Sugarman, 2004; Borry et al., 2005), indicating that increasingly 
normative analysis is being supplemented with empirical input, as well as the working 
together of more empirical and more philosophical oriented researchers. A recent sys-
tematic review of methodologies used in bioethical research demonstrates a striking 
heterogeneity of methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative (Davies et al., 2015). 
There is an extensive literature discussing the benefits and downsides of integrating 
empirical research with normative analysis and appropriate ways of doing so. Strong et 
al. list a range of familiar advantages of incorporating empirical research in bioethics, 
next to philosophical reasoning (Strong et al., 2010). The strength of empirical research 
in bioethics, they write, is that it allows for:
The description of the experience of individuals or populations with respect to 
morally relevant issues; the description of the attitudes, beliefs, moral opinions, 
reasoning patterns and decision-making of those involved in a certain practice; the 
generation of data which can challenge authority, dogma, convention, norms and 
experience by showing how practice varies; and the identification of moral issues 
that have escaped the attention of ethicists, but are relevant in a specific context, 
including those that are not obvious because they are embedded in practice. (Strong 
et al., 2010, p. 318)
Central challenges concern both the empirical methodology, and the integration of 
empirical and normative research. With regards to methodology, it can be questioned 
what kind of empirical information is most useful – the opinions, arguments or 
expressed moral views of various stakeholders, or perhaps rather their actual moral 
actions and decisions? And which stakeholders should be included? Moreover, what are 
the best ways to collect data on stakeholders’ moral views: open interviews, question-
naires, focusgroups, or vignettes? As regards the integration of empirical data in moral 
reasoning a number of models have been proposed, such as “integrated empirical 
ethics” (Molewijk et al., 2004), “broad reflective equilibrium” (van Thiel & van Delden, 
2010), “reflexive balancing” (Ives, 2014), and “symbiotic empirical ethics” (Frith, 2012), 
just to name a few.
In my opinion, the most challenging issue concerns the question what type of norma-
tive claim or conclusion one can generate through conducting or studying empirical 
research. Davies et al. distinguish two “poles of methodological orientation”, one 
dialogical, the other consultative (Davies et al., 2015). In dialogical approaches “the ethi-
cal analysis and reaching of a normative conclusion is part of the research encounter 
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itself” (Davies et al., 2015, p. 8), whereas in consultative approaches ethical analysis is 
“undertaken post-engagement, by the researcher or the research team. (…) stakehold-
ers feed into the ethical analysis, but are not involved in it directly” (Davies et al., 2015, 
p. 9). The approach to empirical data generated in the context of this thesis is mostly 
consultative in nature. 
A review from 2012 maps empirical research on human enhancement specifically 
(Schuijff & Munnichs, 2012). Empirical studies on enhancement employ a diversity of 
methodologies, ranging from more quantitatively to qualitatively oriented, and mostly 
focus on studying public attitudes and preferences. The authors argue that empirical 
research, and research on public opinion specifically, can enrich the largely expert-
only debate on human enhancement (Dijkstra & Schuijff, 2015). Because, they argue, 
consulting the public may aid in better understanding what shapes public preferences, 
and this may help in policy making. Ethical analysis of potential practices of moral 
enhancement indeed needs to include and account for views of relevant stakeholders 
such as potential users, potential medical professionals or ‘operators’, policy makers, 
and the general public. Indeed; “the question of moral bioenhancement is a paradig-
matic instance in which understanding public attitudes is critical” (Reiner, 2013, 2017).
Outline of this thesis
Chapter 2 contains a systematic clustering of ethical arguments that emerge in the 
moral enhancement debate (based on a systematic search of the literature). Each argu-
ment is discussed separately, and the debate as a whole is assessed. It is concluded, 
first, that there is little discussion on what distinguishes moral bioenhancement from 
treatment of pathological deficiencies. Furthermore, remarkably little attention has 
been paid so far to the safety, risks and side-effects of moral enhancement, including 
the risk of identity changes. Finally, many authors overestimate the scientific as well 
as the practical feasibility of the interventions they discuss, rendering the debate too 
speculative.
Chapter 3 discusses a number of contexts or domains in which (future) moral bio-
enhancement interventions possibly or most likely will be implemented. By looking 
closely at similar or related existing practices and their relevant ethical frameworks, 
we identify ethical considerations that are relevant for evaluating potential moral 
bioenhancement interventions. Domains that are examined are, first, debates on the 
proper scope of moral education; second, proposals for identifying early risk factors 
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for antisocial behaviour, and third, the difficult balancing of the best interests of the 
individual and third party concerns in (forensic) psychiatry.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 report on a series of interviews with forensic practitioners 
on the prospects, threats, and limitations of integrating neurobiological and behav-
ioural genetic interventions in forensic psychiatric practices. Forensic practitioners 
were interviewed about their expectations as well as moral views regarding potential 
applications of current neurobiological and behavioural genetic research aiming to un-
derstand (and possibly help prevent, contain, or treat) violent and antisocial behaviour. 
Potential applications that were included were potential biomedical possibilities to 
lower aggression, the possible usage of neuroimaging in assessing legal responsibility, 
and the potential use of biomarkers in assessing risk for future violent and antisocial 
behaviour. Furthermore, these interviews explored to what extent forensic practitio-
ners consider moral development and moral growth to be a part of their current profes-
sional practices and to what extent they think that stimulating moral development is 
a legitimate objective in the context of forensic psychiatric treatment. In addition, we 
asked how forensic practitioners balance public safety and risk management concerns 
with the interests and wellbeing of the individual patient.
Chapter 6 reports on an empirical study aimed at gaining insight into the reasons that 
the public may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological moral enhancement 
for themselves or for others. The study is driven by three hypotheses: first, the hypoth-
esis that the degree to which members of the public support an empathy-enhancing 
moral enhancement program depends on whether or not the means employed are 
pharmacological or non-pharmacological. Second, that people are less supportive of 
pharmacological moral enhancement of their own children than they are of other 
people’s children. Third, that the degree to which respondents support these programs 
depends on whether they imagine themselves or someone outside their immediate 
circle of concern to participate. In other words, we expect that the distinction between 
self and other is relevant.
Chapter 7 reflects on the main findings of the preceding chapters, as well as their 
limitations. It revisits the main research question, formulates normative conclusions, 
and suggestions for future research.
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Abstract 
Background
The debate on the ethical aspects of moral bioenhancement focuses on the desirability 
of using biomedical as opposed to traditional means to achieve moral betterment. 
The aim of this paper is to systematically review the ethical reasons presented in the 
literature for and against moral bioenhancement.
Discussion
A review was performed and resulted in the inclusion of 85 articles. We classified the 
arguments used in those articles in the following six clusters: (1) why we (don’t) need 
moral bioenhancement, (2) why it will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what 
moral bioenhancement should involve, (3) the feasibility of moral bioenhancement 
and the status of current scientific research, (4) means and processes of arriving at 
moral improvement matter ethically, (5) arguments related to the freedom, identity 
and autonomy of the individual, and (6) arguments related to social/ group effects and 
dynamics. We discuss each argument separately, and assess the debate as a whole. First, 
there is little discussion on what distinguishes moral bioenhancement from treatment 
of pathological deficiencies in morality. Furthermore, remarkably little attention has 
been paid so far to the safety, risks and side-effects of moral enhancement, including 
the risk of identity changes. Finally, many authors overestimate the scientific as well 
as the practical feasibility of the interventions they discuss, rendering the debate too 
speculative. 
Summary
Based on our discussion of the arguments used in the debate on moral enhancement, 
and our assessment of this debate, we advocate a shift in focus. Instead of speculating 
about non-realistic hypothetical scenarios such as the genetic engineering of morality, 
or morally enhancing ‘the whole of humanity’, we call for a more focused debate on 
realistic options of biomedical treatment of moral pathologies and the concrete moral 
questions these treatments raise.
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Background 
Should we develop and implement interventions that aim to improve people’s moral-
ity? Ever since the publication of two papers in a special issue of the Journal of Applied 
Philosophy in 2008 (Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008), the ethical 
desirability of moral bioenhancement has been the subject of intense debate. Whereas 
‘traditional methods’ of moral betterment (such as upbringing, socialization and edu-
cation) are arguably as old as humanity itself, the debate on moral bioenhancement 
focuses specifically on the desirability of the use of biomedical methods. Interventions 
that are being investigated in the literature range from various types of psychopharma-
ceuticals, deep brain stimulation (DBS), and genetic selection and engineering.
In a previous paper (Raus et al., 2014) we examine the different ways in which the concept 
of moral bioenhancement is used in the literature: what different authors understand 
its main goals to be, what would count as a success, and what kind of interventions 
would and would not fall within their proposed definitions. In this paper, we ask what 
reasons and arguments have so far been given in the debate on the ethical desirability 
of moral bioenhancement. We do this by mapping out the different arguments that 
have been presented in the debate up till now (see subsection ‘Arguments used in the 
debate’). We aim to provide a complete overview including both the main arguments in 
the debate as well as the less commonly voiced arguments. In the final critical appraisal 
section (see subsection ‘Critical appraisal of the current debate’), we analyze the kinds 
of arguments given, thereby critically assessing the issues and concerns that have been 
discussed, as well as identifying those issues and concerns that up to now have been 
neglected. This section represents our own interpretation and views concerning the 
debate and the arguments that are given. We argue for a shift in focus of the debate 
towards a discussion of more realistic interventions for specific target groups.
Discussion
Methodology
In order to give a comprehensive overview of the debate so far, we conducted a litera-
ture search to collect all publications that discuss ‘moral (bio)enhancement’ since the 
start of the debate in 2008. With assistance from a reference librarian, we selected 
suitable databases in bioethics. In September 2013, we searched these databases to find 
all publications that mention moral (bio)enhancement. For the specific search terms 
and strings per database, please consult Table 1. The results of these searches were 
downloaded to Endnote, and duplicates were removed. 
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Table 1: Search terms and strings
Database Search string
Embase (morality/de AND (‘genetic enhancement’/de OR ‘medical technology’/de OR 
‘neurosurgery’/de)) OR (((moral* OR virtue* OR virtuous OR biomedical* OR bio-
medical) NEAR/6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc* OR manipulat*))):ab,ti 
Medline OvidSP ((morals/ OR Moral Development/ OR Virtues/) AND (“Genetic Engineering”/ OR 
exp “Biomedical Enhancement”/ OR “neurosurgery”/)) OR (((moral* OR virtue* 
OR virtuous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) ADJ6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc* OR 
manipulat*))).ab,ti. 
Web-of-science TS=(((moral* OR virtue* OR virtuous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) NEAR/6 
(enhanc* OR bioenhanc* OR manipulat*))) 
PsycINFO OvidSP ((morality/ OR Moral Development/ OR Virtue/) AND (“Genetic Engineering”/ OR 
“neurosurgery”/)) OR (((moral* OR virtue* OR virtuous OR biomedical* OR bio-
medical) ADJ6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc* OR manipulat*))).ab,ti. 
PubMed publisher (Moral enhanc*[tiab] OR Moral bioenhanc*[tiab]) NOT medline[sb]
Scopus TITLE-ABS-KEY(((moral* OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) W/3 (enhanc* OR 
bioenhanc*)) AND (ethic* OR bioethic*)) 
Google Scholar “moral (enhancement|bioenhancement|enhancing)”|”moral bio enhancement”
Scirus – preferred 
web/ ProQuest
“Moral enhancement” OR “Moral bioenhancement”
Table 2: Selection of publications
Database Initial results Results after deduplication
Embase 1027 1008
Medline OvidSP 820 178
Web-of-science 1191 788
Scopus 449 261
PsycINFO OvidSP 427 253
PubMed publisher 17 10
Google Scholar 192 142
ProQuest 75 58
Scirus 5 3
Total 4203 2701
Based on title and abstract, we excluded all articles that are not directly related to 
moral bioenhancement. As the main aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the 
ethical reasons for and against moral bioenhancement in the debate so far, we included 
only those publications in which authors explicitly mention moral bioenhancement. 
We excluded from our analysis publications on the moral status of post-persons, unless 
there was an explicit reference to the debate on the desirability of moral bioenhance-
ment. We also excluded those publications that discuss moral bioenhancement but 
were not written in English (N=14). We discussed those publications that we were less 
sure about (N=99) until consensus was reached. In April 2014 we repeated the exact 
same search, in order to retrieve all publications that were published in the interven-
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ing period (N=22). All in all, 85 publications were included. For a schematic overview of 
the selection process, see Figure 1 (Appendix A, p. 65).
We read the full-text of all articles and conducted a thorough thematic document 
analysis, in which we identified and coded each argument for or against moral bioen-
hancement mentioned in each publication. Based on this analysis, we formulated six 
broad clusters of arguments: arguments on the need for moral bioenhancement, on the 
possibility of attaining sufficient agreement on what moral bioenhancement should 
involve, on the status of current scientific research, on whether means and processes 
matter with respect to the desirability of moral bioenhancement, on the effects on 
the identity and the autonomy of the individual, and finally on the social effects of 
moral bioenhancement. This clustering was further refined and complemented on the 
basis of the analysis of all included publications, resulting in the final categories and 
subcategories that can be found in this article (see Table 3 for an overview of the argu-
ments and sub-arguments we identified). 
We have conscientiously attempted to provide a neutral and comprehensive review 
of the existing arguments, by clearly separating the description of the arguments (see 
subsection ‘Arguments used in the debate’) from our critical appraisal of the arguments 
(see subsection ‘Critical appraisal of the current debate’).
Arguments used in the debate 
Table 3 provides an overview of the clusters of arguments and sub arguments we 
identified, as well as an overview of the authors addressing the specific argument. The 
arguments are formulated in a neutral way, and are almost always used by some to 
argue in favor of moral bioenhancement and by others to argue against it. 
Below we will present the arguments we identified in the literature, organized in the 
following six clusters: (1) why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement, (2) it will (not) 
be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should purport, (3) the 
feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research, (4) 
means and processes of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically, (5) arguments 
related to the freedom, identity and autonomy of the individual, and (6) arguments 
related to social/ group effects and dynamics. 
In the next section, we will describe these arguments in greater detail by summarizing 
these six clusters and their components. Given the richness of the publications we 
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Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
1. Why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement
There is scope for improvement Almost by definition, each person can be/ act/ behave 
better. We therefore all have a moral duty/ imperative/ 
reasons to enhance ourselves. We have good reasons 
for wanting to better ourselves. Also: a duty to do the 
right thing.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Agar, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Douglas, 
2013; Jones, 2013; Douglas, 2014b; Jebari, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; Beck, 2015; Kahane & 
Savulescu, 2015)
Human biological nature is defective Humans are innately evil. Evil cannot be eradicated 
by socialization and education alone. Or: humans are 
innately good.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; I. Persson & Savulescu, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 
2010; Harris, 2011; Hughes, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014b; Rakic´, 
2014b; Beauchamp, 2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015; Ingmar Persson & 
Savulescu, 2015b)
Traditional means are (not) effective 
enough
Such as education, upbringing, socialization. These will 
only bring us so far. Or: they do suffice, are attractive 
and effective.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Bronstein, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; I. Persson & 
Savulescu, 2010; Harris, 2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Tonkens, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; 
Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Our only hope in averting major 
disaster
Avoidance of ultimate harm. Some of the world’s 
most important problems can be attributed to moral 
deficits of individuals. Or: those problems have other 
causes besides the moral deficits of individuals. Moral 
enhancement should accompany, or even precede/ 
prioritize over cognitive enhancement and scientific 
progress. 
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Fenton, 2010; I. Persson & Savulescu, 
2010; Harris, 2011; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2011; Rakic´, 2012; Tennison, 
2012; Gunson & McLachlan, 2013; Hughes, 2013; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Tonkens, 2013; 
Zarpentine, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; Selgelid, 2014; Wasserman, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; 
Beck, 2015; J. A. Carter & Gordon, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Moral bioenhancement might 
reduce criminality
Promise of solving immoral and criminal acts. Or: 
warning that these are not necessarily the same. 
(Walker, 2009; Brooks, 2012; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015)
2. It will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should purport
No consensus on the mechanisms 
that comprise our moral psychology
The way we should interpret neurobiological findings. (Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Bruni, 2011; Chan & Harris, 2011; 
Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Shook, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Triviño, 2013; Baertschi, 
2014; Lechner, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Beck, 
2015)
Behavioral changes alone are (not) 
enough
Emotions versus moral reasoning. Dependent on view 
on what is considered worthy of moral appraisal. 
Behavioral control, or: certain attitudes towards 
behavior are also necessary (they have cognitive 
content). 
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Spence, 2008; Walker, 2009; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; 
Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Tennison, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013a, 2013b; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 
2013; Baertschi, 2014; DeGrazia, 2014; Douglas, 2014b; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; 
Morioka, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Savulescu et 
al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Ethical systems and theories differ 
and often disagree
Subjectivity of/ disagreement between main 
(substantive) moral theories. Individuals and cultures 
differ, there is moral pluralism. Possibility of being 
neutral between different conceptions of the good.
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Agar, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Bruni, 
2011; Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Lev, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; DeGrazia, 2014; Lechner, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian 
Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Savulescu et al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Beck, 
2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
(Im)possibility of considerable 
consensus
The question whether we can find a common ground, 
despite moral pluralism. Also: discussions on relativism/ 
nihilism, objectivism.
(Douglas, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Walker, 2010; Pacholczyk, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Lev, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ingmar Persson 
& Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; Savulescu et al., 2014; 
Sparrow, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Hauskeller, 2015)
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Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
1. Why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement
There is scope for improvement Almost by definition, each person can be/ act/ behave 
better. We therefore all have a moral duty/ imperative/ 
reasons to enhance ourselves. We have good reasons 
for wanting to better ourselves. Also: a duty to do the 
right thing.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Agar, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Douglas, 
2013; Jones, 2013; Douglas, 2014b; Jebari, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; Beck, 2015; Kahane & 
Savulescu, 2015)
Human biological nature is defective Humans are innately evil. Evil cannot be eradicated 
by socialization and education alone. Or: humans are 
innately good.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; I. Persson & Savulescu, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 
2010; Harris, 2011; Hughes, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014b; Rakic´, 
2014b; Beauchamp, 2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015; Ingmar Persson & 
Savulescu, 2015b)
Traditional means are (not) effective 
enough
Such as education, upbringing, socialization. These will 
only bring us so far. Or: they do suffice, are attractive 
and effective.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Bronstein, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; I. Persson & 
Savulescu, 2010; Harris, 2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Tonkens, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; 
Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Our only hope in averting major 
disaster
Avoidance of ultimate harm. Some of the world’s 
most important problems can be attributed to moral 
deficits of individuals. Or: those problems have other 
causes besides the moral deficits of individuals. Moral 
enhancement should accompany, or even precede/ 
prioritize over cognitive enhancement and scientific 
progress. 
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Fenton, 2010; I. Persson & Savulescu, 
2010; Harris, 2011; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2011; Rakic´, 2012; Tennison, 
2012; Gunson & McLachlan, 2013; Hughes, 2013; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Tonkens, 2013; 
Zarpentine, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; Selgelid, 2014; Wasserman, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; 
Beck, 2015; J. A. Carter & Gordon, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Moral bioenhancement might 
reduce criminality
Promise of solving immoral and criminal acts. Or: 
warning that these are not necessarily the same. 
(Walker, 2009; Brooks, 2012; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015)
2. It will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should purport
No consensus on the mechanisms 
that comprise our moral psychology
The way we should interpret neurobiological findings. (Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Bruni, 2011; Chan & Harris, 2011; 
Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Shook, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Triviño, 2013; Baertschi, 
2014; Lechner, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Beck, 
2015)
Behavioral changes alone are (not) 
enough
Emotions versus moral reasoning. Dependent on view 
on what is considered worthy of moral appraisal. 
Behavioral control, or: certain attitudes towards 
behavior are also necessary (they have cognitive 
content). 
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Spence, 2008; Walker, 2009; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; 
Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Tennison, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013a, 2013b; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 
2013; Baertschi, 2014; DeGrazia, 2014; Douglas, 2014b; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; 
Morioka, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Savulescu et 
al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Ethical systems and theories differ 
and often disagree
Subjectivity of/ disagreement between main 
(substantive) moral theories. Individuals and cultures 
differ, there is moral pluralism. Possibility of being 
neutral between different conceptions of the good.
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Agar, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Bruni, 
2011; Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Lev, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; DeGrazia, 2014; Lechner, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian 
Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Savulescu et al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Beck, 
2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
(Im)possibility of considerable 
consensus
The question whether we can find a common ground, 
despite moral pluralism. Also: discussions on relativism/ 
nihilism, objectivism.
(Douglas, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Walker, 2010; Pacholczyk, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Lev, 2012; 
Shook, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Macer, 2014; Ingmar Persson 
& Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; Savulescu et al., 2014; 
Sparrow, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Hauskeller, 2015)
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Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature 
(continued)
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
Situation- and role-dependency Situation dependency of what counts as an 
improvement (morally). Different roles, assessments of 
situations. Weighing relevant reasons to act. One virtue 
can turn into a vice dependent on the situation.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Sprinkle, 2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; 
Hallgren, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Agar, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Morioka, 2014; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; 
Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wasserman, 2014b; Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Human enhancement versus treating 
mental disorders
Enhancing humanity or treating mental disorders. 
Moral element in mental disorders. 
(Agar, 2010; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; Agar, 2014; DeGrazia, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; 
Wiseman, 2014a; Agar, 2015b; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015)
3. The feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research
Status of current scientific research Further research is needed or, technological 
possibilities are already there.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Walker, 2010; Pacholczyk, 2011; 
Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Agar, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; Jotterand, 2014; 
Savulescu et al., 2014; Casal, 2015; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Complexity of our moral psychology/ 
biology
Makes it doubtful that we will gain sufficient 
understanding.
Is morality genetically/ biologically determined? For 
example: are virtues and vices heritable? Is the core of 
our moral dispositions malleable by biomedical and 
genetic means? Danger of reductionism: we should not 
overlook the impact of the socio-cultural environment.
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Blackford, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; 
Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ehni & Aurenque, 
2012; Hallgren, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Agar, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; Douglas, 2014b; Jotterand, 
2014; Lechner, 2014; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wiseman, 
2014a; Agar, 2015b; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015; J. A. Carter & Gordon, 2015)
Unintended or undesirable side 
effects
Interventions have effects beyond the intended effects 
(also: bluntness of the instruments).
A ‘baby and bathwater’ problem.
Moral bioenhancement might even lead to the 
opposite: not moral progress but moral decline.
(Bronstein, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; 
Pacholczyk, 2011; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Lev, 
2012; Tennison, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Jones, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Baertschi, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; 
DeGrazia, 2014; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015; 
Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Scientific rigor, standards Research ethical questions about standards of 
good/ sound science. Is scientific experimentation 
permissible, given that ‘lack of moral virtue’ is not a 
disease?
(Bronstein, 2010; Shook, 2012; Tonkens, 2013)
4. Means and process of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically
Other (non-biomedical) methods are 
preferable
Such as moral training, socialization or (self-) 
education. Taking a pill might seem ‘all too easy’ or too 
disconnected from ordinary human understanding. Are 
biomedical means intrinsically bad? Also: man is not 
supposed to play God.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Harris & Chan, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Harris, 
2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Douglas, 
2013; Harris, 2013a; Hughes, 2013; Jones, 2013; William P. Kabasenche, 2013; Douglas, 2014b; Jebari, 
2014; Casal, 2015)
There is no principled difference 
between traditional and biomedical 
means
Results matter, the means less so. 
Perhaps the difference lies in the irrevocability/ 
irreversibility of biomedical means.
(Walker, 2009, 2010; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; 
Jebari, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a)
5. Arguments related to the freedom, identity, and autonomy of the individual
Moral bioenhancement might 
threaten the freedom of the 
individual
Moral bioenhancement might impair our freedom and 
diminish our freedom to act on bad motives. It might 
subvert moral agency.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; 
Pacholczyk, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Curtis, 2012; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013a; Harris, 2013a, 
2013b; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Ingmar Persson & 
Julian Savulescu, 2014b; Rakic´, 2014b; Savulescu et al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a; Beck, 2015)
Moral bioenhancement might 
endanger our identity and autonomy
Questions about personal identity, and ‘true’ versus 
‘brute’ self. 
Enhancer decides on outcome of moral 
bioenhancement (paternalism). Might compromise 
autonomous, informed choice. 
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Spence, 2008; Hubbeling, 2009; Agar, 2010; Blackford, 2010; Bronstein, 
2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Curtis, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 
2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Harris, 2013a; Savulescu et al., 2014; D. Shaw, 2014; Sparrow, 
2014a; Beck, 2015)
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Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature 
(continued)
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
Situation- and role-dependency Situation dependency of what counts as an 
improvement (morally). Different roles, assessments of 
situations. Weighing relevant reasons to act. One virtue 
can turn into a vice dependent on the situation.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Sprinkle, 2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; 
Hallgren, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Agar, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Morioka, 2014; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; 
Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wasserman, 2014b; Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Human enhancement versus treating 
mental disorders
Enhancing humanity or treating mental disorders. 
Moral element in mental disorders. 
(Agar, 2010; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; Agar, 2014; DeGrazia, 2014; Jotterand, 2014; 
Wiseman, 2014a; Agar, 2015b; Beck, 2015; Casal, 2015; Hauskeller, 2015)
3. The feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research
Status of current scientific research Further research is needed or, technological 
possibilities are already there.
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Walker, 2010; Pacholczyk, 2011; 
Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Agar, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; Jotterand, 2014; 
Savulescu et al., 2014; Casal, 2015; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015b)
Complexity of our moral psychology/ 
biology
Makes it doubtful that we will gain sufficient 
understanding.
Is morality genetically/ biologically determined? For 
example: are virtues and vices heritable? Is the core of 
our moral dispositions malleable by biomedical and 
genetic means? Danger of reductionism: we should not 
overlook the impact of the socio-cultural environment.
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Blackford, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; 
Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ehni & Aurenque, 
2012; Hallgren, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Shook, 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Agar, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; Douglas, 2014b; Jotterand, 
2014; Lechner, 2014; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wiseman, 
2014a; Agar, 2015b; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015; J. A. Carter & Gordon, 2015)
Unintended or undesirable side 
effects
Interventions have effects beyond the intended effects 
(also: bluntness of the instruments).
A ‘baby and bathwater’ problem.
Moral bioenhancement might even lead to the 
opposite: not moral progress but moral decline.
(Bronstein, 2010; Harris & Chan, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; 
Pacholczyk, 2011; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Lev, 
2012; Tennison, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Jones, 2013; Zarpentine, 2013; Baertschi, 2014; Crockett, 2014a; 
DeGrazia, 2014; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; Agar, 2015b; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015; 
Casal, 2015; Kahane & Savulescu, 2015)
Scientific rigor, standards Research ethical questions about standards of 
good/ sound science. Is scientific experimentation 
permissible, given that ‘lack of moral virtue’ is not a 
disease?
(Bronstein, 2010; Shook, 2012; Tonkens, 2013)
4. Means and process of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically
Other (non-biomedical) methods are 
preferable
Such as moral training, socialization or (self-) 
education. Taking a pill might seem ‘all too easy’ or too 
disconnected from ordinary human understanding. Are 
biomedical means intrinsically bad? Also: man is not 
supposed to play God.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Harris & Chan, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Fröding, 2011; Harris, 
2011; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; William Paul Kabasenche, 2012; Douglas, 
2013; Harris, 2013a; Hughes, 2013; Jones, 2013; William P. Kabasenche, 2013; Douglas, 2014b; Jebari, 
2014; Casal, 2015)
There is no principled difference 
between traditional and biomedical 
means
Results matter, the means less so. 
Perhaps the difference lies in the irrevocability/ 
irreversibility of biomedical means.
(Walker, 2009, 2010; Christen & Narvaez, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; 
Jebari, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a)
5. Arguments related to the freedom, identity, and autonomy of the individual
Moral bioenhancement might 
threaten the freedom of the 
individual
Moral bioenhancement might impair our freedom and 
diminish our freedom to act on bad motives. It might 
subvert moral agency.
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Chan & Harris, 2011; Harris, 2011; Jotterand, 2011; 
Pacholczyk, 2011; Schaefer, 2011; Curtis, 2012; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; Simkulet, 2012; Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013a; Harris, 2013a, 
2013b; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; Harris, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Ingmar Persson & 
Julian Savulescu, 2014b; Rakic´, 2014b; Savulescu et al., 2014; Sparrow, 2014a; Beck, 2015)
Moral bioenhancement might 
endanger our identity and autonomy
Questions about personal identity, and ‘true’ versus 
‘brute’ self. 
Enhancer decides on outcome of moral 
bioenhancement (paternalism). Might compromise 
autonomous, informed choice. 
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Spence, 2008; Hubbeling, 2009; Agar, 2010; Blackford, 2010; Bronstein, 
2010; Chan & Harris, 2011; Curtis, 2012; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 
2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Harris, 2013a; Savulescu et al., 2014; D. Shaw, 2014; Sparrow, 
2014a; Beck, 2015)
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studied, it will not be possible to take account of all the arguments in great detail. 
However, in the following paragraphs we hope to sketch the outlines of the discussions 
held so far and to provide an overview of the main arguments identified under clusters 
one through six. Relevant subthemes will be discussed under each cluster.
1. Why We (Don’t) Need Moral Bioenhancement
The arguments gathered under this first cluster address the question as to why (or 
whether) we in fact need moral bioenhancement. What kinds of problems we hope 
it would eradicate, what its advantages are compared to other methods, and how it 
relates to traditional methods of moral betterment. It is clear that most proponents 
of moral bioenhancement feel the need to offer some story on why there is in fact an 
urgent need for it. Opponents or sceptics may doubt whether we need moral bioen-
hancement at all.
Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature 
(continued)
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
Despite concerns about individual 
liberty and autonomy, a trade-off is 
justified
The advantages outweigh the disadvantages. (Douglas, 2008; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Douglas, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; 
Harris, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014b; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b; 
Savulescu et al., 2014; Selgelid, 2014)
6. Arguments related to social/ group effects and dynamics
Moral bioenhancement benefits 
others
Unlike other types of enhancements (cognitive, 
cosmetic, sports). Or: who benefits? The individual or 
society as a whole?
(Douglas, 2008; Bronstein, 2010; Baertschi, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Marshall, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b)
Moral bioenhancement might foster 
abuse
Moral bioenhancement might induce free-riding 
(e.g. prisoner’s dilemma). The virtuous exposed to 
exploitation by the vicious. It may lead to moral 
decline. 
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Shook, 2012; 
Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013b; Triviño, 2013; Jotterand, 2014; Morioka, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; 
Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wilson, 2014; Wiseman, 2014a; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015)
Moral bioenhancement might 
undermine moral diversity and 
moral debate
It might diminish opportunities for ethical thinking/ 
debate. Reasonable pluralism. Moral bioenhancement 
might generate social inequalities, elitism. 
(Agar, 2010; Brooks, 2012; Shook, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jotterand, 2014; Lechner, 2014; 
Marshall, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 
2014; Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; Wilson, 2014; Wiseman, 2014a; Casal, 2015)
Risks of utopian derailing Progressive, well-intended, yet…
Utopian.
Interventions will be used recklessly or 
overenthusiastically. Moral perfectionism. 
(Faust, 2008; Bronstein, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Douglas, 2013; 
Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Joyce, 2013; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b)
Mandatory implementation or free/ 
parental choice
State neutrality versus free choice. Danger of tyranny/ 
discrimination.
(Faust, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Bronstein, 2010; Curtis, 
2012; Lev, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; Shook, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; Joyce, 
2013; Triviño, 2013; Lechner, 2014; Macer, 2014; Morioka, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 
2014b, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; Selgelid, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; 
Wasserman, 2014b; Wiseman, 2014a)
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There is scope for improvement
Almost by definition, most if not all people would benefit from an improvement in 
their moral character. Different authors vary, however, with respect to the kind of 
changes they would like to see implemented: changes in moral behavior, will-power, 
or moral agency and insight. 
Because the moral character of most people is suboptimal (or even defective by nature), 
every person has good reasons to morally better herself. The general argument holds 
that we have a moral duty to enhance ourselves, and that if we need moral bioen-
hancement to reach this goal, we should consider it: “it is not that taking medicine 
is intrinsically moral or immoral, it is that a human subject can use medication as 
a means to assist them towards a moral end: reducing future harm. Such a person 
exhibits altruism” (Spence, 2008, p. 180). The only right attitudes towards one’s own 
bad motives and impediments are “non-acceptance and a desire for self-change”, Thomas 
Douglas (Douglas, 2008, p. 235) maintains.
Table 3: Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature 
(continued)
Cluster Argument Description/ background Key articles
Despite concerns about individual 
liberty and autonomy, a trade-off is 
justified
The advantages outweigh the disadvantages. (Douglas, 2008; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Douglas, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014; 
Harris, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014b; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b; 
Savulescu et al., 2014; Selgelid, 2014)
6. Arguments related to social/ group effects and dynamics
Moral bioenhancement benefits 
others
Unlike other types of enhancements (cognitive, 
cosmetic, sports). Or: who benefits? The individual or 
society as a whole?
(Douglas, 2008; Bronstein, 2010; Baertschi, 2014; Jebari, 2014; Marshall, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b)
Moral bioenhancement might foster 
abuse
Moral bioenhancement might induce free-riding 
(e.g. prisoner’s dilemma). The virtuous exposed to 
exploitation by the vicious. It may lead to moral 
decline. 
(Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Walker, 2009; Pacholczyk, 2011; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Shook, 2012; 
Douglas, 2013; Harris, 2013b; Triviño, 2013; Jotterand, 2014; Morioka, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 2014; 
Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Wilson, 2014; Wiseman, 2014a; Beauchamp, 2015; Beck, 2015)
Moral bioenhancement might 
undermine moral diversity and 
moral debate
It might diminish opportunities for ethical thinking/ 
debate. Reasonable pluralism. Moral bioenhancement 
might generate social inequalities, elitism. 
(Agar, 2010; Brooks, 2012; Shook, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; Harris, 2013b; Jotterand, 2014; Lechner, 2014; 
Marshall, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Ram-Tiktin, 
2014; Robichaud, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; Wilson, 2014; Wiseman, 2014a; Casal, 2015)
Risks of utopian derailing Progressive, well-intended, yet…
Utopian.
Interventions will be used recklessly or 
overenthusiastically. Moral perfectionism. 
(Faust, 2008; Bronstein, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010; Walker, 2010; Ehni & Aurenque, 2012; Douglas, 2013; 
Harris, 2013b; Jones, 2013; Joyce, 2013; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b)
Mandatory implementation or free/ 
parental choice
State neutrality versus free choice. Danger of tyranny/ 
discrimination.
(Faust, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Walker, 2009; Arnhart, 2010; Bronstein, 2010; Curtis, 
2012; Lev, 2012; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Rakic´, 2012; Shook, 2012; Sio et al., 2012; Joyce, 
2013; Triviño, 2013; Lechner, 2014; Macer, 2014; Morioka, 2014; Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 
2014b, 2014a; I. Persson & J. Savulescu, 2014; Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; Selgelid, 2014; Sparrow, 2014b; 
Wasserman, 2014b; Wiseman, 2014a)
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Where Douglas (Douglas, 2008) presents the recognition that there is room for im-
provement as an argument for moral bioenhancement, others are of the opinion that 
although we can agree that the world we live in now is far from optimal, it is not clear 
why this would be a reason in favor of moral bioenhancement. For example, according 
to Nicholas Agar: “We don’t need superior moral vision to understand that poverty, 
climate change, and terrorism are bad things. (…) We do need enhanced effort and 
perhaps enhanced nonmoral powers to fix poverty, climate change, and terrorism but 
we don’t need enhanced moral vision to recognize that they need fixing” (Agar, 2010, 
p. 75).
Human biological nature is defective
In defense of the need for moral bioenhancement to morally better ourselves, Ingmar 
Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that there is a fundamental mismatch between our 
moral psychology and today’s conditions of human life (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2013, p. 124). Because human moral psychology evolved in conditions that are radically 
different from those in today’s world, we should alter human moral psychology by 
biomedical and genetic means, they argue:
People encode the race of each individual they encounter, and do so via computa-
tional processes that appear to be both automatic and mandatory. (…) If genetic 
and biomedical means of enhancement could counter such natural tendencies, 
they could have a crucial role to play in improving our moral character, that could 
complement traditional social and educational means of moral enhancement. 
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 168)
Others add that besides being ill equipped for today’s conditions of human life, human 
beings are innately evil to a greater or lesser extent. Wickedness is an indispensable 
part of human nature. If we want to eradicate evil, we have to alter these immoral 
innate (biologically determined) tendencies of human beings. Socialization, upbringing 
and education will bring us only so far. According to Mark Walker, precisely because 
humans are evil by nature, we need biomedical interventions in order to effectively 
alter human nature for the better: “For sure, it may be possible to minimize some con-
temporary evil through better socialization, but it will never be possible to eliminate it 
so long as human nature remains unaltered” (Walker, 2009, p. 29).
On the other hand, Robert Sprinkle argues that the observation that evil may not be 
an eliminable feature of the human condition should temper our hopes regarding the 
possibility of effectively addressing all forms of evil, not raise them: “I, for one, never 
held such a hope” (Sprinkle, 2010, p. 89). John Harris turns the ‘humans are evil by 
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(biological) nature’-argument around and argues that there is an inborn human good-
ness: “We have certainly evolved to have a vigorous sense of justice and right, that is, 
with a virtuous sense of morality” (Harris, 2011, p. 104).
Traditional means are (not) effective enough
In addition to stating the need for moral bioenhancement due to our defective moral 
nature, some authors argue that traditional means are ill-equipped or less effective as 
compared to biological and/or genetic means. As mentioned by David DeGrazia, surely, 
we already have at our disposal many different means of enhancing our moral capaci-
ties: methods such as “explicit moral instruction, mentoring, socialization, carefully 
designed public policies, consciousness-raising groups, literature and other media that 
encourage moral reflection, and individual efforts at improvement” (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 
361). However, Persson and Savulescu argue that these means are not nearly effective 
enough to help us counter the great evils of our time: “Biomedical and genetic means 
may be much more effective in terms of both how thoroughly and quickly they could 
improve everyone in need of improvement” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 168).
Others, for example John Harris and Jamie Bronstein, feel that this line of argument 
wrongly minimizes the moral progress that has been made through those tried and 
tested traditional methods (Bronstein, 2010, p. 86; Harris, 2011, p. 104), and argue that 
these methods still offer many possibilities for moral improvement. 
Our only hope in averting major disaster
On top of the need for effective interventions to morally better ourselves, urgency is 
another critical factor that is addressed in the debate. If we succeed in (biomedically) 
enhancing people’s cognitive abilities, some argue, it is of paramount importance to 
also – or even first – enhance their moral abilities due to the risks that cognitively 
enhanced human beings may pose to others. In today’s technologically advanced 
world, Persson and Savulescu argue that a “morally corrupt minority” (Ingmar Persson 
& Savulescu, 2008, p. 163) is increasingly able to inflict major disaster on the majority. 
Moral bioenhancement might be our only hope of engaging with other major chal-
lenges as well. According to DeGrazia:
The status quo is deeply problematic because there is such an abundance of im-
moral behavior, with devastating consequences, and serious risk of worse to come. 
(…) In addition to these harms and injustices, there is the threat of truly massive 
harm. (…) It is increasingly possible for a small number of individuals to acquire the 
technical capability of inflicting terrible harm. (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 362)
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Harris, however, argues that we should instead embrace cognitive enhancements, as 
they are our best prospect of self-defense against disaster (Harris, 2011, p. 110). Adam 
Carter and Emma Gordon argue that because cognitive and moral enhancements are 
principally interconnected, we should consider potential enhancements “outwith any 
essential reference to a moral/cognitive conceptual dichotomy” (J. A. Carter & Gordon, 
2015, p. 160).
David Wasserman questions whether all of these evils can be attributed to individual 
moral defects, and warns us not to underestimate the role of defective institutions 
(Wasserman, 2014b, p. 375).
Moral bioenhancement might reduce criminality
Last but not least, some authors such as Walker (Walker, 2009) suggest that moral 
bioenhancement could achieve a significant reduction in ‘evil’, referring to criminal 
behavior such as rape, murder, torture and so on. Others, for example Thom Brooks, 
warn us that immorality and illegal behavior do not necessarily coincide:
Morality and law are imperfectly linked at best. First, not all immorality is illegal. 
Lying is widely regarded as immoral, but not all lying is criminal. (…) Second, not all 
illegality is immoral. Drug offenses are widely incorporated in most legal systems, 
but it is unclear at best whether cannabis use is intrinsically immoral. (Brooks, 
2012, p. 29)
Because the project of moral bioenhancement and the project of reducing criminality 
are not necessarily the same, it is argued that we should be careful in suggesting that 
moral bioenhancement might indeed reduce criminality and using this as an argument 
for moral bioenhancement.
2. It Will (Not) Be Possible to Reach Consensus On What Moral 
Bioenhancement Should Purport
In this second cluster we discuss arguments that address the many different kinds of 
disagreement that influence the different proposals on the way moral bioenhancement 
should take shape. Opponents of moral bioenhancement think that because of these al-
legedly fundamental disagreements, moral bioenhancement is a problematic endeavor. 
Proponents, however, argue that sufficient consensus is possible, and that these differ-
ences need not necessarily jeopardize the project of moral bioenhancement. 
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No consensus on the mechanisms that comprise our moral psychology
The first issue that fuels disagreement on the way moral bioenhancement should take 
place relates to our limited knowledge concerning our moral psychology. Moreover, 
according to Persson and Savulescu, how we should interpret and understand findings 
of moral psychology is not straightforward, and influenced by our preferred view on 
what constitutes morality: “what morality is, or of what it is to be moral” (Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 168). Agar warns us that:
The absence of a consensus upon the mechanisms of morality could prevent any 
agreement that a proposed moral enhancer could really be enhancing morality, 
whatever else it may be doing. This skepticism is not the fault of the behavioral and 
brains sciences, but our own, for failing to agree about which cognitive processes 
are genuinely relevant to what we want to call morality and moral agency. (Shook, 
2012, p. 5)
Behavioral changes alone are (not) enough 
Even if a consensus would exist on the mechanisms of morality and how to achieve 
more moral behavior, several authors question whether it is enough for any moral 
bioenhancement intervention to have effect on behavior, but not necessarily on other 
aspects of morality, such as moral reasoning, moral insight, or moral will. Do behavior 
control interventions constitute moral enhancement or does moral enhancement 
require an accompanying change in moral agency? 
According to Douglas (Douglas, 2008, 2013, 2014b), reducing an individual’s tendencies 
towards violent aggression directly, without using cognitive means such as persuasion 
or deliberation (and assuming this would effectively lead to less immoral behavior), 
would count as moral enhancement. Harris (Harris, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Harris, 2013b; 
Harris, 2014), however, insists that without concurrent changes in a person’s moral 
reasoning, these changes would not amount to moral enhancement at all: 
We will, I believe, always need to use moral reasoning to act as a guide to our 
emotions and as a way of checking that we are having appropriate feelings in appro-
priate circumstances and for appropriate objects. If the good involves feeling the 
right way, how do we know that we are feeling the right way? (Harris, 2013a, p. 172)
Fabrice Jotterand also argues that “the emphasis on the control of moral emotions ap-
pears reductive and one-sided in the sense that it conflates moral reasoning (as practi-
cal reasoning) with moral psychology (how moral reasoning acts on one’s motivational/
emotional states)” (Jotterand, 2011, p. 5).
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Bernard Baertschi argues that much of the disagreement between Douglas and Harris 
can be attributed to their different preferred meta-ethical positions (Baertschi, 2014, 
pp. 66-67). Harris adheres to a rationalist conception of ethics, according to which 
emotions should only be acted upon through cognitive means, and, as described by 
Baertschi, “reason furnishes the only genuine moral motives” (Baertschi, 2014, p. 66). 
Douglas however appears to be a sentimentalist, Baertschi argues, i.e. espousing a 
view on ethics according to which having the right feeling matters. Their different 
conceptions of what morality is influence their different assessments of whether moral 
bioenhancement might be effective. Whereas Douglas thinks that direct modulation 
of emotions is effective (and permissible), Harris denies that direct modulation of emo-
tions even amounts to moral enhancement at all. 
Ethical systems and theories differ and often disagree
The wide variety of substantive moral principles that characterizes debates between 
ethical theorists, also hampers agreement on what would constitute a moral enhance-
ment. John Shook provides the following example:
Suppose a brain modification transforms a person into someone who now takes the 
moral deed to be the one maximizing the welfare of all. (…) most utilitarians would 
soon find fault with this new utilitarian’s concrete moral judgments, just as they 
find fault with each other’s. And many deontologists would simply deny that this 
fresh utilitarian has received moral enhancement at all. (Shook, 2012, p. 4)
Nevertheless, as DeGrazia argues, in one way or another, every program for moral 
bioenhancement needs to make explicit what it considers to be a moral improvement, 
based on what kind of principles or theory. Differences between various moral theories 
are not necessarily purely theoretical, and may lead to different normative judgments 
concerning a variety of moral dilemmas (e.g. abortion, the death penalty, and euthana-
sia) (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 363). 
Next to disagreement between the major ethical theories, DeGrazia reminds us that 
individual (groups of ) people hold diverse and often conflicting moral outlooks. They 
differ greatly with respect to the values they adhere to: politically conservative or 
progressive values for example (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 363). 
(Im)possibility of considerable consensus
In addition to the fact that a consensus is currently lacking, some authors view ethical 
standards as “arbitrary products of cultural history”, as Larry Arnhart wonders with 
regard to Walker’s writings (Arnhart, 2010, p. 81). Or, given a pluralistic reality, is it 
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possible to be neutral with respect to wide-ranging outlooks and ethical systems? Pers-
son and Savulescu, for instance, expect that their proposal for the core of our moral 
disposition – consisting of altruism, a sense of justice or fairness, and empathy – will 
be shared by many (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, pp. 168-169). They think that 
despite the deep disagreements between different accounts of right action, some sort 
of actions (“the willingness to sacrifice one’s own interests for the benefit of others”, 
for example) will be viewed as “a moral enhancement, on any account of morality” 
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012, pp. 5-6).
Walker also cautions against overemphasizing the differences, and points to significant 
overlap between different lists of virtues (Walker, 2009, p. 35). DeGrazia proposes that 
we “stick to improvements that represent points of overlapping consensus among 
competing, reasonable moral perspectives” (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 364). Moreover, Filippo 
Sio and colleagues claim that:
As in the cases of cognitive enhancement and social progress, reference to some 
objective standards is also necessary to make the concept of moral enhancement 
coherent. (Sio et al., 2012, p. 15)
Situation- and role-dependency
In addition to different views on morality and moral behavior, situation- and role-
dependency further add to the confusion concerning what should count as a moral 
enhancement. What should count as an improvement is highly dependent on the 
specific context and the roles performed in that situation (e.g. detached surgeons to 
remove brain tumors, impartial judges to administer justice). Wasserman asserts that 
even slight moral improvements will vary according to the role and context in which 
these are brought about (Wasserman, 2014b). 
Sprinkle approvingly cites Aristotle’s assertion that “traits virtuous in moderation 
might be vices in absence or excess” (Sprinkle, 2010, p. 89). Moreover, Markus Christen 
and Darcia Narvaez argue that “moral character cannot emerge from a short-term in-
tervention, but, as Aristotle advised, must be shaped with mentoring through multiple 
situations over time” (Christen & Narvaez, 2012, p. 26). Moreover, Sarah Chan and John 
Harris refer to a situation in which “serotonin-induced aversion to inflicting direct 
harm” might have stopped passengers from forcefully stopping a would-be hijacker 
(Chan & Harris, 2011, p. 131). In situations like these, aggression can be a good thing, 
although it is clearly bad in others. From this it follows that even enhancing traits that 
everyone would agree to be ‘good’, may still not result in an overall, all-purpose, moral 
enhancement. However, such criticisms on moral bio-enhancement fail to consider, ac-
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cording to Kahane and Savulescu, that this is “not at all an argument against enhance-
ment but, rather, an argument for more precisely fine-tuned enhancement” (Kahane & 
Savulescu, 2015, p. 141). For example, by making biomedical interventions sensitive to 
certain contexts, but not to others.
Human enhancement versus treating mental disorders
Some authors, such as Agar and Jotterand, highlight the difference between enhancing 
moral capacities of individuals “beyond human norms” (Agar, 2014, p. 369) and treating 
mental disorders that may or may not contain “an inherent moral element” (Jotterand, 
2014, p. 1). Dorothee Horstkötter and colleagues for example argue that “if there is a 
health problem, medical treatment is the reasonable reaction, while enhancement, 
either moral or otherwise, does not arise” (Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012, 
p. 27).
3. The Feasibility of Moral Bioenhancement and the Status of Current Scientific 
Research
Under the third cluster, we discuss arguments based on the alleged feasibility of pro-
posals for moral bioenhancement. Whereas proponents of moral bioenhancement are 
optimistic about the status of current scientific research, opponents warn us that the 
complexity of our moral psychology and biology make it doubtful that we will be able 
to develop effective interventions. 
Status of current scientific research
Current scientific developments give rise to both high hopes and substantial skepticism. 
DeGrazia, for example, rather optimistically lists research that may further the science 
of moral bioenhancement, ranging from the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibi-
tors as a means to being less inclined to assault people, to deep brain stimulation as a 
way to reduce aggression (DeGrazia, 2014, pp. 361-362). Walker sees no technological 
reasons why the pre-implantation sorting of embryos that is presently used to screen 
for genetic diseases could not be used for selecting virtues (Walker, 2009, p. 31). 
Molly Crockett warns us against overstating the conclusions of single studies, and as-
serts that science in this field is “in its infancy” (Crockett, 2014a, p. 370). With respect 
to genetic engineering Arnhart observes that clear examples of “specific genetic link-
ages to virtue that could be altered” are presently unknown (Arnhart, 2010, p. 79). 
Persson and Savulescu admit that their proposals for moral bioenhancement are 
mostly based on hypothetical scenarios, and treatment at this moment is only possible 
to a very small extent: “A lot more scientific research is needed before we can be made 
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more altruistic or just by suitable drugs or surgery, or genetic manipulation” (Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 172).
Although William Kabasenche thinks that human moral psychology is highly complex 
and therefore that it is difficult to ‘engineer’ virtues and vices, he feels that these stud-
ies “give us important insights into what embodied virtues might look like, and they 
suggest that we should take our embodied nature seriously” (William Paul Kabasenche, 
2012, p. 20).
Complexity of our moral psychology/ biology
Regardless of an optimistic or pessimistic view on the status of current scientific 
research, it is also argued that character traits, such as those involved in human moral-
ity, are highly complex, and therefore that moral bioenhancement is probably not 
feasible. These reservations are not only expressed with respect to the manipulation of 
neurotransmitters, but also with respect to the possibilities of genetically engineering 
virtues.
Arnhart doubts that we are anywhere near having found the “generic correlates of 
virtue that are clear, strong, and manipulable” (Arnhart, 2010, p. 80). Walker however 
thinks that, given the fact that much progress has been made in the behavioral genet-
ics of schizophrenia, this field can show the way forward to investigating the possibili-
ties of a comparable behavioral genetics of virtue: “After all, genes for schizophrenia 
are polygenetic and show intensity of expression and gene-environment interactions” 
(Walker, 2010, pp. 91-92). Douglas also feels that there are some elements of our moral 
psychology that we are beginning to understand to such a degree that manipulating 
them is possible: “it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that moral enhancement 
technologies which operate on relatively simple emotional drives could be developed 
in the medium term” (Douglas, 2008, p. 233).
Some authors, for example Robert Sparrow, voice concerns about reductionism, i.e. 
“the claim that whether an individual is a (morally) good person is a function of 
that person’s neurochemistry and/or that person’s genetics” (Sparrow, 2014b, p. 27) . 
Others, such as Hans-Joerg Ehni, Diana Aurenque (Ehni & Aurenque, 2012) and Chris 
Zarpentine (Zarpentine, 2013), warn us not to underestimate the importance of societal 
and cultural influences.
Unintended or undesirable side effects
Given the complexity of our moral psychology and biology, can we hope to influence it 
without also altering other crucial processes? Crockett (Crockett, 2014a) warns against 
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the unintended, and possibly undesirable, consequences of altering the function of a 
specific neurotransmitter, beyond the desired effects on moral behavior. Karim Jebari, 
for example, discusses findings that suggest that enhancing empathy may render indi-
viduals less fair and more partial rather than less fair and more impartial (Jebari, 2014). 
Agar provides the following example:
What we recognize as the correct pattern of judgment strikes a particular balance 
between the call of empathy and the appeal of moral reasoning. (…) Unbalanced 
enhancement of empathy is likely to disrupt what we view as the morally correct 
trade-off between benefits conferred on those to whom we are socially bonded and 
costs experienced by those to whom we are not socially bonded. It tends to reinforce 
our tendency to endorse solutions that inflict suffering on strangers to protect our 
nearest and dearest from less significant suffering. (Agar, 2015b, p. 344)
In the case of genetic engineering, many more systems than just the targeted virtue 
or vice might be effected. For example, Bronstein asks: “What happens if selecting for 
virtuous genes also increases the likelihood of cancer, diabetes, heart disease, or even 
shyness or depression?” (Bronstein, 2010, p. 85). 
Scientific rigor, standards
In addition to the scientific and philosophical uncertainties regarding our moral 
psychology and biology, some authors touch upon the issue of future scientific experi-
mentation with respect to moral bioenhancement. Bronstein asks whether medical ex-
perimentation is permissible, given the fact that immorality is not a disease: “Walker’s 
project design may also violate one of the great principles of human experimentation: 
that medical experimentation approved by proxy on behalf of those who cannot con-
sent must benefit the patient. Lack of moral virtue is perhaps suboptimal, but we have 
not yet classified it as a disease” (Bronstein, 2010, p. 85). Bronstein further observes 
that, in the case of Walker’s Genetic Virtue Program, many questions can be asked with 
respect to the research design: 
Will genetically modified humans be raised in controlled environments so that they 
can be more easily observed and exposed to uniform socialization? If not, how can 
we know whether these particular humans are indeed more virtuous, and that their 
virtue is indeed genetic? (Bronstein, 2010, p. 86)
4. Means and Processes of Arriving at Moral Improvement Matter Ethically
Under the fourth cluster, we discuss arguments that explore the question as to whether 
the difference between biomedical and non-biomedical means matters ethically. 
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Other (non-biomedical) means are preferable
From an intrinsic perspective, it is often considered whether it would be better, 
more praiseworthy, or more authentic, if a person betters herself without resorting 
to biomedical means? Or as Douglas puts it: is it the case that adopting “biomedical 
means to moral enhancement is objectionable not just relative to other alternative 
means, but in an absolute sense” (Douglas, 2008, p. 236)? Sprinkle thinks that even 
if a safe and “convincingly enduring” intervention would become available, people 
would likely prefer a non-genetic remedy (Sprinkle, 2010, p. 89). This argument implies 
that we have intrinsic reasons, such as authenticity and personal identity, to reject 
biomedical interventions in favor of traditional means for moral enhancement. It also 
assumes that there is a principled difference between biomedical and traditional, non-
biomedical means.
Others argue that biomedical and non-biomedical means will be used in concert, rather 
than separately. According to Douglas (Douglas, 2008), we will likely regard biomedi-
cal enhancement and self-education as complementary and are likely to reinforce the 
desire for both by initially engaging in one or the other. Moreover, according to Ka-
basenche, “none of us achieve any measure of success in moral formation without 
significant assistance from others. If authentic moral formation is something you do 
completely by yourself, none of us has done it” (William Paul Kabasenche, 2012, p. 20). 
There is no principled difference between traditional and biomedical means
Alternatively, some authors argue that there is no principled difference between using 
traditional and biomedical means to morally better oneself or others. DeGrazia, for 
example, argues that (many of the) arguments against biomedical means also apply 
to traditional, non-biomedical means: “one should not inculcate moral values that are 
wrong, so how can a parent be sure that she or he is justified in providing a particular 
type of moral instruction? Also facing this challenge are public school teachers who 
attempt to inculcate in students certain moral virtues such as civility, respect for dif-
ferences and concern for the poor” (Douglas, 2014b, p. 363).
Likewise, according to Walker’s ‘companions in innocence’ line of reasoning, any 
principled argument given against biomedical means for moral enhancement, such 
as those involved in his Genetic Virtue Program, equally applies to socialization and 
education efforts: “If the [Genetic Virtue Program] is wrong in attempting to promote 
virtue as a means of making people morally better, then much current socialization 
and education is mistaken as well” (Walker, 2009, pp. 35-36).
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Sparrow however maintains that a significant disanalogy exists between traditional 
means of moral improvement and the biological manipulation of behavior and motiva-
tion. Whereas education is characterized by “a fundamental moral equality between 
educator and educated”, biomedical interventions to reshape the agency of others 
“involve a subject acting towards an object and as such are fundamentally structured 
by a profound inequality” (Sparrow, 2014a, p. 26).
5. Arguments Related to the Freedom, Identity, and Autonomy of the 
Individual
Under cluster five, we discuss various arguments regarding the question as to whether 
moral bioenhancement would limit the individual in his or her opportunities to freely 
choose his or her behavior? We focus on concerns related to individual liberty and 
autonomy.
Moral bioenhancement might threaten the freedom of the individual
The concept of freedom takes a central role in the moral enhancement debate, with 
Harris being one of its most ardent defenders. He is of the opinion that individual 
liberty is of utmost importance, and should take priority over all other good ends that 
we might pursue. He explicitly opposes “any measures that make the freedom to do 
immoral things impossible, rather than simply making the doing of them wrong and 
giving us moral, legal and prudential reasons to refrain” (Harris, 2011, p. 105). William 
Simkulet argues that “when one is forced against one’s will to do as the virtuous person 
in one’s place would freely do” we should speak of moral compulsion instead of moral 
enhancement (Simkulet, 2012, p. 17).
Some authors, such as Jebari and Birgit Beck, call for conceptual clarification of a suit-
able concept of freedom in the debate on moral enhancement: what kind of freedom is 
at stake? (Jebari, 2014; Beck, 2015)
Moral bioenhancement might endanger our identity and autonomy
Related to the worries concerning individual liberty, concerns are voiced that moral 
bioenhancement could pose a threat to our true, autonomous self. Douglas argues that 
the counter-moral emotions that would be altered are at best part of a person’s ‘brute’ 
self, and thus enhancement would be “allowing his true self greater freedom” (Douglas, 
2008, p. 240). Our true or authentic self refers to our internal characteristics whereas 
our brute self refers to anything that is external to this (Douglas, 2008, p. 240). Certain 
enhancements could alter our brute self in such a way that it constrains our true self, 
thereby threatening our freedom and autonomy. At the same time, others argue that 
we should not overestimate an individual’s capacity for full autonomous behavior as 
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exemplified by his/her ‘true self’. For example, Russell Blackford warns against attrib-
uting to ourselves “a “spooky kind of autonomy all the way down” that does not exist 
in the real world” (Blackford, 2010, p. 83).
Some authors also worry about possible changes of identity as a result of moral bio-
enhancement. Douglas distinguishes a loss of identity in a strong sense, in which an 
individual would, post-enhancement, be a completely different person, and a weak 
sense, in that moral bioenhancement would change some of her most fundamental 
psychological characteristics (Douglas, 2008, p. 239). Yet Douglas stresses that we only 
have reason to preserve those psychological characteristics that have positive value for 
the individual in question. Whereas Douglas emphasizes that the individual is free to 
choose, others such as Agar (Agar, 2010) are less clear on how the positive value of par-
ticular psychological characteristics is to be determined: on the basis of an individual’s 
own judgment, on someone else’s judgment (e.g. within a criminal justice contexts), or 
on a specific moral theory?
Given the large diversity of potential moral enhancements, moral enhancement inter-
ventions will inevitably prioritize some moral values or character traits over others. 
This, some argue, will place the person who undergoes the intervention at the mercy 
of the person performing the intervention: “Someone who has been subjected to moral 
enhancement is likely to have a reduced sensitivity to moral reasons rejected by his or 
her enhancer” (Agar, 2010, p. 75).
Despite concerns about individual liberty and autonomy, a trade-off is justified
Acknowledging that moral bioenhancement might indeed negatively impact the 
freedom, autonomy, or identity of an individual, should this stop us from pursuing 
moral bioenhancement? Some authors, for example Douglas and DeGrazia, stress that 
although such a loss might be regrettable, if it is compensated by an increase of some 
other good, the loss can be justified (Douglas, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014). DeGrazia, for 
example, maintains that “we should not exaggerate the value of freedom. After all, 
moral behavior itself, the end product, is also extremely important—independently 
of how free it is” (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 367; see also Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 
2014b, p. 252). Savulescu and Persson claim that:
We are not free to commit serious crime even now – the laws prohibits it on pain 
of punishment. What we weren’t free to do, the God Machine makes strictly impos-
sible. If this is a loss, it would be outweighed by the fact that there are no victims 
suffering from serious crimes. (Savulescu & Persson, 2012, p. 13)
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Bronstein is not convinced however that this trade-off is justified: “one might ask 
whether the goal of moral perfection is worth the trade-off for human autonomy on a 
large scale” (Bronstein, 2010, p. 86).
6. Arguments Related to Social/ Group Effects and Dynamics
Finally, under the sixth cluster, we discuss arguments that consider possible societal 
and group effects of moral bioenhancement. Would moral bioenhancement foster 
abuse? Should its use be mandatory, and who should decide? Is there overconfidence in 
the possibilities of biomedical solutions? 
Moral bioenhancement benefits others
To start, Douglas situates questions about the desirability of moral bioenhancement in 
the context of the wider enhancement debate, and argues that the fact that (unlike other 
enhancements) moral enhancement primarily benefits others, neutralizes many of the 
objections often raised in the broader enhancement debate: “moral enhancement[s] 
could not easily be criticized on the ground that their use by some would disadvantage 
others” (Douglas, 2008, p. 230).
Bronstein however turns this argument around, and criticizes Walker’s Genetic Virtue 
Project precisely because it appears to prioritize the benefits to others over the benefits 
to the agent (Bronstein, 2010, p. 85). He worries that in the design of the project, the 
interests of society will take priority over the interests of the individual.
Walker (Walker, 2009) raises the worry that the biologically unenhanced might be 
discriminated against in favor of the biologically enhanced, but immediately adds that 
it is not clear whether the same incentive for discrimination would arise in cases of 
moral enhancement as can be expected in cases of physical and/or cognitive enhance-
ment.
Moral bioenhancement might foster abuse
Another concern that is put forward, is the fear that an altered ratio of moral people 
to immoral people might give rise to free-riding: the few morally unenhanced might 
more easily take advantage of the good intentions of the many morally enhanced. 
This dynamic might be visible not only between groups of individuals, but between 
countries as well, Shook suggests: “Depictions of entire societies or a whole planet un-
dergoing empathetic moral enhancement will remain utopian fantasies. One country 
after another will decline moral enhancement until the “worse” countries have done it, 
and each country would want their neighbors to go first” (Shook, 2012, p. 11).
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Walker however thinks that this worry underestimates the resilience of the morally 
enhanced: “it seems to assume that the virtuous are meek or compliant” (Walker, 2009, 
pp. 42-43). 
Moral bioenhancement might undermine moral diversity and moral debate
Moral enhancement also raises questions with respect to which moral views or para-
digms may benefit at the expense of others, and whether this may lead to a diminished 
diversity of views. Brooks argues that:
The question is not only whether moral enhancement might lead to only one moral 
judgment, but also whether moral enhancement might benefit some reasonable 
moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines over others. If not all reasonable 
doctrines may benefit equally, then moral enhancement might violate the equality 
between citizens and fail to respect the reasonable pluralism that exists. (Brooks, 
2012, p. 29)
This may hamper the quality of political and social debate: Shook worries that moral 
enhancers “could diminish opportunity, capacity, and responsibility for serious ethical 
thinking” (Shook, 2012, p. 8). Moreover, in a future dystopia, moral enhancements may 
be regarded as suitable quick fixes in case of moral ambiguities and dilemmas, thereby 
further reducing valuable opportunities for serious ethical reflection: “individuals 
thinking too hard about moral ambiguities and dilemmas are told that they simply 
need their enhancers adjusted” (Shook, 2012, p. 8). 
Sparrow worries that the morally enhanced would gain important advantages, for 
example by their exclusive participation in social and political institutions, thereby 
generating or intensifying social inequalities (Sparrow, 2014b). 
Risks of utopian derailing
Related to the risk of disrespect for reasonable pluralism, some authors express the 
worry that the promises and high hopes of moral bioenhancement projects (for ex-
ample Walker’s (Walker, 2009) proposal for a Genetic Virtue Project) will repeat many 
of the mistakes (such as mass regimentation and loss of autonomy) of what Bronstein 
calls ‘High Modernist planning’: “Walker’s plan features all of the confidence, and 
many of the other signs, of High Modernist planning. The project that he proposes is 
transnational in scope; it seeks to transcend, or one might even say ignore, current 
political realities. Its emphasis is on the future, and it is enlivened by the discourse of 
the good” (Bronstein, 2010, p. 86).
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Sprinkle recalls the excesses of the eugenics movement: “Walker’s work should not be 
turned wrong-side-out. But neither can the lessons of the Eugenics Movement be taken 
as safely learned long ago. It was avowed to be a progressive movement, a product of 
progressive thought and an instrument for progressive action” (Sprinkle, 2010, p. 89).
Mandatory implementation or free/ parental choice
Despite the many reservations described above, if we assume that safe and effective 
moral bioenhancement would become available, would it be justifiable to make its use 
mandatory – for all, or for specific target groups? First, Bronstein raises doubts that 
many people will voluntarily seek moral bioenhancement: “how large is the distance 
between explaining what is good for you and imposing what we know to be good 
for you? (…) Genetic virtue is an idea that ought not to be imposed on an unwilling 
public—and seems unlikely to find a willing public” (Bronstein, 2010, p. 86).
Persson and Savulescu however argue that an unwilling public should not stop the 
program, and that safe, effective enhancements should be compulsory: “If safe moral 
enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use 
should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should 
take them are least likely to be inclined to use them” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2008, p. 174). Rakic´ (Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a) however argues that making moral bioen-
hancement obligatory would deprive us of an essential part of our human existence, 
that is, the freedom “for us acting intentionally in a morally appropriate manner” (Rakic´, 
2014b, p. 248), and therefore advocates voluntary moral enhancement. 
A specific version of this question arises with respect to children. Should parents be 
the ones to decide whether their children should undergo an intervention, or whether 
their future offspring should be genetically selected within the framework of Walker’s 
(Walker, 2009, 2010) Genetic Virtue Project? Walker himself favors “some hybrid or 
conditional option to mediate between the state-mandated versus liberal (parental 
choice) implementation” in which parents are free to choose which virtuous charac-
teristics they would like to see enhanced, but in which they are not free to choose the 
associated vices (Walker, 2009, p. 43). Arnhart wonders who will be responsible for 
setting and enforcing the standards for these virtues and vices, and fears the “threat of 
tyranny – either the tyranny of a few or the tyranny of the majority” (Arnhart, 2010, 
pp. 80-81).
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Critical appraisal of the current debate
The debate on moral bioenhancement is a fairly recent phenomenon. Douglas, in the 
first article on the subject in 2008, discusses moral bioenhancement as a theoretical 
possibility in the context of the discussion on the permissibility of enhancement 
in general. Persson and Savulescu first discuss the possibility of moral bioenhance-
ment in the context of the rapid developments in the field of cognitive enhancement 
(Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008). Although they are doubtful as to whether moral 
bioenhancement is in fact feasible in the foreseeable future, they nevertheless call 
for intensified research efforts because they see moral bioenhancement as the only 
possible solution for a number of pressing problems. Later on, the debate moved on 
to fundamental philosophical questions about what human morality involves, and 
whether or not we would be able to reach enough consensus to transcend our current 
pluralistic moral reality. In what follows, we critically assess the arguments discussed 
under the six clusters presented above, and identify those issues and concerns that 
have been neglected so far. We identified four topics of concern: (1) the distinction be-
tween treatment and enhancement; (2) an overestimation of the possibilities/feasibility 
of moral bioenhancement; (3) insufficient attention to side-effects, risks and safety; and 
(4) identity changes.
The Distinction Between Treatment and Enhancement
There has been surprisingly little discussion concerning the criteria we should use 
to identify specific interventions as moral enhancement rather than as therapy or 
moral education. In the debate so far, it remains unclear whether ‘moral enhance-
ment’ should be taken to include treating those with a pathological lack of certain 
moral capacities. Horskötter and colleagues argue that those interventions aimed at 
restoring normal moral functioning in subjects whose moral functioning is somehow 
pathologically impaired, should be called medical treatment, rather than enhancement 
(Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2012, p. 27). Agar is one of the few authors in 
the debate who do make this distinction. He claims that targeted interventions aimed 
at “therapeutic ends” can possibly amend specific deficiencies, but that these same 
interventions “can produce unbalanced excesses when used to enhance beyond human 
norms” (Agar, 2014, p. 369). Other authors, for example Douglas and DeGrazia, appear 
to use examples of general moral enhancement and specific mental pathologies, such 
as psychopathy and antisocial traits (e.g. violent aggression), interchangeably (Douglas, 
2008; DeGrazia, 2014).
Although some, for example DeGrazia (2014), reject the distinction between treat-
ment and enhancement, and while it is clear that the exact boundaries will of course 
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always be up for dispute, we believe that distinguishing between treatment of those 
with pathologies and enhancement of normal people will greatly benefit the debate. 
Shifting the focus to treatment of pathological deficiencies in morality raises new and 
interesting questions that are different from the ones raised in the debate on moral en-
hancement for normal people. What is to be considered normal moral functioning, and 
who is to determine whether a subject functions ‘normally’? Should subjects who lack 
certain capacities or who show ‘abnormal’ moral functioning be considered to have 
a disease or disorder? In other words: when should diminished moral functioning or 
immoral behavior be considered to be pathological? How should society deal with com-
mon moral deficiencies? As mentioned above, Persson and Savulescu argue that safe 
and effective moral enhancement should be compulsory since those individuals that 
need them will be least willing and/or likely to use them (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2008). Such safe and effective moral bio-enhancements are not available at present and 
difficult questions remain to be answered. This brings us to our final remark regarding 
the distinction between treatment and enhancement: more debate is urgently needed 
on what would be the right kind of response towards those who behave immorally due 
to pathological deficiencies of their moral capacities: treatment or punishment? 
Overestimation of the Possibilities/ Feasibility of moral bioenhancement
Although some authors, such as Bronstein and Sprinkle, are very cautious and even 
skeptical (Bronstein, 2010; Sprinkle, 2010), many if not most authors in the current de-
bate voice an overwhelming enthusiasm concerning the feasibility and future applica-
tions of moral bioenhancement. However, based on the empirical possibilities available 
today and in the near future, this enthusiasm seems somewhat misguided. The lack of 
scientific scrutiny is particularly striking when the possibility of genetic screening and 
modification to morally enhance individuals and potentially reduce criminal behavior 
is put forward (e.g. Walker’s Genetic Virtue Project). Although genetic findings may im-
prove our understanding of the risk factors associated with criminal behavior, we are 
far from identifying genetic risk factors for crime that could predict with reasonable 
certainty which individuals are at greater risk of engaging in criminal behavior. There 
is no one-to-one relationship between biological factors and criminal behavior. Indeed, 
depending on the environmental context, many individuals that carry biological risk 
factors for such behavior will not develop it, while others who do not show these risk 
factors might (van Goozen & Fairchild, 2008; Glenn & Raine, 2014; Glenn et al., 2015). 
Genetic modification that could lead to reliable moral enhancement is extremely far 
removed from our present-day knowledge and capacities, and it is doubtful whether it 
will ever be successfully achieved.
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Morality and moral behavior are associated with so many different areas of the brain, 
that it has been claimed that morality is everywhere and maybe nowhere in the brain 
(Young & Dungan, 2012). Offenders with impaired moral decision-making, such as indi-
viduals with antisocial personality disorder, show overlapping abnormalities in several 
of these brain areas. Morality and moral behavior are very complex human traits and 
this is reflected at the developmental, experiential and neuroanatomical level, and 
most likely at the genetic level as well. It is misguided to think that we will be able to 
identify single genes or a single combination of genes that underlie morality and moral 
behavior. As most psychiatric and personality disorders are polygenic (i.e. involve a 
set of genes) and genetically heterogeneous (i.e. different sets of genes underlie the 
same diagnosis), it is highly likely that complex cognitive-emotional processes such 
as morality and (im)moral behavior are similarly associated with a myriad of genes 
and substantial genetic heterogeneity among different individuals. Similarly, not all 
antisocial individuals show the same biological deficits and a wide range of biological 
and environmental factors may contribute to antisocial behavior in a variety of ways 
(Glenn et al., 2015).
Other potential interventions for moral enhancement could be neurofeedback, tran-
scranial brain stimulation (e.g. magnetic stimulation, and direct current stimulation), 
electrical stimulation of the brain via electrode implants (e.g. deep brain stimulation 
or DBS), and neuron replacement therapy (currently investigational). Although some 
of these neurotechnologies have reached the stage of demonstrated clinical effective-
ness for certain disorders (e.g. neurofeedback for ADHD, TMS for depression, and DBS 
for Parkinson’s), few have reached that level regarding phenotypic traits that likely 
contribute to (im)moral behavior. Nevertheless, preliminary studies indicate that tran-
scranial brain stimulation might be effective for addiction, isolated case-studies exist 
where electrical brain stimulation via electrode implants is applied for chronic ag-
gression or addiction, and preliminary experimental research suggests that functional 
magnetic resonance imaging neurofeedback could hold some potential for addressing 
addictions, antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy and sexual disorders. Improv-
ing ‘normal’ moral traits or behavior with such means is even further away from being 
practically feasible at present.
The idea of reliably bioengineering complex cognitive-emotional processes such as 
altruism or virtues is not feasible in the near future and it is highly unlikely even 
in the distant future. Because so many different biological and environmental factors 
influence an individual’s (im)moral behavior, we are convinced that biomedical means 
alone will not suffice for moral enhancement. Hence, the debate on moral enhance-
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ment should take as its starting point a combined approach in which traditional meth-
ods and emerging biomedical methods are used in tandem.
Little Attention to Side-effects, Risks and Safety
Except for psychopharmacological or hormonal treatments, few actual or potential 
interventions for moral bio-enhancement have been discussed in the moral enhance-
ment debate. Moreover, whenever specific biomedical interventions are discussed, it 
is particularly worrisome that surprisingly little attention is given to side-effects, risks 
and safety-issues. Every biomedical intervention in the brain will likely have unintend-
ed, unwanted or unexpected side effects, especially so in cases where the underlying 
mechanisms of action are not well-understood and/or the procedure is invasive. 
While neurofeedback and transcranial stimulation are non-invasive procedures, electri-
cal stimulation of the brain via electrode implants and neuron replacement therapy are 
highly invasive. For example, aside from risks associated with brain surgery and elec-
trode placement (e.g. brain hemorrhage, infection, death), DBS for Parkinson’s disease 
carries a 1.1-33% risk of cognitive side effects (e.g. speech disturbance), a 1.3-10.2% risk 
of behavioral side effects (e.g. hypomania), a 0.5-25% risk of psychiatric side effects (e.g. 
depression) and a 50-71% risk of familial side effects (e.g. marital problems) (Clausen, 
2010). While electrical stimulation of the brain via electrode implants is essentially 
reversible, neuron replacement therapy is a non-reversible procedure involving the 
injection of stem cells into the brain or spinal cord. Aside from the risks associated 
with surgery and stem cell injections, this carries the risk of tumor growth, seizures 
or intractable pain (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013). Finally, even more familiar 
interventions such as pharmaceuticals and hormones have risks and side-effects, and 
their long term effects are not always known. In sum, in contrast to what has been the 
case so far, safety should be a key issue in the debate on moral enhancement.
Identity Changes
It is particularly surprising from a philosophical point of view that so little attention 
is given in the debate to unintended, unwanted or unexpected identity changes and 
the huge impact these changes may have on one’s self-understanding, well-being and 
social and familial relationships. This problem has been discussed quite extensively in 
relation to psychopharmaceuticals (especially SSRI’s) and DBS, but potential identity 
changes due to changes in one’s moral dispositions or behavior are not often touched 
upon in the moral enhancement debate. 
Within the broader biomedical treatment and enhancement debate, several authors 
have convincingly argued that whereas drastic identity changes are problematic from 
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an ethical perspective, typically requiring the discontinuation of the treatment or 
intervention, mild or moderate changes are not necessarily ethically problematic (e.g. 
Baylis, 2013). The key philosophical concept that is at stake is the concept of narrative 
identity rather than numerical identity. Narrative identity reflects an individual’s most 
central and salient characteristics (e.g., motivations, beliefs, values, desires, character 
traits) that together comprise their self, and needs to be understood within the dynam-
ics of psychological change. These characteristics may and often do change throughout 
one’s life in response to various life events. It is important for the continuity of nar-
rative identity that such changes are or can be incorporated into one’s life story in a 
coherent way, without compromising one’s sense of self. Since many if not most of such 
‘naturally’ or ‘traditionally’ occurring changes are experienced in a non-problematic 
and identity preserving way throughout our life, one can, by comparison, argue for 
the ethical acceptability of narrative identity changes resulting from biomedical treat-
ment or enhancement interventions (DeGrazia, 2005; Schechtman, 2009). At the same 
time however, it could be the case that unforeseen, instantaneous, uncontrollable and/
or drastic changes in one’s moral dispositions or behavior are more likely to disrupt 
one’s narrative identity, giving rise to a whole new array of personal and even societal 
queries. In agreement with the latter view, in a public opinion study on biomedical 
enhancement, individuals reported to be most reluctant to undergo enhancements 
of traits that are more fundamental to the self (e.g., morally relevant traits such as 
empathy and kindness) and the most frequently voiced reasons for resisting those 
enhancements were concerns of changes to their fundamental self (Riis et al., 2008). 
Summary 
In this paper, we have categorized and discussed the arguments in the published debate 
on the ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement. We have organized these argu-
ments under the following headings: (1) why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement, 
(2) it will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should 
purport, (3) the feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific 
research, (4) means and processes of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically, 
(5) arguments related to the freedom, identity and autonomy of the individual, and (6) 
arguments related to social/ group effects and dynamics. 
After discussing each argument in more detail, we have identified a number of issues 
that in our view merit greater attention. First, we observed that, in the debate so far, 
discussions about the moral enhancement of ‘humanity as a whole’ and the targeted 
treatment of specific mental health disorders (such as psychopathy) are not sufficiently 
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distinguished. Many authors overestimate the scientific as well as the practical feasibil-
ity of the interventions they discuss, rendering the debate too speculative. Related to 
this is our observation that insufficient attention is devoted to possible side-effects, 
risks and safety. There is also remarkably little attention to questions about identity 
and identity change. 
We believe that the debate on moral enhancement is extremely interesting from a 
meta-ethical point of view, since it triggers important questions about the nature of 
morality, moral thought and moral behavior. However, the normative ethical ques-
tion as to whether moral bioenhancement as such is good or bad, desirable or not, is 
not a very fruitful question for further debate. We therefore believe that, instead of 
speculating about non-realistic scenarios like the genetic engineering of morality, or 
other imaginary forms of biomedical moral enhancement of ‘the whole of humanity’, 
it would be much more useful to discuss novel and emerging biomedical interventions 
that may improve moral capacities or moral behavior in specific target groups and in 
relation to particular mental health problems. For the near future, biomedical treat-
ment of moral pathologies may be a more realistic option than moral enhancement, 
and may raise more concrete moral questions. 
In order for the moral enhancement debate to move beyond its focus on speculative 
philosophical theorizing and discussion, we need in-depth analyses of both the practi-
cal feasibility of existing or novel biomedical interventions for moral therapy (and 
perhaps eventually enhancement); and the ethical acceptability of such interventions, 
including safety concerns. 
We conclude that although the discussion on moral enhancement so far raises interest-
ing questions on an abstract, philosophical level, it often appears to be too remote 
from real (and realistic) contexts and applications to do justice to the specific ethical 
questions raised by such practices. We therefore urge for a more focused debate on 
realistic options of biomedical treatment of moral pathologies and the concrete moral 
questions these treatments raise.
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Abstract
In this article, we consider contexts or domains in which (future) moral bioenhance-
ment interventions possibly or most likely will be implemented. By looking closely at 
similar or related existing practices and their relevant ethical frameworks, we hope 
to identify ethical considerations that are relevant for evaluating potential moral bio-
enhancement interventions. We examine, first, debates on the proper scope of moral 
education; second, proposals for identifying early risk factors for antisocial behaviour; 
and third, the difficult balancing of individual freedom and third party concerns in 
(forensic) psychiatry. In imagining moral bioenhancement in practice, we observe that 
unlike other forms of enhancement, moral enhancement fundamentally asks how 
the interests and preferences of the individual and the interests of others should be 
weighed (in view of public safety and managing public risk). Highly diverse domains 
such as education, mental health, and the judicial domain might be involved, and 
moral bioenhancement might challenge existing institutional settings. Given these 
highly varied contexts and domains, it appears unlikely that there will be a distinct set 
of practices that will be referred to as “moral bioenhancement.”
Imagining moral bioenhancement practices 71
Introduction
In the literature on the ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement, a range of 
different potential interventions and applications has been proposed. For example, 
following the growing understanding of biological (neurological, genetic) underpin-
nings of aggression, some argue for morally enhancing (potential) violent offenders. 
Others have speculated about enhancing our capacities for fairness, cooperation, and 
empathy, and for countering (supposedly innate, evolutionary hard-wired) xenophobic 
and racist biases (Douglas, 2008).
Recurring themes in the debate on the ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement 
are questions about the need for moral bioenhancement; the possibility of reaching 
consensus on what moral bioenhancement should realize; its scientific and practi-
cal feasibility; questions whether the difference between traditional and biomedical 
means of arriving at moral enhancement matters ethically; arguments related to the 
freedom, identity, and autonomy of the individual; and arguments related to social/
group effects and dynamics (Specker et al., 2014). More recent discussions have focused, 
among other concerns, on the ethical relevance of the distinction between direct and 
indirect moral bioenhancement (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015; Schaefer, 2015), the 
effect that prescription drugs could already be having on moral agency (Levy et al., 
2014a, 2014b), the question of whether mandatory moral bioenhancement would be 
permissible or even required, and how people could be encouraged to participate in 
moral bioenhancement voluntarily (Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu, 2014b; Rakic´, 
2014b; S. Carter, 2015).
In an earlier article, we argued that although discussions on moral enhancement so far 
raise important philosophical questions about the nature of human morality, moral be-
havior, and moral thought, these debates often appear to be too remote from real (and 
realistic) contexts and applications to do justice to the specific ethical questions raised 
by such practices (Specker et al., 2014). We therefore advocated a more focused debate 
on realistic options of biomedical treatment of moral pathologies and the concrete 
moral questions these treatments raise.
As the science on moral bioenhancement is “in its infancy” (Crockett, 2014c), it is 
not known which ethical issues will play out once potential moral bioenhancement 
technologies are more fully developed. In what Alfred Nordmann has termed the “if 
and then syndrome,” a possible technological development is presented as inevitable 
and as something that demands immediate attention (Nordmann, 2007, p. 31). We 
agree that speculating about potential applications of technologies currently under 
72 Chapter 3
development—such as moral bioenhancement—without specifying intended users, 
target groups, and contexts of implementation runs the risk of “exploring a misguided 
or irrelevant set of ethical issues” (Brey, 2012, p. 2), while at the same time overlooking 
issues that would be important to consider once these technologies are implemented. 
This is why we think that the rather speculative and abstract debate on moral bioen-
hancement so far can benefit from closely examining either a number of contexts in 
which interventions under the heading of moral bioenhancement might first be imple-
mented, or domains that are in one or more aspects importantly similar to potential 
moral bioenhancement practices, and therefore can inform our ethical thinking. 
In this article, we start from the assumption that it is helpful to consider in which 
contexts or domains (future) moral bioenhancement interventions possibly or most 
likely will be implemented. By looking closely at similar or related existing practices 
and their relevant ethical frameworks, we hope to identify ethical considerations that 
are relevant for evaluating potential moral bioenhancement interventions. Focusing 
on how we deliberate ethically within these domains now will help identify ethical 
considerations specific to those domains. We think the moral bioenhancement lit-
erature can and should build on the ethical literature about these related practices. 
We also believe that it might point to ways in which moral bioenhancement differs 
from other types of enhancements such as sports, beauty, and cognitive enhancement. 
And finally, we think that because of these differences, ethical evaluation of moral 
bioenhancement asks for partially different evaluative frameworks. With this article 
we hope to contribute to the development of such frameworks. 
Given these considerations, in this article, we have chosen to examine, first, debates 
on the proper scope of moral education; second, proposals for identifying early risk 
factors for antisocial behavior, and third, the difficult balancing of individual freedom 
and third party concerns in (forensic) psychiatry.13 If and when moral bioenhancement 
technologies would become available, we expect that they would first be implemented 
within these domains. Moreover, we think that a number of central themes that are 
currently discussed within the debate on moral bioenhancement are the subject of 
debate within these three domains as well. For example, what moral enhancement 
should purport in contexts of moral pluralism is already being discussed extensively 
within the literature on moral education. Likewise, whether and under what conditions 
treatment should be made mandatory is a topic of debate in the literature on (forensic) 
psychiatry. In the following paragraphs, we intend to show that ethical considerations 
13 This list is not exhaustive, and closer examination of other domains might be of interest as well; for 
example, the domain of artificial intelligence (Savulescu & Maslen, 2015).
Imagining moral bioenhancement practices 73
that are central within these existing practices can inform and add to current debates 
on moral bioenhancement.
Moral Bioenhancement in Context
Moral Education and the Right to an Open Future
One often-cited reason why the possibilities of moral bioenhancement should be ex-
plored is the supposed lack of effectiveness of so-called traditional methods of moral 
enhancement, such as upbringing, socialization, and education. Another recurring 
argument is that there are little principled differences between employing traditional 
and potential biomedical methods of moral betterment in terms of their ethical ac-
ceptability. David DeGrazia, for example, argues that (many of the) arguments against 
biomedical means also apply to traditional, non-biomedical means: “one should not 
inculcate moral values that are wrong, so how can a parent be sure that she or he is 
justified in providing a particular type of moral instruction? Also facing this challenge 
are public school teachers who attempt to inculcate in students certain moral virtues 
such as civility, respect for differences and concern for the poor” (DeGrazia, 2014, p. 
363).
An example of a domain in which these same questions are explicitly discussed is the 
field of so-called “moral education.” What is the proper aim of (moral) education and 
what is the appropriate role of parents and educators in guiding the moral develop-
ment of children? What particular moral codes and values do we want to nurture or 
even instil in our children, and how much pluralism are we willing to tolerate? What 
aspects of the family, social, and schooling environment impact on the development of 
prosocial and moral competencies of children? 
The theoretical and empirical study of moral functioning—of moral cognition, moral 
emotions, moral behavior, moral motivation, moral character, and moral develop-
ment—has attracted a lot of interest from a wide range of scientific disciplines in 
recent years (Young & Dungan, 2012; Darragh et al., 2015; Decety & Wheatley, 2015). 
At what Daniel Lapsley and Gustavo Carlo have termed ‘the new crossroad’ of moral 
development research, questions arise about the relevance of these different lines of 
research for “addressing the pressing social issues of our times” (Lapsley & Carlo, 2014, 
p. 3).14 They argue that in order to adequately address these issues, broad, integrative 
14 The diverse social issues they mention are frequently discussed in the debate on moral bioenhancement 
as well: violence, genocide, and war; concerns about environmental degradation; poverty and famine; 
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and multidisciplinary theoretical and methodological approaches are needed. One 
important similarity between discussions on moral education and those on moral 
bioenhancement is a search not only for a scientifically adequate model of human 
moral psychology, for linking “substantive philosophical issues with relevant (neuro)
psychological data and in providing the empirical paradigm with which to do so” 
(Frimer & Walker, 2008, p. 334), but also an explicit focus on the practical implications 
of this growing body of knowledge. 
Traditionally, within the literature on moral education, two main dominant educa-
tional approaches to the moral formation of children can be distinguished: traditional 
character education—focusing on the inculcation of virtuous traits of character—and 
rational moral education—seeking to facilitate the development of autonomous moral 
judgment and the ability to resolve disputes and reach consensus (Narvaez, 2006, p. 
703). The latter approach focuses on nurturing skills such as perspective taking and 
deliberation more than on direct instruction on what to value and how to act (Narvaez, 
2006, p. 708), and has, therefore, been characterized as a more progressive approach 
to moral education. Traditional character education on the other hand focuses on 
internalizing values inherent in the tradition and culture of society (Schuitema et al., 
2008). Darcia Narvaez formulates a number of familiar strengths and weaknesses of 
both approaches: 
Whereas rational moral education adopts constructivism and adult coaching, 
fosters reasoning for civic engagement, and avoids relativism, it can be criticized 
for a narrow emphasis on moral reasoning, whether in dilemma discussion or a 
just community, which is insufficient for moral action and misses the centrality of 
moral identity in moral behaviour. Traditional character education rightly empha-
sizes the importance of content and demonstrated some insight into the impact of 
environments. However, it can be faulted for a changing set of core virtues open to 
the charge of relativism, for downplaying the importance of autonomy, and for a 
problematic pedagogy (Narvaez, 2006, p. 712).
More integrative and comprehensive perspectives on moral functioning and the impli-
cation for moral development and education are explicitly being sought, for example 
in a special issue of the Journal of Moral Education in 2008 (Turiel, 2008). Dissatisfaction 
with “the near exclusive focus on verbal reasoning about justice in a large portion 
of the research in the field” (Reed & Stoermer, 2008, p. 418) has inspired attempts 
to formulate unifying, integrative models that encompass “not only personality but, 
and the persistence of racism and discrimination. 
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also, on the one hand, the brain and central nervous system, and on the other hand, 
interaction and culture” (Reed & Stoermer, 2008, p. 419; Kim & Sankey, 2009), and that 
acknowledge the importance of both reflective reasoning (in the Kantian or utilitarian 
traditions), moral emotions (based in the Humean tradition), and virtues and good 
practical judgement (following the Aristotelian tradition) (Narvaez, 2006, p. 703; Reed 
& Stoermer, 2008, p. 419; Wren, 2014). This literature could inform the moral enhance-
ment debate. 
Both in the debate on moral bioenhancement and within moral education, a central 
and much discussed topic of debate concerns the question what moral bioenhance-
ment should focus on given the fact that ethical systems and theories differ consider-
ably (Schaefer, 2011; Shook, 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; Hauskeller, 2014; Sparrow, 2014a; 
Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2015a). Given a plurality of moral values and outlooks, a 
question that has been asked in the philosophy of education is whether parents and 
educators are justified in raising and shaping children according to their own prefer-
ences: “Should our goal be to raise our children so that they will have, as adults, as 
many options as possible, to give them, insofar as we can, a maximally ‘open’ future? 
Or should our goal be more directive, to lead our children toward a more specifically 
shaped future that we ourselves endorse?” (Mills, 2003, p. 499)
The “right to an open future” argument concerns the balancing of the liberty of parents 
to raise their children according to their own lights, and the “anticipatory autonomy 
rights” of children to leave important life choices open. Joel Feinberg who introduced 
the right in 1980, discusses adults’ rights to exercise their religious beliefs, a right that 
a child is not yet capable of exercising, but that still holds “prematurely” as a so-called 
“right-in-trust” (Feinberg, 1998, p. 251). The argument has become commonplace in 
applied ethics in debates on genetic reproductive technologies, through which disclo-
sure of certain types of genetic information could infringe on childrens’ right to have 
future’s options kept open until they are capable of making their own decisions (Lotz, 
2006, p. 537).
In the context of education, a child’s right to have important life choices kept open in-
cludes “restrictions on what parents (and others) are allowed to do to children, and, on 
some interpretations,…what parents (and others) ought to provide children” (Millum, 
2014, p. 522). Besides an argument for refraining from imposing important life choices, 
the right to an open future might also be interpreted as a “positive claim right” with 
a corresponding obligation for parents and educators to ensure that a child has a good 
starting position (Lotz, 2006). This right to an open future argument could therefore 
also be used within the context of moral enhancement: on the one hand, to argue for 
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limitations on what parents or others may do to “morally enhance” children, and on 
the other to argue in favor of instilling capacities that would help them to become full 
moral subjects with their own moral autonomy.
Early Identification of “Risky Children” and the Moral Pitfalls of Screening
It has been argued that “early childhood is probably the optimal starting point for 
moral enhancement” (Christen & Narvaez, 2012, p. 26), and that neuroscientific knowl-
edge may inform traditional forms of moral education as well as enable early identifica-
tion and prevention of antisocial behavior. Research is underway to determine which 
biomarkers—genetic, neurobiological, and physiological—give the most accurate risk 
predictions (van Goozen & Fairchild, 2008; Singh & Rose, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Liu, 
2011), and to determine which preventive interventions would be effective (Rocque 
et al., 2012; Cornet et al., 2013; Glenn & Raine, 2014; Glenn et al., 2015). “Biological 
information may provide useful information about which individuals may be at some-
what greater risk for antisocial behaviour, and thus may provide for the opportunity 
to intervene with programs designed to reduce this risk” (Glenn et al., 2015, p. 1690).
Early detection of children “at risk” for developing antisocial personality disorder or 
for becoming violent criminal offenders is ultimately aimed at prevention of antisocial 
behavior and violent crime.15 Envisaged biomedical interventions aimed at prevention 
of such behavior can be understood as moral enhancements, in the sense of improving 
the moral capacities and/or behavior of these children. It aims to make them “mor-
ally better” persons than they would otherwise be. An (as yet largely hypothetical) 
comprehensive program for screening and early intervention to prevent antisocial 
behavior can, therefore, be understood as a program for moral enhancement. Some 
may oppose this framing, as consensus on the definition of moral enhancement is 
lacking (Raus et al., 2014). However, even if such screening and prevention practices 
do not meet the criteria of one’s preferred definition of moral bioenhancement, the 
similarities are obvious. The emerging ethical discussion around early detection and 
prevention of antisocial behavior may therefore inform the moral enhancement debate 
and introduce new and important considerations and arguments.
15 As Nikolas Rose (2010) rightly observes about the aims of such programs: “The first, is the desire to iden-
tify risky individuals—that is to say, those who will present a future risk to others—before the actual 
harm is committed. The second is the hope that one might be able to identify individuals at risk—those 
whose particular combination of biology and life history makes them themselves susceptible to some 
future condition” (Rose, 2010, p. 80). Hence two notions of risk—risk to self and risk to others—tend to 
become conflated.
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First, in the moral enhancement debate so far, the idea that a suitable target popula-
tion will need to be determined for any moral enhancement intervention that may 
be developed has not yet been considered. Targeting interventions at specific groups; 
for example, those who already exhibit immoral behavior, or those who are at risk 
of doing so, requires a way to distinguish those people from others. Some form of 
screening will be necessary to determine who is in need of moral enhancement, who 
will benefit most from a specific intervention, or who need to be targeted to optimize 
societal benefit. A first—moral—question is who the target population should be; a 
second, more practical, question is how these subjects can be identified.
When such a hypothetical screening program for children “at risk” for antisocial 
behavior is considered, a number of ethical issues come up that have so far hardly 
been addressed in the moral enhancement debate (Schermer, 2006; Pieri & Levitt, 2008; 
Horstkötter & de Wert, 2013; Glenn & Raine, 2014; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 
2014; Munthe & Radovic, 2015). First of all, screening tests may give false negative or 
false positive outcomes, resulting in unjustified reassurance and failure to intervene, 
or in unjustified labeling and unnecessary interventions. Limitations to the predic-
tive value of screening tests are, therefore, morally problematic. Of many identified 
risk predictors, it is unclear whether they are causally relevant factors or mere cor-
relates, making their exact meaning doubtful (Wikström, 2010). Moreover, screening 
tests themselves or the follow-up interventions could have side effects or carry risks; 
therefore, issues of safety should be considered. Next, it has been argued that such a 
screening program may have unwanted social effects. It may lead to individualization 
of problem behavior and lead to neglect of social and environmental factors contribut-
ing to this behavior. It may also lead to stigmatization and discrimination of children 
who are labeled (correctly or falsely) as “at risk.” This may also have negative effects 
on their self-identity or even become a self-fulfilling prophecy: if one is looked on and 
treated as a potential violent offender, this may cause one to start behaving as such. 
One could even say that this threatens the child’s “open future.” At the same time, 
too strong a focus on antisocial behavior “might disadvantage those in greatest need 
of good youth care who are not also, for example, genetically at risk to translate early 
personal into later social problems” (Horstkötter & de Wert, 2013, p. 20). Finally, it 
has been brought forward that such screening programs could easily lead to oppres-
sion and exclusion of the identified individuals, especially in the absence of effective 
preventive or therapeutic interventions (Munthe & Radovic, 2015).
All these considerations are highly relevant for understanding what it would mean to 
single out certain individuals or groups as suitable candidates for moral improvement, 
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but they have so far been neglected in the debate on moral enhancement, because this 
debate has hardly concerned itself with potential “real world” practices.
A third lesson to be drawn from the discussion about early detection and prevention of 
criminal or antisocial behavior concerns the tension between the interests of the indi-
vidual and those of society. This is mentioned as a very important issue by almost all 
commentators in the screening debate. Briefly stated: is the intended purpose helping 
the detected children, or is it protecting society? What if both aims cannot be served 
at the same time? Which one should take precedence? “At the core, perhaps, is the 
challenge of ethically balancing public protection and individual autonomy, privacy, 
and liberties” (Giordano et al., 2014, pp. 81-82). This issue will be taken up further in 
the next section. 
Mandatory Treatment in (Forensic) Psychiatry and the Dual Role Dilemma
We can imagine examples of people who freely choose to morally enhance themselves 
using biomedical technologies, in which case an individual choice frame that empha-
sizes the freedom of the individual and related concepts such as autonomy and self-
determination appears the most suitable ethical framework. Nonetheless, in the debate 
on moral bioenhancement so far, the theme of “mandatory moral bioenhancement” 
has been a central one. Examples that are frequently discussed range from preventing 
individuals from initiating “ultimate harm,” to preventing violence or violent crime 
in the population at large (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Julian 
Savulescu, 2014b). The argument is made that those who are most in need of moral 
enhancement are least likely to be inclined to use it, and that mandatory use is there-
fore required. Subsequently, there has been explicit and quite extensive discussion 
on whether or not (safe and effective) moral bioenhancement technologies should be 
mandated either for the general population or for specific target groups (Curtis, 2012; 
Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; S. Carter, 2015; Rakic´ & Hughes, 2015).
This raises a number of questions with respect to who decides, implements, and moni-
tors the mandatory intervention in terms of expected and appropriate contexts, patient 
rights, and professional roles and responsibilities. These questions are reminiscent 
of a number of central ethical dilemmas in psychiatry, and in forensic psychiatry in 
particular, surrounding involuntary or coercive treatment, domains that are arguably a 
likely setting for implementing potential moral bioenhancement interventions. 
In general, the conditions under which coercive treatment is warranted in mental 
health now involve direct prevention of suicide or other forms of self-inflicted harm, or 
situations when an individual poses a direct risk to others. Generally speaking, within 
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mental health settings “protection of the community is typically a side constraint, 
something that moderates the treatment of the client or patient” (Ward, 2013, p. 95), 
whereas “a fundamental obligation to the best interests of one’s patient” remains cen-
tral (Robertson & Walter, 2008, p. 233). However, when focusing on forensic contexts16 
ethical issues become more complex and controversial (Sharma & Sharma, 2006, p. 
98), as these contexts are much more motivated by non-offender considerations (Ward, 
2013, p. 95).
The so-called “dual-role dilemma,” central in the ethics of forensic psychiatry, refers 
to possible tension between psychiatrists’ obligations of beneficence toward their 
patients, and conflicting obligations to the community or third parties (Robertson & 
Walter, 2008). This tension or dissonance is something an individual psychiatrist might 
experience when “attempting to adhere to the conflicting ethical requirements associ-
ated with client well-being and community protection” (Ward et al., 2015). This tension 
might also be inextricably linked to the profession, as forensic psychiatry “involves an 
interaction between two distinct state institutions, the criminal justice and mental 
health systems” (Ward, 2013, p. 92) that each carry varying sets of ethical norms that 
can conflict. 
In a classic text from 1984, Alan Stone formulated fundamental criticism on the lack 
of clear ethical boundaries for the professional roles of forensic psychiatrists (Stone, 
1984). His main worry was that the role of evaluator moves the forensic psychiatrist 
away from the role of physician and the fundamental notion of nonmaleficence: “help-
ing the patient, which is the ethical thesis of the practitioner, becomes the ethical 
temptation in the legal context” (Stone, 1984, p. 171). Paul Appelbaum on the other 
hand argued that beneficence and nonmaleficence are not central notions in forensic 
psychiatry, and that forensic psychiatry is instead guided by a distinct set of ethics. The 
ethics of the “forensicist” is directed toward the benefit of society, and, therefore, the 
central responsibility of the forensicist is to justice, not the patient (Appelbaum, 1990, 
1997). A notable example is forensic risk assessment, where the welfare of the patient 
is not necessarily the immediate object of concern, but rather the immediate concern 
is about public safety (Roychowdhury & Adshead, 2014).
16 Contexts that involve court-mandated forensic psychiatric evaluation and assessment, risk manage-
ment, and forensic treatment. There is great variation in what the profession of forensic psychiatrist 
entails. There are large differences in the range of forensic psychiatric services available, there are no 
unified standards, and forensic psychiatry is not recognized as distinct subspecialty everywhere (Velinov 
& Marinov, 2006).
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This distinction suggests three directions for mandatory moral bioenhancement 
interventions. Either moral bioenhancement will be situated firmly within a health 
context, in which the interests and well-being of the patient are central and the pa-
tient’s right to treatment and other forms of support is emphasized, and in which in 
principle medical doctors prescribe a potential moral bioenhancement intervention, 
and monitor and weigh potential risks. An alternative option is to position manda-
tory moral bioenhancement within correctional, criminal justice contexts, where 
non-offender considerations, such as community protection and risk assessment, are 
primary. Whereas the first option presupposes the primacy of medical ethical consid-
erations, the latter would function within a more general ethical framework, in which 
respect for persons, justice, and human rights are important considerations. A third, 
hybrid model would explicitly acknowledge that “more than one ethical theory will 
be required to justify and guide offender treatment” (Ward, 2013, p. 97), and would 
seek a pragmatic, procedural solution to solve potential conflicts between the different 
sets of norms and values. The Dutch Entrustment Act for example represents a rather 
exceptional combination of punishment and treatment (van Marle, 2002), a system 
that is criticized for (possible infinite) preventive detention (Petrila & de Ruiter, 2011), 
but that is also praised for the quality of the care provided to prisoners and the lower 
recidivism rates. However, the fact that “individuals may be unable to ethically justify 
their professional actions and could move somewhat erratically between different 
courses of action” (Ward, 2013, p. 98) remains a concern, one that should also be ad-
dressed with respect to those who would implement potential moral bioenhancement 
interventions.
Imagining Moral Bioenhancement Practices
To distil a number of ethical considerations that are relevant for the moral evaluation 
of proposals for moral bioenhancement but have not yet been sufficiently recognized 
in the discussion on moral bioenhancement yet, we have imagined practices and do-
mains in which potential moral bioenhancement might first be implemented.
In the domain of moral education, a similar focus on the practical application of the sci-
entific study of morality is visible. In seeking practical applicability and effectiveness, it 
transcends the separation of moral functioning into cognitive, emotional, and affective 
domains, and instead aims to formulate integrative models and interventions. Within 
moral education debates, discussions on the appropriate role of educators and parents, 
and a commitment to securing the (future) autonomy rights of children, are visible. 
In addition to providing a reason to be cautious in forcing on children certain choices 
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(based on the negative claim right that follows from the right to an open future), this 
principle might under certain circumstances also provide reason to intervene in order 
to secure better chances in life for the child in question.
This connects to the second cluster: ethical concerns with respect to potential early 
detection of children at risk of exhibiting antisocial behavior (either now or in later 
life). On what basis the intended target population for potential preventive interven-
tions should be determined (and what the intended population should be) is something 
that needs to be discussed, especially in view of potential unjustified labeling resulting 
in stigmatization and potentially unnecessary interventions that may carry risks and 
burdens. Moreover, a comprehensive screening program for antisocial behavior needs 
to address possible tensions between the interests of society and the interests of the 
individual, and be clear on its intended purpose.
In the field of forensic psychiatry as well, safety and risk management concerns often 
need to be balanced with the interests and well-being of the individual. The dual role 
dilemma describes the tension between distinct sets of norms that guide professional 
conduct, which may be “personal, universal, agency related, or professional in nature” 
(Ward, 2013, p. 98). If neither a purely medical nor a purely criminal justice frame is 
appropriate, professionals in forensic psychiatry risk being bound to navigate a com-
plex ethical landscape without clear ethical frameworks to justify their professional 
conduct. 
In imagining moral bioenhancement in practice, we have seen that unlike other forms 
of enhancement, moral enhancement fundamentally asks how the interests and prefer-
ences of the individual and the interests of others should be weighed (in view of public 
safety and managing public risk). Whereas enhancement in general is advocated for 
contributing to both the individual and collective good, moral enhancement appears 
to be predominantly aimed at the collective good. Because morality is fundamentally 
something relational, and hence asks for concern for others, a focus on interventions 
that would merely benefit the individual and not others is not a very likely perspec-
tive for moral enhancement. The opposite—moral enhancement solely in light of some 
greater good—might be possible, but would run the risk of neglecting the freedom 
and preferences of the individual. Especially in the genetic enhancement debate, such 
a one-sided focus on the benefits for society has been fiercely opposed because of its—
historically evident—potential for abuse. Therefore, the need for balancing individual 
and collective interests may well be inherent in moral enhancement, and something 
that ought to be considered in more depth. Likewise, whereas it is an open question 
whether many people would consider moral bioenhancement voluntarily, the condi-
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tions for offering or even mandating potential moral bioenhancement interventions 
should be discussed as well (E. Shaw, 2014). 
Mandatory treatment is subject to strict conditions, and liberal democratic societies 
generally share a commitment to tolerance and value pluralism, and respect the (future) 
autonomy rights of individuals. Although value pluralism is considered a challenge 
within moral education debates, it is not considered a reason (“principled” or “practi-
cal”) to stop moral education programs from being implemented. In line with the views 
from moral progressivists, an important “guiding concern” in implementing potential 
moral bioenhancement interventions might be to focus on enhancing morally relevant 
capacities, without imposing one particular comprehensive moral doctrine. However, 
it should be noted that in societies that do not share this commitment to pluralism and 
tolerance, any possibilities for moral bioenhancement might lead to risks.
In asking which occupational group would be charged with implementing moral bio-
enhancement, the particular institutional setting in which they work becomes highly 
relevant. With respect to cognitive enhancement, the options discussed in this respect 
are rather limited: either enhancement will be obtained from the free market, or it 
will be prescribed by physicians, or possibly by so-called “schmocters” (Parens, 1998, 
p. 11). With moral enhancement, highly diverse domains such as education, mental 
health, and the judicial domain might be involved, and moral bioenhancement might 
challenge existing institutional settings. 
Given these highly variable contexts and domains, it appears unlikely that there will 
be a distinct set of practices that will be referred to as moral bioenhancement. Rather 
than attempting to formulate a single evaluative framework, the current debate on the 
ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement might point to aspects of moral better-
ment within our current practices, and might invite us to consider a number of ethical 
issues anew.
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Abstract 
Neurobiological and behavioural genetic research give rise to speculations about po-
tential biomedical interventions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and anti-social 
behaviour. These developments have stirred considerable ethical debate on the pros-
pects, threats, and limitations of integrating neurobiological and behavioural genetic 
interventions in forensic psychiatric practices, yet little is known about how forensic 
practitioners perceive these potential interventions. We conducted a qualitative study 
to examine: (i) the extent to which forensic practitioners expect that effective bio-
medical interventions will be developed and integrated in their daily work practice; 
and (ii) their normative views concerning those potential biomedically informed 
interventions. We focused on: potential biomedical possibilities to lower aggression, 
the possible usage of neuroimaging in assessing legal responsibility, and the potential 
use of biomarkers in assessing risk for future violent and antisocial behaviour. Forensic 
practitioners expect novel biomedical interventions to be developed and display a gen-
eral openness towards them. At the same time, they express concern that integration 
of neurobiological and behavioural genetic elements in explanatory models of violence 
and antisocial behaviour may lead to misinterpretations, especially when implemented 
in the forensic field. 
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Introduction
Scientific developments in neurobiology and behavioural genetics give rise to specula-
tions about potential biomedical interventions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and 
anti-social behaviour (de Ridder et al., 2009; Rocque et al., 2012; Glenn & Raine, 2014; 
van der Gronde et al., 2014; Eichelberger & Barnes, 2015; Lee, 2015; Fozdar, 2016). 
These potential developments have stirred considerable ethical debate on the pros-
pects, threats, and limitations of integrating neurobiological and behavioural genetic 
interventions in forensic psychiatric practices (Rose, 2000; Pustilnik, 2009; Rose & 
Abi-Rached, 2013; Chhangur et al., 2015; Horstkötter, 2015; Munthe & Radovic, 2015; 
Hübner & White, 2016).
In this study, we intend to broaden the ethical debate by asking how practitioners 
in forensic mental health contexts (both forensic psychiatrists and clinical psycholo-
gists and therapists) view these potential interventions. Do they expect that effective 
biomedical interventions aimed at preventing, containing, and treating violent and 
anti-social behaviour will be developed? How do they normatively view the potential 
integration of such interventions within current treatment practices? For the present 
study, we interviewed forensic practitioners about their expectations as well as moral 
views regarding potential applications of current neurobiological and behavioural 
genetic research aiming to understand (and possibly help prevent, contain, or treat) 
violent and antisocial behaviour. 
An earlier study asked people who are professionally engaged in in the criminal justice 
system and who work with young people and families judged to be ‘at risk’ of crimi-
nal or antisocial behaviour about their views on the causes of violent and antisocial 
behaviour, about their response to the idea of a genetic susceptibility to aggressive 
behaviour, and possible implications for their own work (Pieri & Levitt, 2008). Other 
studies explored the views of juveniles in juvenile justice institutions on biological 
explanations of anti-social behaviour (Horstkötter, Berghmans, Feron, et al., 2014) and 
the views of parents and (non-forensic) healthcare professionals (genetic professionals 
and paediatricians) on genetic tests for violent behaviour (Campbell & Ross, 2004). To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first interview study to probe the normative 
views of forensic mental health practitioners concerning potential future biomedical 
interventions for forensic patients and offenders with mental health issues.
We first asked forensic practitioners, with reference to their role in treating forensic 
patients and offenders with mental health issues, about their expectations regarding 
potential future biomedical possibilities to lower aggression. Current research on the 
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neurobiology and (epi)genetics of aggression may inform new treatments for pathologi-
cal, maladaptive, or antisocial aggressive behaviour (Asherson & Cormand, 2016). Ag-
gressive behaviours are often partially refractory to medication (Raine, 2013; Gurnani 
et al., 2016; Temel et al., 2016). Research on novel medications and neuro-stimulation 
may provide new ways to deal with aggressive behaviours. Non-invasive interventions 
may involve biofeedback, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and transcranial direct 
current stimulation. More invasive potential interventions such as deep brain stimula-
tion involve electrical stimulation of the brain through electrode implants (Temel et 
al., 2016).
Second, with respect to forensic practitioners’ role as court-appointed experts, we 
probed their views on the possible uses of neuroimaging in assessing legal responsi-
bility within court settings. Further developments in neuroimaging research may be 
used in criminal justice settings to inform forensic psychiatric and neurological expert 
reports (Witzel et al., 2008). Currently, the use of structural or functional brain images 
in court is more widespread in US courts as compared to European courts and it is 
mostly limited to the sentencing phase to acquire sentence mitigation (de Kogel & 
Westgeest, 2015; Ginther, 2016; Morse, 2016; McSwiggan et al., 2017). Future usage of 
brain imaging in court settings may involve establishing the presence or absence of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders (Roskies et al., 2013), and scientifically assessing 
intentionality, degrees of legal responsibility, or recidivism risk (Aharoni et al., 2008). 
Finally, with relation to their role in prevention and public protection, we asked them 
about their views concerning the possibilities and desirability of early detection and 
intervention based on biomarkers. Preliminary research is underway to determine 
which biomarkers - genetic, neurobiological, and physiological – might give accurate 
risk assessments of future violent and antisocial behaviour and which preventive in-
terventions would be effective in reducing those risks (van Goozen & Fairchild, 2008; 
Singh & Rose, 2009; Liu, 2011; Rocque et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2013; Glenn & Raine, 
2014; Glenn et al., 2015; Gaudet et al., 2016). Other uses of biomarkers that are being 
investigated are biological predictors of inpatient violence, length of stay, and reof-
fending (Aharoni et al., 2013; Sedgwick et al., 2016).
Methods
Sample and recruitment
We recruited 18 forensic practitioners (forensic psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and 
therapists) in The Netherlands and in Belgium. Subjects were recruited via professional 
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organizations and by snowballing, and were not incentivized. Our sample consists of 
seven females and 11 males, ranging in age from 32 to 68 years. At the time of the 
interviews, nine participants were employed in The Netherlands and nine participants 
were employed in Belgium.
We conducted eight interviews with forensic psychiatrists (FP) (at the time of the in-
terview, one participant worked as a general psychiatrist, but had worked in forensic 
settings in the past). We conducted 10 interviews with clinical psychologists (CP) or 
therapists (T) (at the time of the interview, one participant - a therapist - was primarily 
involved in research and did not consult patients, but had done so in the past). 10 par-
ticipants (five psychiatrists and five psychologists) are involved in scientific research, 
alongside their clinical or therapeutic work.
Qualitative interviews 
Participants took part in an individual semi-structured interview lasting approximately 
one hour. During one interview, two respondents were present and interviewed to-
gether. The interviews were held in Belgium and The Netherlands, and took place 
between July 2015 and July 2016. The interviews were conducted by JS, FF and MS. JS 
attended 14 interviews, FF attended seven interviews, and MS attended one interview.
The interview schedule included open-ended questions about participants’ expecta-
tions towards and normative views on: potential future options for treating aggression; 
potential usage of neuroimaging in determining legal responsibility within court set-
tings; and the question as to whether insight into the neurobiological and biosocial 
predictors of criminal behaviour might broaden opportunities for early detection and 
prevention of children and adolescents who might be considered at risk of future violent 
or antisocial behaviour. As forensic psychiatrists and psychologists, and psychiatrists 
and psychologists in general, are trained to understand and treat human behaviour 
from a medical and/or healthcare perspective, and faced with the many variations that 
may exist between people, with respect to both non-deviant and deviant behaviour 
on a daily basis, we expected to receive highly nuanced and diverse responses to our 
questions. 
In addition to the open-ended questions, the interview schedule contained a number 
of examples (prompts) to enable the interviewer to gain a more detailed answer. For 
example, regarding potential future options for treating aggression, we would add: 
“One might well look at interventions such as TMS, DBS, or potential new pharma-
cological interventions. Do you expect interventions such as these to find entrance 
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in your professional practice?” In this paper, we report on our findings and discuss 
possible ethical implications.
Coding
All interviews were conducted in Dutch, audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Interviews were coded in QSR NVivo version 10 using descriptive theme analysis (Ba-
zeley & Jackson, 2013). Because our methodological orientation was content analysis, 
and our research was not hypothesis-driven but data-driven, we aimed at exploring 
the broad, varied perspectives and meanings that participants hold (Tong et al., 2007; 
Creswell, 2013).
All transcripts were independently read by all members of the research team (JS, FF, 
MS, SS) and discussed with the purpose of drafting a preliminary analytic framework. 
JS independently coded the transcripts by labelling sections and text units referring to 
one or multiple concepts relevant for the study purpose. An iterative approach was used 
in which new data that challenged the existing coding structure were used to revise 
the themes until no new themes emerged. Interpretative bias of data was avoided by 
means of investigator triangulation, which involved all researchers checking the codes 
for consistency. Two researchers (FF and MS) independently coded three transcripts and 
compared their coding and categorizing with that of JS. Illustrative quotes that were 
included in the results section were translated by JS. All members of the research team 
checked the translations for accuracy.
Results
Aggression
Do forensic practitioners expect that effective biomedical interventions to lower aggres-
sion will be developed, and how do they morally view those potential interventions? A 
large majority of participants expect that novel interventions will be developed. At the 
same time, however, nearly all participants stress that violent and antisocial behaviour 
can have many different (kinds of ) causes, that at present there is lack of fundamental 
knowledge, and that no simple, mono-causal model of aggression is (and will be) avail-
able. In view of this complexity, several participants question the effectiveness of one 
single (biomedical) intervention and urge for an approach combining biomedical and 
psychosocial interventions instead. Forensic practitioners’ moral views of potential 
biomedical interventions are quite diverse, and range from outright rejection, to cau-
tious embracement, and more positive and welcoming attitudes.
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Complexity of aggression
Before offering an opinion on potential neurobiological and genetic interventions 
for treating aggression, nearly all participants discuss at length the considerable 
difficulty of formulating a correct and comprehensive model of aggression. Forensic 
psychiatrists particularly tend to emphasise the importance of accurate diagnosis, of 
understanding different types of aggression (e.g., recurring and constant, or incidental, 
premeditated or impulsive), and of unravelling possible associations with mental or 
personality disorders, intellectual disability, and addiction and substance abuse. This 
can be illustrated with the following quote from a participant:
Apparently, with compulsive behaviours, behaviour regulation can be influenced 
on a fundamental level. With aggression, we need to ask, is it constant or inciden-
tal? Oftentimes, it is incidental and triggered in a specific situation. That is different 
from, for example, OCD, which is more or less permanent. (FP4)
Many participants emphasise the current absence of a comprehensive explanatory 
model of aggression. One example of a knowledge gap that is often mentioned is the 
lack of understanding of the relation between psychiatric disorders and (aggressive, 
deviant) behaviour. 
We know very little about the relationship, the causal link between disorders and 
behaviour. This applies to problems as we observe them and as we now classify 
them according to the DSM – let alone how that plays out physiologically. […] You 
can look at a brain, and you can say, ‘well, maybe those neural pathways are less 
developed, or that lobe is a bit smaller or bigger’ – but by saying that, you have not 
explained why someone is aggressive. Not everyone who has that brain-abnormality 
is aggressive. The reverse does not apply either. We are still very far from being able 
to intervene and remedy it [aggression]. (T1)
If I try to understand how different factors interact, the only fair answer is that we 
do not know. We know a number of codetermining factors, but we have no idea 
how they relate to each other, how they might reinforce, stop, trigger other factors, 
set up a cascade or not. We do not understand why many people in spite of these 
factors continue to develop in a healthy and well-behaved way. (CP3)
Most participants (forensic psychiatrists as well as psychologists) discuss the ways in 
which societal norms and definitions of aggression differ and the ways in which aggres-
sion is often dependent on personal and social circumstances. Many participants stress 
that neither our understanding of aggression nor potential interventions to counter 
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aggression should focus exclusively on either individual or environmental factors, but 
that, instead, both should be taken into account.
A general trend can be observed towards intervening at the biological or somatic 
level. We see this for example in sexual offenders, in a quite rigorous way. This 
entails a risk of taking a fairly one-sided approach. With aggression, it might be 
that treatment will develop in the same direction. Although I have yet to see if that 
would be possible as specifically as with sexual disorders. (FP6)
A number of participants identify barriers to the introduction of biomedical interven-
tions, such as the need to build consensus and support among professionals with 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds, who work from within different paradigms. Some 
participants mention that, historically, research in forensic populations has not been 
a priority.
Once you enter prison, you find yourself in a criminal justice context. Here, medi-
cine stops, and research stops as well. That really struck me. It is an interesting, 
special pathology that you do not see in regular medicine. Yet hardly any research 
is conducted there. (FP2)
Aggression: Moral views
Several participants refer to the harmful side effects of many current (typically phar-
macological) biomedical interventions and their negative impact on treatment adher-
ence. Some participants express the hope that future biomedical interventions will 
have fewer side effects. Others, however, are concerned that interventions must be 
highly invasive in order to counter aggression effectively.
I think to do this, for this to be really effective, I feel the interference with brain 
function needs to be so high impact, that things such as identity and personal 
performance would become radically standardised. (CP3)
Some participants express the concern that wider opportunities to intervene will insti-
gate less tolerance towards deviant traits or towards acting out (both in society at large 
and in forensic contexts). They stress that deviant or seemingly unwanted traits (such 
as those associated with psychopathy) can be advantageous in some contexts, and that 
altering ‘bad traits’ or enhancing ‘good traits’ could have unforeseen and unwanted 
consequences (e.g., too much empathy). 
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Several participants question whether potential interventions may be mandatory (for 
example as a precondition for rehabilitation). Many stress the importance of voluntari-
ness and proper informed consent procedures, even if – as a number of participants 
discussed – treatment in forensic contexts may often involve coercive offers. A number 
of participants speculate on how future biomedical interventions may offer options for 
patients who currently are considered treatment refractory, yet at the same time argue 
that invasive interventions should preferably (or only) be offered as a last resort.
The more invasive and irreversible it is, the longer you should wait to consider it, I 
think. However, it need not be ruled out completely. (CP1)
Several participants prefer alternative, less invasive ways to limit aggressive behav-
iours and promote impulse control and self-regulation, e.g. cameras, gaming, apps, 
electronic monitoring, virtual reality training, etc. 
Several participants discuss whether biomedical interventions would render the sub-
ject’s role in treatment too passive. Some participants feel that passivity in this context 
is morally problematic in itself. For example because biomedical treatments tend not 
to consider the reasons why someone engaged in aggressive behaviour, or because they 
feel treatment should focus on enhancing a patient’s capacity to manage herself or on 
fostering self-awareness and self-knowledge. Others are worried that passivity would 
reduce the treatment’s long-term effectiveness, for example because they expect the 
aggression reducing effects to last only as long as the intervention is given. 
Neuroimaging in the courtroom
Will enhanced options for neuroimaging improve the identification of criminal respon-
sibility? Expectations vary widely; some participants indicate that they indeed expect 
that developments in neuroimaging will be rapid, and that neuroimaging will be used 
more often in court settings, while others situate such options in the distant future. 
By and large, most participants were highly sceptical of its potential effectiveness, and 
mentioned numerous moral concerns regarding its implementation. 
Neuroimaging in the courtroom: Confrontation of legal and medical terminology
Also on this issue, many participants reflect on the conceptual framework before going 
into the expected use and moral desirability of using neuroimaging to assess legal 
responsibility. Several participants mention the difficulties associated with operation-
alizing responsibility, which is essentially a legal and not a medical concept, and argue 
that legal concepts fall outside of their expertise as forensic practitioners. Some even 
indicate that they feel they should not say anything at all on this issue. 
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The whole concept of legal responsibility is almost a philosophical concept. As 
psychiatrists, and behavioural experts in general, we are limited in what we can 
say about it. (FP6)
Some problematize the concept of legal responsibility itself, and express a preference 
for a system in which forensic risk assessment instead of assessment of legal responsi-
bility determines whether someone is referred to prison, treatment, or both.
Neuroimaging in the courtroom: Moral views
Many participants are concerned that imaging data will be misinterpreted and over-
simplified. They refer to the difficulty of correctly interpreting neuroimaging results 
and the lack of expertise of, for example, judges or juries. They talk about the power of 
images and the illusionary appearance of objectivity they might convey. They discuss 
the false sense of security neuroimaging might offer, and how this might negatively 
impact legal processes. 
 At one point, the image starts to determine who someone is, well, yes almost de-
termining who someone is. And therefore also, how far his responsibilities, to what 
extent he is responsible for his behaviour. (…) I even think it’s a risky development, 
because it claims that it can classify people very precisely. And taking into account 
the ways things tend to go in the confrontation between behavioural experts and 
the judiciary, the behavioural expert suddenly pretends to hold the truth. And if 
you’re not careful, the judiciary will go along with that. (FP6)
Some participants are concerned that the use of neuroimaging results would reinforce 
ideas of incorrigibility, of ‘violent brains’, ‘born criminals’ or ‘born monsters’ who dif-
fer fundamentally from normal people, thus underestimating plasticity and individual 
adaptability and undermining ideas of individual agency and responsibility.
Several participants indicate that they feel that presenting imaging data unequivocally 
would fulfil a societal demand, for example because judges welcome it or because it 
would make it easier for many people to tolerate and accept crime. 
This man said ‘Show me a brain and I can tell you if he is a paedophile or not.’ 
That is something society begs for, I think, a doctor who clearly indicates based on 
an image, ‘This is a paedophile and he is dangerous, he’s a predator, lock him up.’ 
Or ‘Remove that part of his brain, break his skull open.’ That is something society 
would really welcome. If only it would be so simple and easy to address. I think this 
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is a serious danger. In this regard, I feel more than a professional resistance; I think 
we should not go there. (CP4)
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using 
biomarkers
Finally, we asked participants whether insight into neurobiological and biosocial 
predictors of violent and antisocial behaviour might broaden opportunities for early 
detection and prevention of children and adolescents who might be considered at risk 
of future violent or antisocial behaviour. All participants (except for one psychiatrist) 
indeed expected biomarkers to be integrated in preventive screening programs and 
even considered this a largely unstoppable development. At the same time, however, 
participants expressed a strong professional resistance, discussed the substantial impli-
cations of such programs, and mentioned a range of moral concerns. 
Many participants stressed the importance of prevention rather than cure, of being 
able to prevent pathology, and of intervening before people become involved with the 
criminal justice system. Some expressed a particular interest in identifying extreme 
cases as early as possible.
The earlier we can intervene, the better. Because we often see people with such 
difficult pasts and with histories of failing assistance. This is due to the person in 
question, but also due to us. We do too little, or we fail to persevere. Legal frame-
works also provide us insufficient opportunities to intervene, measures such as 
involuntary commitment for example. (FP3)
Pessimism about or reluctance towards prospects of using biomarkers in early preven-
tion and intervention programs sprang from the following main considerations: the 
low predictive value of biomarkers; the lack of feasibility of large and comprehensive 
screening programs; and moral concerns about labelling and stigmatization.
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using 
biomarkers: Feasibility of accurate prediction
Several participants stress difficulties associated with (or even the impossibility of ) 
accurately predicting risk of future violent or antisocial behaviour. For example, they 
assert that hardly any direct, causal relations between physiological characteristics and 
future antisocial or criminal behaviour are established.
It seems that a range of factors – that are also associated with each other – correlate 
with crime. I cannot see how you could intervene solely based on physiological 
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characteristics. There are hardly any cases where such a one-on-one relation exists. 
(T1)
Of course there is always the problem that there never is a one-on-one relation, and 
that all those factors that contribute to you going off track in such a way that you 
end up in civil commitment, are all, single-handedly, very prevalent. (CP6)
Everyone is at risk for aggression. Because aggression is the most human thing 
there is. (CP5)
Some also mention the difficulty of determining the proper moment to intervene. They 
caution against intervening too early and note the problem of potential false positives 
and negatives.
Several participants draw a parallel with screening and prevention programs within 
general psychiatry, aimed at identifying people who are at a higher risk of experienc-
ing psychoses, where a large group needs to be screened and monitored in order to 
identify the relatively small sub-group that is actually at risk and that could benefit 
from interventions. Participants contemplate the (cost-) effectiveness of such large and 
comprehensive programs, and mention difficulties associated with correctly interpret-
ing biomarkers and formulating appropriate selection and inclusion criteria. A few 
participants problematize underlying conceptions of crime, delinquency, antisocial 
behaviour, and violence.
Delinquency has to do with transgressing norms, which are nowhere to be found in 
the brain but are defined by a social group. (CP3)
Early identification and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour using 
biomarkers: Moral views
In addition to concerns about feasibility, many participants express moral concerns 
regarding early prevention and detection programs. They are worried that such 
programs would be focused primarily at preventing future crime instead of helping 
children or relieving suffering, that such approaches would tend to be paternalistic 
and coercive in nature, and that they would target and single out individual children 
as “risky children”. Many participants mention and strongly reject the likely stigmatiz-
ing and discriminatory (and even self-fulfilling) effects of labelling – especially young 
children – as being at risk for future antisocial behaviour. 
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If I need to choose between labelling and prevention, I would say that it is more 
important not to label, especially young people. Labelling is based solely on risk, 
and so little on opportunities and possibilities for positive development. (FP1)
Although many participants underline the importance of prevention in general, they 
see important ethical differences between prevention programs aimed at precluding 
impaired development of the child or individual in question and programs that focus 
on preventing crime. 
What you strive for, is helping children, when they are hindering themselves or 
others, to develop in a positive way. Once you identify a child as a potential of-
fender, you are already treading on very thin ice. (FP6)
Some participants welcome biomedically informed prevention efforts, provided that 
they aim to relieve current and future suffering, aid development, and offer opportuni-
ties to develop a full life. Some participants speculate about biomarker research offer-
ing insights into underlying factors, how such research may offer new, more precise 
treatment options, and how it could be used as a source of information in treatment 
settings. 
What I find more interesting is whether it [e.g. skin conductance] may provide in-
dications for doing something different than we had imagined by looking at behav-
iour alone. That could give some sort of insight; ‘You have been tense for a couple of 
days.’ And that this would help prevent escalation. I find that very interesting, that 
you can use it as a source of information, to gain insight. (FP8)
A number of participants prefer general awareness and education campaigns (for 
example about impulsiveness for all school-aged children) or (psycho) education aimed 
specifically at individuals at risk:
I support everything that has to do with self-awareness and with being able to 
deal with those personal characteristics that increase the likelihood of undesirable 
outcomes. (CP3)
However, some participants worry that other, non-biological markers (such as social 
and environmental factors) will disappear from sight, which would negatively affect 
the therapeutic relationship. 
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I hope that it won’t become self-evident, that my job in several years will be re-
duced to being confronted with a blood level and to determine on that basis which 
treatment to initiate, and whether treatment should be outpatient or inpatient. I 
hope I will still be able to be in contact with people. (CP4)
Some participants situate speculation about biomedically informed early detection 
and prevention programs in the context of broader societal trends, such as increased 
focus on early prevention, higher societal risk aversion, and decreasing tolerance for 
deviance and abnormality.
I think these issues are very topical, because much appears to be controllable. At 
many levels, not only with regard to people but also in business, we assume every-
thing manageable. I don’t believe such malleability exists – we are keeping this 
illusion alive, but it is a kind of fake truth. (FP5)
Everyone wants us to do more prevention. Authorities are asking, what should 
we do with those children in the neighbourhoods? Which signals must we take 
seriously and which not? When should we scale up? That has nothing to do with 
innovative technology, but rather with how far we should go in actively tracking 
and detecting. (FP8)
At that moment, we will have to ask what kind of society we want to live in. North 
Korea will have a different perspective than European countries. If you decide as 
a society that you prioritise zero-risk policy, where the collective rather than the 
individual is the starting point, then I can imagine that politics will embrace such 
policies. Yes, I find that prospect quite disturbing. (FP5)
Discussion
In this study, we interviewed forensic practitioners in The Netherlands and in Flanders, 
Belgium about their expectations and moral views regarding potential biomedical 
interventions to prevent, contain, or treat violent and anti-social behaviour, explicitly 
focusing not only on potential efficacy but on moral desirability as well. Little is known 
about forensic mental health practitioners’ perceptions of potential biomedical inter-
ventions for forensic patients and offenders with mental health issues. 
Overall, this study indicates that forensic practitioners expect novel biomedical in-
terventions to find entry in their professional practice, either because they anticipate 
Neurobiological interventions in offenders 99
that rapid scientific developments will generate effective biomedical interventions, 
or, alternatively, because they observe a growing (societal, professional) demand for 
biomedical interventions (for example because of their perceived greater objectiveness 
and effectiveness as compared to non-biomedical interventions). This is a reason why, 
in our analyses, we have been careful to distinguish between four aspects: forensic prac-
titioners’ expectations that potential new biomedical interventions will become avail-
able; their expectations regarding the effectiveness of these potential interventions; 
whether they generally welcome biomedical interventions and hope new biomedical 
interventions will become available, or whether, on the contrary, they fundamentally 
ethically reject the introduction of potential future biomedical interventions in their 
professional practice. 
 Few forensic practitioners in our study seem to oppose biomedical interventions per 
se. Yet, when discussing their potential efficacy, most forensic practitioners strongly ad-
vocate epistemic caution. Participants underline that mono-causal explanatory models 
are not available and point to the complex (non-direct/ non-causal) relations between 
individual (neuro)biology, genetic susceptibilities, mental disorders, environment, SES, 
and violent and antisocial behaviour. They discuss difficulties associated with correctly 
interpreting neuroimaging results (see for example Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013), and warn 
that genetic susceptibility to violence (Pieri & Levitt, 2008) and predictions based on 
biomarkers lack individual predictive value (Starr, 2014).
Participants who in general welcome novel biomedical interventions anticipated 
or hoped for less severe side effects than those of current (mostly pharmacological) 
treatments. Moreover, they hoped that these interventions will provide insight into 
underlying causes of violent and antisocial behaviour as well as increased opportu-
nities to tailor interventions to the individual in question (personalised medicine). 
Participants also expressed hope that such interventions might provide opportunities 
for increased self-awareness and self-regulation, and will make patients less dependent 
on contingent factors such as the particular care provider and the preferred form of 
(psychosocial) therapy.
Our study reveals a mixed picture with respect to forensic practitioners’ moral concerns 
about potential biomedical treatments for aggression. Major scepticism and consider-
able moral concerns were expressed with regard to the use of neuroimaging in court. 
As to early detection and prevention using biomarkers, these were almost entirely 
rejected by our respondents. 
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By and large, participants seem to be aware of major ethical issues as they are being 
discussed in current ethical debates on potential biomedical interventions. These are: 
concerns about reductionism and disregard for socio-political circumstances in case 
of novel treatment options for violent and antisocial behaviour (Goldberg, 2011), the 
difficulty of reaching consensus on the meaning and significance of neuroimaging in 
the courtroom (Aggarwal, 2009; Glannon, 2014), as well as major ethical concerns with 
respect to early detection and prevention of violent and antisocial behaviour such as 
labelling and stigmatization, societal control, and undue focus on risk (compare Wolpe, 
2013; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2014).
Regarding potential novel treatment options for violence and antisocial behaviour, 
several participants stressed the need to obtain informed consent when offering 
biomedical interventions. The legitimacy of coercion and of mandating biomedical 
interventions has recently been a topic of discussion in the ethical literature as well. 
Interventions involving coerced or semi-coerced drug and/or hormonal treatments 
that may involve very serious side effects and affect an individual’s mental liberty are 
considered ethically problematic (Bublitz & Merkel, 2014; Focquaert, 2014). However, 
some philosophers have recently argued that an offender’s mental liberty or ‘freedom 
of thought’ is potentially equally violated by forced incarceration practices as by forced 
biomedical interventions (e.g., Douglas, 2014a; S. Carter, 2016; Petersen & Kragh, 2017). 
In our view, important differences exist between forcing a biomedical intervention 
upon an offender and depriving an offender of the right to free movement. Even 
though current incarceration practices are often ethically problematic, incarceration 
does not violate an offender’s mental liberty in the same way forced neuro-interventions 
can violate it, because biomedical interventions are more likely to bypass our capacity 
to reflect upon the changes they bring about, and can overrule the ability to gradually 
endorse, reject or object to the alterations of our self (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015; 
Focquaert, 2017).
Most direct biomedical interventions (e.g. pharmacological interventions, transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, transcranial direct current stimulation) exert temporary effects 
and are essentially reversible in nature. This means that the beneficial treatment 
effects (e.g., symptom reduction in case of aggressive thoughts and behaviour) only 
last as long as one takes the medication or gets the stimulation. Nevertheless, it is 
not unlikely that the long-term use of biomedical interventions can have irreversible 
effects on one’s cognitive-emotional functioning, especially when the intervention is 
started and an early age (e.g., the use of Ritalin for attention deficit hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD)). Non-invasive, indirect biomedical interventions such as environmental 
enrichment and food supplements on the other hand supposedly have lasting, positive 
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effects on children’s brain development. Although more invasive interventions such as 
deep brain stimulation are considered to have the potential to permanently rewire the 
brain after long-term use as well (e.g. in case of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)), 
such findings have not been reported.
With respect to the use of neuroimaging data in court, participants in our study were 
particularly concerned about mis- and overinterpretation and potential detrimental 
effects on legal processes. Similar worries are voiced in a recent paper on the use of 
neuroscientific evidence in Canadian criminal proceedings (Chandler, 2016). For ex-
ample, an experimental study by Aspinwall and colleagues showed that judges that are 
confronted with neuroimaging data tend to impose lower sentences and list more miti-
gating factors (Aspinwall et al., 2012). A recent empirical analysis examining the use of 
neurological and behavioural genetic evidence in US criminal law (between 2005 and 
2012) reports that neurobiological data was most commonly used by criminal defence 
attorneys to mitigate responsibility and punishment (Farahany, 2016). At the same time 
however, this study showed that prosecutors have argued for higher sentences refer-
ring to ‘hard-wired’ incorrigibility or future dangerousness of perpetrators, confirming 
the idea that neuroimaging data can function as a double-edged sword (Aspinwall et 
al., 2012; Chandler, 2016).
A significant added value of our study is that it shows forensic practitioners to be aware 
and cautious of various misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might result 
from the specific dynamics of the forensic field. These misinterpretations may arise, 
first, from the ways in which scientific findings are translated to forensic psychiatric 
practice. Second, they may arise when forensic practitioners interact with other legal 
(judges, jurors, etc.) and political (e.g. Department of Health or Justice) professionals 
who operate in different institutional frameworks (law, medicine, politics), and who 
may lack the expertise to correctly interpret biomedical interventions or findings. 
Third and finally, in confrontation with wider society, forensic practitioners are con-
cerned about how biomedical interventions will be perceived by the general public and 
the media (Berryessa et al., 2016). Of particular concern is the risk that biomarkers for 
future violent or antisocial behaviour will reinforce perceptions of children as at risk, 
or risky17 before they have actually engaged in harmful behaviour, and the substantive 
17 “Two senses of risk are brought into alignment. The first is the desire to identify risky individuals – that 
is to say, those who will present a future risk to others – before the actual harm is committed. The 
second is the hope that one might be able to identify individuals at risk – those whose particular 
combination of biology and life history makes them themselves susceptible to some future condition 
– here personality disorder, impulsivity, aggressivity, or whatever, but more generally susceptibility for 
any psychiatric disorder” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 197).
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negative effects of labelling and stigmatization (Pieri & Levitt, 2008; Levitt & Pieri, 
2009; Rocque et al., 2012; Wasserman, 2014a; Chhangur et al., 2015; Horstkötter, 2015).
Notably, a range of ethical concerns voiced by forensic practitioners in this study may 
not be exclusive to bio-interventions. Some participants even explicitly mentioned that 
many of their moral concerns apply to some non-biomedically informed interventions 
as well: 
I think dilemmas of this type apply equally to behavioural therapy for example. 
(FP8)
Likewise, in ethical analyses regarding early detection and prevention programs, the 
argument has been made that many (but not all) objections voiced against biomedi-
cal approaches apply to psychosocial approaches as well, and that therefore, from an 
ethical point of view, “it is more important to determine how to deal responsibly with 
possible risks of early detection and prevention than asking whether this is based on 
a social scientific, a psychological, a biological or a mixed approach” (Horstkötter, 
Berghmans, De Ruiter, et al., 2012, p. 295; Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2014). 
On the other hand, our interviews suggest that forensic practitioners think that some 
issues may nevertheless be more relevant to bio-interventions (notably concerns about 
invasiveness, mental freedom, and irreversible or long-term side-effects). 
In conclusion, forensic practitioners mostly appear to endorse and reason based on bio-
psycho-social models of violent and antisocial behaviour. They stress that biomedical 
approaches will not (or should not) make current psychosocial approaches obsolete 
and that they should work in concert instead. This is consistent with current scientific 
literature in which there is a growing consensus that bio-psycho-social explanatory 
models of violent and antisocial behaviour are the most promising ones (Eichelberger 
& Barnes, 2015; Lee, 2015). Yet, our interviews show that forensic practitioners are also 
concerned about and acutely aware of the fact that the integration of neurobiological 
and behavioural genetic elements in explanatory models of violence and antisocial 
behaviour may be misinterpreted in various ways and by various actors, especially 
when implemented in the forensic field. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research
Because the study is qualitative and the sample size is limited, we cannot draw conclu-
sions about the minor differences we observed between psychiatrists and psycholo-
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gists in terms of their general openness towards potential biomedical interventions. 
Whereas the majority of forensic psychiatrists demonstrated a basic openness to these 
developments, we observed a more critical attitude among psychologists. Drawing a 
comparison between these groups was not a central study aim, as our focus was on the 
expectations and moral views regarding potential biomedical interventions of forensic 
practitioners generally. The differences we observed reflect and are consistent with the 
various disciplinary backgrounds of forensic practitioners, i.e. medicine in the case of 
forensic psychiatrists and clinical and social psychology and criminology in the case 
of forensic psychologists and therapists, as well as the slightly different institutional 
contexts they tend to work in. Future research might explicitly focus on comparing 
expectations and moral views of different forensic practitioners working in different 
institutional settings, and in addition might take into account differences with respect 
to institutional architectures of forensic care in for example European countries com-
pared to the United States. 
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Abstract
In the context of debates on (forensic) psychiatry issues pertaining to moral dimen-
sions of (forensic) psychiatric health care are frequently discussed. These debates invite 
reflection on the question whether forensic practitioners have a role in stimulating 
patients’ moral development and moral growth in the context of forensic psychiatric 
and psychological treatment and care. We conducted a qualitative study to examine 
to what extent forensic practitioners consider moral development and moral growth 
to be a part of their current professional practices and to what extent they think that 
stimulating moral development is a legitimate objective in the context of forensic 
psychiatric treatment. In addition, we asked how forensic practitioners balance pubic 
safety and risk management concerns with the interests and wellbeing of the individual 
patient. We conclude that: (i) elements of moral development and moral growth in 
forensic psychiatric care practices are to a certain extent inevitable and not necessarily 
questionable or undesirable; (ii) yet, as in similar debates these elements need to be 
made explicit in order to discuss the accompanying ethical challenges and boundaries. 
An open academic, professional and public debate on aspects of stimulating moral 
betterment within current practices is therefore desirable.
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Introduction
A number of separate debates invite reflection on the question whether forensic prac-
titioners have a role in stimulating patients’ moral development and moral growth in 
the context of forensic psychiatric and psychological treatment and care. 
Psychiatrist Sean Spence has raised the question whether moral improvement (in 
the sense of being a better person, or a better behaving person) is an implicit, or even 
explicit, goal of psychiatric treatment: “Can pharmacology help us enhance human 
morality? (...) I argue that we are already deploying certain medications in a way not 
totally dissimilar to the foregoing proposal: whenever humans knowingly use drugs 
as a means to improving their future conduct.” (Spence, 2008, p. 179). Apart from the 
– what Spence calls – ‘Promethean project’ of “specifically designing drugs that target 
and increase a pro-social feeling and behaviour such as ‘kindness’” (Spence, 2008, p. 
179), treatment can have morally relevant side-effects or consequences. Spence dis-
cusses the example of “a man prone to psychosis, who can be violent when ill, takes 
his medication reliably, thereby reducing his risk to others)” (Spence, 2008, p. 179). 
Here, Spence argues, the well-being of others has improved as a direct result of phar-
macological treatment of a mental disorder. A number of commentators have discussed 
potentially morally relevant “side-effects” of existing drugs that may (or already) have 
altering effects on moral decision making or on morally significant behaviour, and 
urge more research to able to better distinguish between desirable and less desirable 
effects (Levy et al., 2014a, 2014b). One example discussed by the authors concerns selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) that are prescribed to treat depression and 
anxiety disorders, but as a possible side-effect may increase aversion to directly causing 
harm in others (Crockett et al., 2010b). 
Psychiatrist Steve Pearce and philosopher Hanna Pickard make a similar point when 
they argue that psychiatric treatment can foster moral growth in various ways: “First, 
they can lead to the emergence of new moral motives and intentions. Second, they 
can lead to the acquisition or development of cognitive skills such as empathy, which 
are central planks of moral action. Third, they can enhance the ability to apply moral 
understanding and skills in particular circumstances” (Pearce & Pickard, 2009, p. 281). 
They take it as a given that interventions that can foster moral growth occur routinely 
within psychiatric settings, most notably in the treatment of personality disorders. In 
this context the question is posed as to whether forensic psychiatric disorders should 
partly be understood as moral disorders, and forensic psychiatric treatment as moral 
therapy. Diagnostic criteria for personality disorders involve traits that involve failings 
of morality or virtue, such as lack of empathy in the case of narcissistic personality 
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disorder, or anger and impulsivity in the case of borderline personality disorder (Pearce 
& Pickard, 2009; Pickard, 2011). Pickard has discussed this in terms of the inherent 
‘Janus-faced nature’ of personality disorders (PD): “The fact that the characteristics and 
traits that cause distress and impairment to the individual often involve harm to others. 
(…) Although harm to others, broadly conceived, is not part of the DSM-IV-TR definition 
of PD, it is part of how particular kinds of PD are diagnosed: via characteristics or traits 
that count as failures of morality or virtue and thus impair social, occupational, or 
other areas of interpersonal functioning.” (Pickard, 2011, pp. 182-183).18
In sum, in the context of debates on (forensic) psychiatry issues pertaining to moral 
dimensions of (forensic) psychiatric care are frequently discussed. Although some 
experts have argued that moral betterment is or should be a goal within forensic psy-
chiatry and psychology practices (Pearce & Pickard, 2009), it is unclear to what extent 
stimulating moral development and moral growth is a goal within current forensic 
mental health settings and much less so whether it should be. 
In this article, we explicitly focus on questions related to the moral dimensions of 
forensic psychiatric practice. The main objective of this study is to explore the question 
whether forensic practitioners consider stimulating moral development and moral 
growth to be a part of their current professional practices, and to what extent they 
think that stimulating moral development is a legitimate objective in the context of 
forensic psychiatric treatment. In addition, we ask how forensic practitioners balance 
public safety and risk management concerns with the interests and wellbeing of the 
individual patient. In the discussion, we discuss whether, and of so in what ways, our 
findings relate to and can be informative for the bioethical debate on moral bioen-
hancement. 
Methods
Sample and recruitment
We recruited 21 forensic practitioners (forensic psychiatrists, clinical psychologists 
and therapists) in The Netherlands and in Belgium. Subjects were recruited via profes-
sional organizations and by snowball sampling, meaning that initial research subjects 
18 See also: “wrongfulness-laden disorders should be investigated to determine whether the disorder in-
volves a moral incapacity (a disability in the moral sphere or “faculty”) or is simply a matter of wrongful 
moral choice” (Sadler, 2014, p. 167); and “some psychopaths do, in fact, appear to have deficits that 
distinguish them from responsible offenders. These deficits appear to undermine psychopaths’ ability 
to understand morality” (Shaw, 2016).
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suggested potential future subjects from their network (Atkinson & Flint, 2004). Our 
sample consists of nine females and 13 males, ranging in age from 32 to 68 years. At 
the time of the interviews, 12 participants were employed in The Netherlands and nine 
were employed in Belgium.
We conducted 11 interviews with forensic psychiatrists (FP) (at the time of the inter-
view, one participant worked as a general psychiatrist, but had worked in forensic 
settings in the past). We conducted 10 interviews with clinical psychologists (CP) or 
therapists (T) (at the time of the interview, two participants - a therapist and a clinical 
psychologist - were primarily involved in research and did not consult patients, but had 
done so in the past). Twelve participants (seven psychiatrists and five psychologists) are 
involved in scientific research, alongside their clinical or therapeutic work.
Qualitative interviews
Participants took part in an individual semi-structured interview lasting approximately 
one hour. During one interview, two respondents were present and interviewed togeth-
er. The interviews were held in Belgium and The Netherlands, and took place between 
January 2014 and July 2016. The interview guide was developed by JS in consultation 
with MS, FF and SS. The interviews were conducted by JS, FF and MS. JS attended 17 
interviews, FF attended seven interviews, and MS attended three interviews.
The interview schedule included open-ended questions about the moral dimensions 
of forensic psychiatric practice, about participants’ views on the question whether 
they consider stimulating “moral improvement” or “moral development” part of their 
current work practise and as a legitimate part of their professional responsibilities, 
and about how to balance and prioritize public safety and risk management concerns 
with the interests and wellbeing of patients. The interview schedule also contained a 
separate part with questions on forensic practitioners’ expectations and moral views 
regarding potential applications of current neurobiological and behavioural genetic 
research aiming to understand (and possibly help prevent, contain, or treat) violent 
and antisocial behaviour. We have reported on that topic elsewhere (Specker et al., 
2018).
Coding
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded in QSR NVivo version 11, using 
descriptive theme analysis (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). All transcripts were indepen-
dently read by all members of the research team (JS, FF, MS, SS). All transcripts were 
independently read by all members of the research team (JS, FF, MS, SS). JS and FF 
discussed a random selection of transcripts with the purpose of drafting a preliminary 
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analytic framework. JS independently coded the transcripts by labelling sections and 
text units referring to one or multiple concepts relevant for the study purpose. An 
iterative approach was used in which new data that challenged the existing coding 
structure were used to revise the themes until no new themes emerged. Interpretative 
bias of data was avoided by means of investigator triangulation, which involved all 
researchers (JS, FF, MS, SS) checking the codes for consistency.
Results
Do stimulating moral development and moral growth play a role in treatment?
The first set of questions offered to participants raised the – deliberately broadly for-
mulated – issue of whether forensic psychiatric treatment and care involve, in one 
way or another, elements of stimulating moral development and moral growth. In 
their responses, participants did not only differ in their opinion on whether these 
elements should or shouldn’t be part of treatment, but also in their understanding of 
what morality entails. Nearly all participants started their response with discussing 
how to understand moral development and moral growth, and what kind of morally 
relevant aspects are, or potentially can be, targeted in treatment. Before outlining the 
different aspects of morality participants mentioned in the subsequent section, below 
we discuss the reasons participants offered why they do or do not think stimulating 
moral development and moral growth is part of treatment. 
Whereas only a few participants indicated that stimulating moral development and 
moral growth were not part of treatment, most participants appeared to be more 
ambivalent in their answers. Participants who indicated that stimulating moral devel-
opment and moral growth play no role in treatment, mentioned that their treatment 
plans do not involve aspects of stimulating moral development, and that their medi-
cal training did not involve a focus on the moral aspects of behaviour. Instead, they 
underlined their medical rather than ‘moral’ expertise. This can be illustrated with the 
following quote from a participant:
Look, our task is not to create ‘better people’. We want them to stop doing awful 
things, we want to lower the risk factors, and I think that, to create better people, 
that is a very big step. CP8
If someone says to me; ‘Generally, I’m quickly aroused, high in blood so to say (…) 
And then I feel rejected very soon’, if I can improve that in any way, in how he re-
lates to higher values and the world surrounding him, by intervening by giving him 
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a beta blocker, for example, to make sure he is less quickly aroused – I will do that. 
But my goal is to increase his quality of life, my goal is not to improve someone’s 
morality. Because, I actually think that that does not belong to my expertise, to my 
profession, and is actually not part of my assignment. FP1
A number of participants argued that stimulating moral development or moral growth 
should not be part of treatment, and emphasized the importance of maintaining a 
clinical stance towards their patients, if only to provide a safe place to discuss sensitive 
subjects. They argued that the primary task of a forensic psychiatrists or therapist 
should be to treat disorders and to improve the quality of life of their patients – not to 
moralize – and that moral condemnation and judgment, if applicable, should happen 
not in the consulting room, but elsewhere (in court for example, or perhaps in society 
at large).
I do not like the idea that this would be a required task of a forensic psychiatrist. I 
think, I can only speak for myself, I think, well, we are not to judge about good and 
evil. I mean, we can only observe. And the only thing we are trained to do is to see 
if we can find a way to improve the quality of life of patients, preferably in a holistic 
way. And that is the only thing we can do, anything else, we cannot. FP1
Is it the aim for psychologists to become priests? To become moralists? Please, no. 
There must be a place for someone, who of course is condemned everywhere else 
within society, to find shelter and to not be judged. If such a place is no longer avail-
able (…) that person will no longer dare to share her most immoral thoughts. CP6
And by the way, who am I to lecture that person? Because presumably they would 
be able to mention a few things they disapprove of about me, right? PF5
However, other participants indicated that moral development is indeed part of fo-
rensic psychiatric treatment. These participants often mentioned that they considered 
improving patients’ capacities for empathy (both cognitive and affective) and moral 
reasoning (in terms of correcting cognitions and logical errors) as explicit treatment 
goals.
Empathy, for example, is certainly a goal for us. We focus on impulse control, 
relapse prevention, empathy enhancement, and responsabilization. CP4
Very often with people who do not behave morally, I feel it is about logical errors. 
And then I try – but I am necessarily limited in this regard – I try to determine 
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whether there are any thinking errors involved, and whether I can test their flawed 
ways of thinking, and possibly correct or adjust them, pharmacologically or psycho-
therapeutically. FP1
Interestingly, as the interviews progressed, several participants kept coming back to 
this subject and wondered whether, even though moral development is not an explicit 
treatment goal, this might be an implicit part of forensic treatment: 
However, as far as I am concerned, not to change him as a person, no. In the sense 
of trying to impose a certain kind of moral awareness, no. 
Interviewer: That is not one of the goals of treatment? 
Interviewee: No. Not explicitly, and perhaps also not implicitly, but I’m not entirely 
sure about that. FP8
In this context, several participants referred to the inherently normsetting and pre-
scriptive nature of their profession and the challenge of not placing one’s own moral 
convictions and moral values at center. Participants thus appeared hesitant to moralize, 
but at the same time discussed that to a certain extent, this might also be inevitable:
Well, at least I think many psychiatrists, unknowingly, very much approach and 
also treat their patients on the basis of a certain moral idea, that is, with their 
own norms, values, and morality, which simply pervades everything you’re trying 
to convey to your patients. So implicitly I would certainly agree. I think explicitly, 
also - many people, hm… Well, to provide a very concrete example, we offer a 
training that consists of three parts: social skills, emotion regulation, and moral 
reasoning. Moral reasoning is about casuistry: ‘What does this mean for the other?; 
What do you do merely for your own advantage?; What if this would happen to 
you?’. So in training, for example, we do call it, ‘to learn to reason better morally’. 
So apparently we have some kind of idea about what good moral reasoning is, and 
apparently it is also something we want to teach. FP10
Coming from general psychiatry, it does indeed strike me that, the, hm, the moral 
framework is implicitly present – much more than outside of forensic psychiatry. 
It is not made explicit, but it does play a role. If you would put it bluntly: ‘To what 
extent do we want the people whom we are treating here to be good citizens?’ Yes, 
I’m afraid that it does, that it does play a role beneath the surface, but that we do 
not talk about it. On a superficial level, we aim to make sure that people no longer 
pose a risk, or as little risk as possible to themselves or others. But of course that 
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has a very strong moral component. So, yes: it plays a big role. And no: it is not 
expressed as such. FP8 
So it is not my job to socialize people. Although somehow it is, but I will never say 
this out loud, because otherwise people will interpret socializing as re-educating, 
in the sense of ‘becoming like us’. I embrace a socialization that takes place from 
within a subject’s own coordinates. If someone regains a place within society – 
without necessarily actively participating in society, but also without wandering 
and suffering; if someone is able to make life bearable for himself/oneself, in a very 
discrete manner, without experiencing others as threatening and so forth – that for 
me is already a successful socialization. Whether others will share that perspective? 
The prevailing norms of others claiming that a normal individual should be like 
this or like that. I don’t care about such norms. As long as that person no longer 
poses a physical threat to others or to himself, that’s okay for me. Regardless of 
what that person is like at that time. CP6
Participants describe how particular patients and types of offences can elicit moral 
outrage or even abhorrence, and stress the importance of a clinical stance or attitude in 
order to overcome or distance themselves from these negative emotions. Some reflect 
on the ways their profession has forced them to reflect on their own moral framework 
and commitments. 
And of course, I experience these thoughts as well: “Come here, you boor, and I will 
beat you up”. Apparently, that is part of us as human beings. But then I realize that 
this would satisfy my own frustration more than anything else. FP3
That subcategory evokes repugnance in almost everyone. And the difficult thing is 
– and that is true for medicine generally of course – that we are trying to disconnect 
this from the disorder. So we see pedosexual offenders primarily as people with a 
problem, with a disorder that we should help them to get rid of as much as possible. 
And in interactions with patients, the moral dimension is not addressed, right? So 
you never say to someone; “What a horrible thing you have done!” FP8
What aspects of human morality do forensic practitioners deem relevant for 
treatment?
In their responses, participants identified and reflected on various aspects of human 
morality that are, or potentially can be, targeted by treatment: patients’ remorse, 
conscience, or guilt; self-regulation and self-awareness; motivation and will to change; 
moral responsibility; capacities for moral reasoning; and moral emotions (such as em-
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pathy). Participants differed in the way they conceptualized morality, and in what they 
understand morality to be. Whereas some focused more on capacities to be moral (such 
as having the capacity to empathize with others, or to reflect on one’s own behaviour), 
others focused on more symbolic elements, such as restoration with society. 
With respect to expressing regret and restoration and such things: a chance of 
recovery, a bond with the victim, restoring the bond with his own family (because 
they are affected as well), restoration with society – these are things we certainly 
address. CP4
Interviewer: “So morality is not addressed at all in treatment?” 
Interviewee: “Yes, it is, but not in terms of morality, but in terms of reciprocity. To 
the extent that one can build a reciprocal relationship with someone and is capable 
to handle and sustain that relationship and to anticipate the other’s position, and 
best-case scenario even to mentalize it. And that he is able to take the position of 
the other.” FP11
One of the aspects that participants deemed especcially relevant in the context of treat-
ment and that was mentioned frequently concerns self-awareness and the capacity and 
will to control oneself. 
You teach people to analyze themselves. You offer a kind of frame to pay attention 
to what they think, feel, and do. Also in the case of sexual offenders. To make them 
aware of the kinds of things they tell themselves when they start to commit and 
continue to engage in an offence, what they tell themselves while they are doing 
it, and what they tell themselves afterwards, to be able to say that it wasn’t that 
bad. And so on. So we actually give people such grids and tools to get to know 
themselves better and to pay attention to feelings and thoughts and actions that 
they did not pay attention to before, and without being fully aware, they would 
proceed to commit a crime. FP2
Really, it is inhibition that is actually our core business. You try to teach these 
people to keep that under control. CP7
To get a chance to, well, create a motivation, the will to control oneself. CP7
Many participants raised the question of whether focussing on one aspect or capacity 
would accomplish a genuine improvement in the sense of someone being ‘a genuinely 
better person’. For example, several participants reflected on whether it is enough for 
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someone to stop a particular behaviour, for example by enhancing inhibition, without 
accompanying changes in beliefs or thought patterns. 
If someone says, ‘I will not perform that behaviour anymore,’ then you could say 
that, because of that, you have become a better person, right? CP7 
In the core? I don’t know. It is also possible, you may also have a different motive to 
stop doing it. To prevent relapse, in your own interest. CP8
I will quote Freud here: We are all rapists and thugs in the depths of our thoughts, 
but the bad ones are those who act on them, and the good ones are those who think 
about it, but don’t act. FP9
Several participants discussed responsibility as an important part of forensic psychiat-
ric treatment. Both in the sense of looking back (I was the one who did these things) 
and in the sense of looking forward (I need to make changes in order to prevent myself 
from doing the same thing again). Several practitioners stressed that, frequently, the 
first is needed to achieve the second:
As long as patients say ‘I could not do anything about it’, I will tell them: ‘Well, yes, 
if you really couldn’t, if you really feel that it was because the sun was shining or 
it was raining, you could not do anything about it, that it was the weather; well, 
then you cannot go outside, can you? That must be terrible; it could happen to you 
tomorrow again, couldn’t it?’ Well, of course they do not think along those lines. 
(…) But when framed like that, that’s not what they want for themselves. So we 
need to address what’s possible. ‘Well, then we do have to figure out what you can 
do about it. For all I care, you bring both your umbrella and your sunglasses, to 
make sure that you… But you must address it.’ T2
Even very seriously disordered people are, at a certain level, accountable. And that 
also makes it possible to achieve progress with them, do you understand? That’s the 
space you need of course, because if you have the extreme, ‘I cannot do anything 
about it’ – yes, and then what? FP5
That has to do with giving responsibility. Because it is you who makes that choice, 
despite the feelings you may have; you are the one who makes the choice to act. CP8
Nevertheless, several practitioners expressed reservations with respect to the impor-
tance of addressing responsibility in treatment. For example, because behaviour change 
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is far more difficult to achieve than was once thought, and this places limits on the 
degree to which moral development can be addressed in treatment. Many participants 
discussed the degree to which you can hold people accountable for past behaviour, 
for example because of societal and situational factors, or expressed a more general 
skepticism with respect to human free will.
I have been working in this field for thirty years of course, the forensic field. And 
I started at a time when we were thinking very much about ‘Malleable Man’. A 
period in which self-regulation and free will were values that we were holding dear. 
And of course, over the course of time, that optimism has diminished, with all the 
consequences that this entails. So we were thinking, when I started more than 
thirty years ago, that as long as people would be willing, and we would be motivat-
ing and stimulating them, they would move in the right direction. And now with 
developments, also neurobiological developments, you think that there is more to 
it than simply the idea: as long as you want to, you will succeed. CP1
My belief in free will is limited. If you observe those boys – and I’ve really seen 
hundreds, also intensively – they are almost all friendly fools who fell victim to 
their own life, their own environment, their upbringing, their lack of intelligence, 
and so on. FP3
I would say: I take human free will as a starting point. That is, ultimately, a hypoth-
esis, a subjective truth, yes. (…) But also for the court it is a basic starting point: it’s 
assumed that people are responsible for what they do, what they think, and so on, 
for their actions, until the opposite is proven. FP2
How do forensic practitioners’ balance the wellbeing of the patient with public 
safety concerns?
Why would stimulating moral development and moral growth in fact be part of foren-
sic treatment? Many participants stressed that their primary objective is to lower the 
risk that someone will harm others.
That is a problem we have with sexual delinquents: that the bodily integrity of 
others is potentially in danger. (…) If I treat a serial rapist, I cannot say: ‘He re-
lapsed, but that is already an improvement, because nothing happened in the three 
months before.’ FP2
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But within this profession, I always say to patients: ‘You can remain as crazy as you 
are now, I am not saying that you have to change at all. I just need to change this 
one thing, that is, that you will never do it again.’ T2
In contrast, several participants indicated that stimulating moral development may be 
part of treatment, when it can help to manage stress relief or to reduce the suffering of 
the patient. Several participants conceptualized this as an ‘egocentric perspective’, in 
that they try to refer to the patient’s interests. 
Moral outrage about paedophiles etcera that’s, that’s very intense in society. Society 
demands that we do something about it. But the moment I… Opportunities to work 
with these people will not grow the moment I start talking about morality. Perhaps 
when I talk with them about empathizing with victims – maybe you could classify 
that under that heading? Which is of course part of the treatment of sexual offences. 
To empathize. But you empathize with the other, in order to enhance your own 
inhibition. It is not about feeling sorry for those people – do you understand that? 
The victim, that is merely, that is actually only just, actually only just instrumental 
for the patient himself. The more you empathize, the more the resistance grows, 
the resistance to act on it. FP5
But what I can say is that if someone, because of his moral deficiencies so to say, 
gets in to a lot of trouble with his environment, and if he is rejected a lot, and 
because of that is acting very hostile, and so on – I will point out that mechanism to 
him. And I would say to him, ‘I would advise you to do some tests, to take a look at 
what we can do, maybe that will help.’ Yes, that I will do. FP1 
Some participants characterized stimulating specific morally relevant aspects as a 
means rather than a goal; moral development may help achieve some other goal of 
forensic psychiatric treatment (such as lowering recidivism), but it is not an end in 
itself.
“I would say, it is a collateral advantage” CP1
These different potential objectives of stimulating moral development and moral 
growth – a focus on safety and harm reduction to protect others versus a focus on 
the patients’ wellbeing and treatment goals - are mirrored in two different sets of 
professional roles and responsibilities of forensic practitioners: on the one hand their 
medical background as doctors, and on the other hand their responsibilities regarding 
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public safety. We asked participants in our study to reflect on these roles and potential 
tensions between them, and to indicate which of the two, if any, they consider primary. 
In general, most participants acknowledged both responsibilities. They differed 
however, in their views on which of these professional roles they considered primary. 
Whereas some participants explicitly positioned themselves as a medical doctor first, 
most participants also stressed their responsibilities in preventing harmful crimes 
from being performed again.
If I would have to choose, I would be inclined to favor the protection of society, 
because the civil commitment of one disturbed forensic patient can prevent the 
victimization of several victims. FP9
If we would make a list of the ten things we are doing here, that would be number 
one: No new victims. And this is also clearly defined in terms of professional secrecy. 
We have professional secrecy pertaining to all, everything that is discussed here, 
until we estimate that there is a real danger with an identifiable future victim. CP4
I think the task of forensic psychiatry is, primarily, to minimize recidivism. That’s 
really primary, because that makes the profession what it is. That doesn’t mean 
I am blind to people’s suffering of course, but that is primary, that is absolutely 
paramount. And then, hm, I would say, secondly, can I, can we maybe, make people 
suffer less, have fewer problems, improve their quality of life. Also for their envi-
ronment, I think that is often forgotten; for the children and for family members, 
that is very important. (…) That is the system within which we operate, and that 
also allows the patient a certain degree of autonomy. FP5
Several participants discussed various tensions between, on the one hand, their medi-
cal responsibilities, and, on the other hand, public safety concerns. 
Sometimes these people experience profound suffering. Sometimes there is no suf-
fering. Those are fundamentally different situations. (…) To put it bluntly, someone 
who does want help in preventing making the same mistakes again, and someone 
who refuses that help – you do have different options available. FP6
You must adhere to the rules of medicine. And that is a danger, I think, for forensic 
psychiatrists. Actually, that is a danger in many disciplines in which you specialize, 
that you have to think carefully where you came from, where your foundations lie, 
to not stray from one’s subject field. (…) Because a forensic psychiatrist is first and 
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foremost a doctor. And must also work from those foundations, and according to 
the oath and principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. FP6
Some participants offered pragmatic rather than principled arguments for not focusing 
too much on future risk in treatment:
Yes, both of course. But when it comes to initiating and achieving successful foren-
sic treatment, I don’t think that the focus should be on that risk. Because if you 
want to motivate people for their own treatment, because that is necessary for 
treatment success, you have to start from their own suffering. And sometimes, that 
is a different suffering than how society sees it, but that needs to be the starting 
point for treatment. Because otherwise, you will not have any commitment of your 
clients. CP2
Several participants drew parallels with regular psychiatry, where their medical ex-
pertise and authority solely function within a therapeutic care setting, and forensic 
psychiatry, where their medical expertise and prognosis become embedded within a 
legal framework, and non-medical or non-therapeutic considerations come into play. 
Participants also discussed different settings forensic practitioners can work in, rang-
ing from outpatient care, to providing mental health care in prison, to specialized long 
term residental secure care, and how these different settings influence the degree to 
which they are able to assert their medical authority.
Perhaps that is specific to forensic psychiatry, that this power [to extend imprison-
ment] does not come to lie with you, but that you are able to function within a kind 
of triangular relationship. But that also entails that you must be able to tolerate 
that someone else is watching along. And that is different compared to a dialogue 
in regular psychiatry. Perhaps therein lays the uniqueness of forensic psychiatry. 
Interviewer: In this third factor? Interviewee: Yes. FP11
I have also worked in prison, there you have nothing to say. That is a prison, it 
is the warden who calls the shots. It is not a medically protected domain, with a 
healthcare logic. So we, as healthcare professionals, can build in safety – but it has 
to be on my own territory. FP2
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Discussion
Forensic practitioners’ views on potential moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric 
treatment and care are highly diverse, as these interviews show. Whereas several 
practitioners rejected the idea that stimulating moral development or moral growth 
is or should be part of forensic psychiatric treatment, other practitioners appeared to 
be more open to reflecting on potential elements of stimulating moral development 
in their work practice. And although current forensic practices do not (explicitly) seek 
the moral development and moral growth of forensic patients, elements of stimulat-
ing moral development and moral growth might be part of forensic psychiatric care 
implicitly, as this study suggests. Yet, forensic psychiatric treatment is hardly ever 
discussed in those terms. As discussed in the discussion, forensic experts Pearce and 
Pickard argue that psychiatry is both a moral and a medical science, and that a conve-
nient blindness to the moral content of psychiatry opens the door to potential abuse 
(Pearce & Pickard, 2009). They conclude that our best defence against abuse in forensic 
psychiatry is honesty and ever-vigilant self-reflection.
In general, the forensic practitioners we interviewed appear to be cautious about moral-
izing and imposing particular moral views and values, and often stress the importance 
of a professional, clinical stance to counter this. In line with this, Marga Reimer men-
tions that it is widely agreed that moral judgment should play no role in the practice of 
medicine due to its capacity to impair clinical judgements and especially so in the case 
of psychiatric conditions (Reimer, 2010).
Participants identified and discussed a range of morally relevant aspects that are or 
potentially can be addressed in the context of forensic psychiatric treatment, rang-
ing from stimulating empathetic concern, improving cognitive skills and correcting 
cognitions, strengthening protective factors to prevent recidivism, to lowering risk 
factors for future problem behaviour. Future research might study in a more systematic 
manner whether there is a relation between what respondents understand morality to 
be with their views on the appropriateness of stimulating moral growth in treatment. 
Participants mentioned different potential objectives for stimulating moral develop-
ment and moral growth in treatment: to treat mental disorders and alleviate suffering 
of their patient, and/ or to reduce the risk of reoffending and prevent future harm to oth-
ers. Our study suggests that forensic practitioners are both security-oriented (in terms 
of risk reduction and recidivism prevention) and concerned about patient care, with 
some individuals focusing more strongly on the care aspect and others more strongly 
on the security aspect. Several participants discussed the importance of maintaining 
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a clinical stance and relying primarily on their medical expertise and patient-centred 
responsibilities, although most practitioners also discussed their role in promoting 
public safety, as well as potential tensions between these two responsibilities. 
Professionals working in forensic psychiatric mental health care are said to indeed 
have diverse, and potentially conflicting, roles and duties, as they need to balance 
responsibilities towards patients (individual offenders), towards the legal system, and 
towards broader society (Day & Casey, 2009). Yet, this study also indicates that a clear 
code of ethics on how to manage potential tensions between promoting public safety 
on the one hand and the wellbeing of individual offenders on the other hand is largely 
lacking.19
Professionals may encounter a range of ethical conflicts between these two roles or 
sets of tasks, often discussed in terms of a ‘dual role’, ‘dual relationship’, or ‘dual loy-
alty’ dilemma (Robertson & Walter, 2008; Jörg et al., 2012; Ward, 2013). This dilemma 
is discussed, first and foremost, in the context of debates about potential conflicts 
between a psychiatrist’s duties as ‘healer/caretaker’ and as ‘evaluator’, for example 
in the USA when forensic psychiatrists are involved in evaluations that may lead to 
administration of the death penalty (Robertson & Walter, 2008). In other legislations, 
for example in the UK, a similar conflict may occur when a forensic psychiatrist’s evalu-
ation of dangerousness may lead to a person’s pre-emptive detention. Also in treatment 
contexts, individual forensic practitioners may face the ethical demands of two roles, 
one prioritizing the needs and interests of the community, the other the (medical and 
therapeutic) needs and interests of the offender (Ward, 2013).
Choice and consent, for example to consent to or refuse treatment, is particularly com-
plex in a secure psychiatric care context, as Gwen Adhead and Teresa Davies discuss: 
“There is a sense in which the medication is fulfilling a penal role in reducing the 
risk of re-offending, in addition to the therapeutic role. Patients may not be allowed 
to refuse to take medication if professionals think that taking medication will reduce 
their risk” (Adshead & Davies, 2016, p. 78). Sex offender therapy might serve as an 
example here. According to forensic psychiatrist Bill Glaser, sex offender therapy 
should be characterized as treatment-as-punishment rather than treatment of the punished, 
for the reason that “this type of therapy does not have the interests of the offender 
19 “If there are different ethical codes or systems of norms available to guide offender assessment and 
treatment, it could be hard to agree on a subsequent course of action. One forensic expert might justify 
his or her actions by appealing to obligations to the court while another could refer to the needs of 
patients or offenders, and an obligation to ease suffering whenever possible. The problem of ethical 
incommensurability raises its head here.” (Ward, 2013, p. 94)
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as its primary focus” (Glaser, 2009, p. 251; 2010). Glaser advocates that in a treatment 
context, it should be made clear to offenders that “the goals of treatment not always 
coincide with their own interests: (Glaser, 2009) as this satisfies the requirements of 
both minimizing distress (caused by otherwise deceitful disguising of the true purpose 
of treatment) and promoting equality (by providing offenders with the same amount of 
knowledge regarding treatment goals as that possessed by therapists)” (Glaser, 2010, p. 
267). Although evidence about the effectiveness of pharmacological agents in treating 
sex offenders is inconclusive (Långström et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2015), Daniel Turner 
and colleagues nevertheless discuss that “clinical experience suggests that, for some 
paraphilic patients, medication is a useful addition to psychotherapeutic interventions 
and, as such, its use is being recommended by both clinicians and the WFSBP [World 
Federation of Societies of Biological Psychiatry] guidelines” (Thibaut et al., 2010; Turner 
et al., 2017).
Adshead and Davies also argue that forensic patients should be included in the medical 
decision-making as much as possible to avoid feelings of humiliation, despair, emo-
tional isolation and stigmatization and to stimulate the long-term recovery of patients 
(Adshead & Davies, 2016). Forensic practitioners and forensic patients need to be able 
to rely on each other for support and safety. This may include that forensic psychia-
trists at times where patients are unable to make fully competent decision support 
patients in the decision-making process to reinstate full autonomous decision-making 
on behalf of the patient and achieve maximal long-term rehabilitation. Liégois and 
Eneman similarly argue that shared decision-making should always be the desired goal 
within a psychiatric context (Liégeois & Eneman, 2008). Coercion should never be self-
evident and should always be normatively defended.
The diversity of ideological and theoretical justifications of penal strategies and crimi-
nal justice institutional frameworks worldwide (more focused on rehabilitation versus 
more focused on retribution) arguably reflect these same tensions.20 Significant differ-
ences exist between forensic mental health systems globally (Dressing et al., 2007), yet 
literature on international comparisons of forensic psychiatric care is scarce (Ogloff 
et al., 2000). In terms of legal demands, admission criteria, the concept of criminal 
responsibility, service provision and treatment philosophy, large differences exist, 
even between Western European countries (Dressing et al., 2007; Salize et al., 2007; 
20 A recent comparison of forensic psychiatric care in England, Germany and The Netherlands confirms 
the presence of the dual role or dual relationship dilemma in Western European contexts: “Clearly, all 
three countries are in the process of significant challenges and changes in care provision reflecting the 
tensions between the two key values of forensic psychiatry: Care for the individual and protection of 
the public” (Edworthy et al., 2016, pp. 24-25). 
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Edworthy et al., 2016; Sampson et al., 2016). These differences between national legisla-
tions shape the particular ways in which forensic practitioners may experience dual 
role or dual relationship dilemmas. We urge for more awareness of the historical, ideo-
logical and political rationales behind particular institutional settings. If only because 
studies have shown that the context in which health care takes place, influences and 
potentially compromises the provision and ethics of health care (White et al., 2014). 
Forensic psychiatrists need to be able to fulfill their therapeutic role without feeling 
pressured to give precedence to public safety in ways that harm or are likely to harm 
their patients. We agree that although forensic psychiatry “can contribute significantly 
to the protection of the public in individual cases, crime prevention cannot be its pri-
mary purpose. In a social climate that places increasing emphasis on the management 
of risk, the pressure to do so is substantial” (Buchanan & Grounds, 2011, p. 422). Foren-
sic psychiatry as a medical discipline needs to be wary of attempts to use psychiatry as 
a means to impose the state’s interests on the lives of offenders. 
Several authors have linked the treatment of offenders, especially with neuro-bio-
logical interventions, to the debate on moral enhancement. In this debate, the main 
question is whether biomedical interventions that enhance prosocial tendencies and 
emotions and/or inhibit anti-social tendencies and emotions may – or should – be used 
to improve morality and moral conduct, in order to solve pressing societal problems 
such as crime and violence, or even terrorism and climate change. Commentators have 
discussed the use of neuro-interventions for offenders or forensic patients who are suf-
fering from various cognitive, motivational and emotional impairments as examples of 
moral enhancement. As such impairments may involve risk factors for various kinds of 
immoral behaviour (e.g., sexual crimes, violence, racism), proponents argue that moral 
bioenhancement could provide new ways to achieve successful recidivism reduction 
and rehabilitation (Douglas, 2008; S. Carter, 2016). 
Several commentators in this debate, including the present authors, have discussed 
whether psychiatric treatments that address neurobiological risk factors for deviant 
behaviour should indeed be understood as proper instances of moral enhancement 
(Specker et al., 2014; Reichlin, 2017; Specker & Schermer, 2017). Discussing the treat-
ment of forensic mental health disorders in terms of the overall practice of moral en-
hancement might have undesirable consequences. One potential negative consequence 
of doing so might be that framing forensic mental health treatment as ‘mere’ moral 
enhancement could bring the public to disregard the seriousness of the mental health 
problems forensic patients may face (Focquaert & Raine, 2012). Even more problematic 
is the possibility that conceptualizing certain risky, invasive and non-voluntary forensic 
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interventions under the umbrella of moral enhancement could inadvertedly promote 
the acceptance of criminal justice practices that are ethically troubling. Examples of 
which would be coerced drug and/or hormonal treatments that may involve very seri-
ous side effects and/or affect an individual’s mental liberty (Bublitz & Merkel, 2014). 
Nevertheless, outspoken proponents such as Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have 
argued that a number of psychiatric disorders can be characterized as “moral defects”, 
and therefore, that treating these disorders should indeed be understood as moral 
enhancement:
The opposite of promoting another’s interests is damaging another’s interests. 
Traits which increase harm to others cause immoral behaviour. The paradigm is 
psychopathic personality disorder, but other personality disorders such as antisocial 
personality disorders, borderline personality disorder and narcissistic personality 
disorder can cause great harm to those who come into contact with these individu-
als. The reduction in these tendencies are thus moral enhancements. (Savulescu & 
Persson, 2012, p. 410)
Likewise, David DeGrazia has characterized the treatment (or prevention) of antisocial 
personality disorder as a uncontroversial example of moral enhancement (DeGrazia, 
2014), and Thomas Douglas has discussed “institutions of criminal justice’” as institu-
tions that are arguably “already engaged in a kind of moral enhancement” (Douglas, 
2014c, p. 1245). 
A reason in favour of discussing certain aspects of forensic psychiatric care practices in 
the context of the debate on moral enhancement is therefore that it enables explicit 
debate on moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric care practices, and fosters profes-
sional dialogue and transparency. As Wiseman notes:
if we are already getting moral enhancement by proxy, and this is to some extent 
inevitable, the best solution may be to drag the whole thing out into the open and 
critically inspect the process in the full light of day. If some forms of medical and 
mental health treatments will always have morally related aspects or societal judg-
ments embedded within them, let us make these judgments explicit and attempt 
to find some way of integrating them within an acceptable code of practice – some-
thing which ensures that the therapeutic context is appropriately person-centered 
in nature and nonreductive, and that the healthcare professionals involved are 
appropriately directed and sufficiently well-armed against the dangers raised above 
(Wiseman, 2016, p. 219).
Stimulating moral growth in forensic psychiatric care 125
Moreover, the moral enhancement debate has proceeded without much attention for 
the specific institutional contexts in which potential moral enhancement interventions 
will be implemented. By exploring views of forensic practitioners on elements of moral 
development and moral growth in current practices, we hope to open up space for 
discussion about where and how ‘moral enhancement’ may – or may not – be brought 
into practice. Without adhering to the view that treatment of psychiatric disorders 
should be understood as moral enhancement, this exploration of views on potential 
moral dimensions of forensic psychiatric care can, in our view, inform the debate on 
moral enhancement. 
In conclusion, we would submit that: (i) Elements of stimulating moral development 
and moral growth in forensic psychiatric care practices are to a certain extent in-
evitable and not necessarily questionable or undesirable; (ii) yet, as in similar debates, 
these elements need to be made explicit in order to discuss the accompanying ethical 
challenges and boundaries. The history of concepts like deviance and mental disorder 
has led to a wide array of “muddled concepts, systems, values, and priorities” within 
current psychiatry (Sadler, 2013). There is a need for philosophical reflection on the 
aims of criminal justice and how these relate to forensic psychiatric practices. How far 
should the authority of the legal system extend within forensic psychiatric practices 
and how should psychiatrists approach and deal with the ethical difficulties that are 
specific to their field? Without such reflections, forensic practitioners risk having to 
navigate a “moral minefield” (Sadler, 2013). Especially in view of the growing interest 
in neurobiological interventions, an open academic, professional and public debate 
on the (un)desirability of stimulating moral development and moral growth within 
current practices is therefore needed.
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Abstract
To gain insight into the reasons that the public may have for endorsing or eschewing 
pharmacological moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used empiri-
cal tools to explore public attitudes towards these issues. Participants (N= 293) from 
the United States were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were randomly 
assigned to read one of several contrastive vignettes in which a 13-year-old child is de-
scribed as bullying another student in school and then is offered an empathy-enhancing 
program. The empathy-enhancing program is described as either involving taking a pill 
or playing a video game on a daily basis for four weeks. In addition, participants were 
asked to imagine either their own child bullying another student at school, or their own 
child being bullied by another student. This resulted in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. 
In an escalating series of morally challenging questions, we asked participants to rate 
their overall support for the program; whether they would support requiring participa-
tion; whether they would support requiring participation of children who are at higher 
risk to become bullies in the future; whether they would support requiring participa-
tion of all children or even the entire population; and whether they would be willing to 
participate in the program themselves. We found that people were significantly more 
troubled by pharmacological as opposed to non-pharmacological moral enhancement 
interventions. The results indicate that members of the public for the greater part op-
pose pharmacological moral bioenhancement, yet are open to non-biomedical means 
to attain moral enhancement.
Public attitudes towards moral enhancement 129
Introduction 
Moral competence is universally valued. Religious texts and the virtue ethics traditions 
all valorize the attainment of moral fluency. The Enlightenment brought its own con-
tributions to the project, with deontology and consequentialism imparting ‘rational’ 
means of defining what it means to be a moral person (Kitcher, 2011). 
Recently, a debate has emerged regarding the propriety of moral bioenhancement 
(Douglas, 2008; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; Harris, 2016a; Wiseman, 2016). The 
suggestion is that we are on the cusp of understanding the neurological and genetic 
underpinnings of moral (and immoral) behaviour, and that we should use that knowl-
edge to develop technologies that enhance human morality. However, what consti-
tutes moral enhancement is highly contested (Raus et al., 2014; Beck, 2015): “clear 
and precise definitions of “moral enhancement” are not to be found; what has been 
called “moral” enhancement ranges from encouraging empathic concern to increasing 
personal responsibility all the way to heightening respect for global fairness” (Shook, 
2012, p. 3). The debate is highly speculative. As the science of moral enhancement is 
“in its infancy”, neuroscientist Molly Crockett has warned to “be careful not to draw 
premature conclusions about potential avenues for moral bioenhancement” (Crockett, 
2014a, p. 370). Most contentious of all has been the suggestion that moral bioenhance-
ment ought to be compulsory.21 The debate has been vigorous but is at somewhat of 
an impasse (Harris, 2011; Douglas, 2013, 2014c; Harris, 2014; Hauskeller, 2014; Rakic´, 
2014b, 2014a; Sparrow, 2014a, 2014b; Agar, 2015b, 2015a; Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2015a; Rakic´ & Hughes, 2015; Bublitz, 2016; Harris, 2016b; Hauskeller, 2016; Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2016). 
In earlier articles we therefore advocated a more focused debate on the potential 
domains for which moral bioenhancement interventions will most likely will be imple-
mented (Specker et al., 2014; Specker & Schermer, 2017). Similarly, Harris Wiseman 
has advocated a ‘practical-realities first’ approach to potential moral bioenhancement 
interventions, implying that speculation about moral bioenhancement should account 
for “the specific practical realities to be found on the ground level, which are not at 
21 In their first publication on moral enhancement, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu famously argued: 
“If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use 
should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take them are 
least likely to be inclined to use them” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 174), and in subsequent 
publications they have reaffirmed this position: “we do not rule out that moral bioenhancement could 
be justifiably imposed without the informed consent of the subjects” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 
2017).
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all incidental but the very realities around which the abstractions of the debate must 
be made to shape themselves (not the other way around)” (Wiseman, 2016, p. 13). 
Given that the issue is of interest not just to philosophers but to the public at large, we 
explored public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement using both quantitative and 
mixed methods techniques.22 
We carefully considered what sort of immoral behaviour would be best to evaluate 
in our studies. We previously found that the public was generally supportive of us-
ing pharmacological means to alter criminal behaviour so long as safety was assured 
(Berryessa et al., 2016), but empirical studies have found criminals to be outside of 
the circle of moral concern (Crimston et al., 2016). It is unclear whether members of 
the public are similarly supportive of biological interventions aimed at persons who 
engage in immoral yet legal behaviour. We therefore narrowed our focus to morally 
contentious behaviours that are not unlawful. We settled on bullying, an act that is 
generally condemned as immoral but usually does not cross the line to illegality.
Bullying is an act that is intended to harm, takes place repeatedly, and is characterized 
by a systematic abuse of the imbalance of power between the aggressor and target 
(Smith et al., 2002). Bullying takes place in schools, between siblings, in prisons, and in 
the workplace (Monks et al., 2009), as well as online (Dooley et al., 2009). The observa-
tion that school bullying (both perpetration and victimization) predicts aggression and 
violence later in life has prompted calls for early prevention efforts (Ttofi et al., 2012; 
Wolke & Lereya, 2015). Although bullying per se is not the primary target of the moral 
bioenhancement debate, commentators have argued that “early childhood is probably 
the optimal starting point for moral enhancement” (Christen & Narvaez, 2012, p. 26; 
Savulescu & Persson, 2012).
Our objective was to test a range of issues that are central to the debate on moral 
bioenhancement. We hypothesize that the degree to which members of the public sup-
port an empathy-enhancing moral enhancement program depends on whether or not 
the means employed were pharmacological or non-pharmacological. We expect people 
to be less supportive of pharmacological than of non-pharmacological programs, even 
when safety and efficacy are held constant. In addition, we hypothesize that people 
are less supportive of pharmacological moral enhancement of their own children than 
they are of other people’s children. Second, we hypothesize that the degree to which 
22 Previous studies on attitudes towards enhancement of a range of different traits suggested that people 
are least open to enhancing traits they believe to be more fundamental to the self/ identity, which 
included morally relevant traits (such as empathy and kindness) (Riis et al., 2008; Cabrera et al., 2014). 
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respondents support these programs depends on whether they imagine themselves or 
someone outside their immediate circle of concern to participate. In other words, we 
expect that the distinction between self and other is relevant (E. F. Williams & Steffel, 
2014). We expect that this distinction matters more for the pharmacological program 
than the pedagogical program. Finally, we hypothesize that the public is uncomfort-
able with mandating moral enhancement interventions, and particularly averse to 
mandatory pharmacological moral interventions.
Methodology
Experimental methods
In order to explore attitudes of members of the public towards moral enhancement, we 
used the contrastive vignette technique (Burstin et al., 1980). The key outcome measure 
was the difference in group means between contrastive conditions rather than indi-
vidual stated preferences. In addition to these quantitative measures, we also employed 
a novel mixed-methods design in which content analysis of free-response answers were 
quantitized and assessed in a contrastive fashion (Cabrera & Reiner, 2016).
Vignette design strategy
Participants were presented with one (and only one) of several contrastive vignettes in 
which a 13-year-old child is described as bullying another student in school and then is 
offered an empathy-enhancing program (see Appendix B, p. 143-5). The vignettes were 
designed to be minimally contrastive, plausible, and to ensure that the results would 
be responsive to the hypothesis under consideration. Vignettes were analyzed using 
the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease and Grade Level readability tests, and we confirmed 
that a 15- to 21-year-old would easily understand the text of the vignettes.
One form of contrast involved the means of moral enhancement: the empathy-enhancing 
program was described as either involving taking a pill or playing a video game on a daily 
basis for four weeks [means: pharmacological or non-pharmacological]. Both programs 
were described as being equally safe and effective. We took pains to insure that the 
pharmacological moral bioenhancement was as innocuous as possible, describing it as 
a pill “based on the natural hormone oxytocin”, as we did not want to bias our results 
with off-putting interventions such as genetic modification or deep brain stimulation. 
A second form of contrast built into the vignettes compared the closeness to the subject 
of the individual who is under consideration for moral bioenhancement: participants 
were asked to imagine either their own child bullying another student at school, or their 
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own child being bullied by another student at school [closeness to subject: other’s child 
or own child]. This resulted in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design. 
In an escalating series of morally challenging questions, we asked participants to what 
degree they thought that it would be a good idea for the bully to participate in the pro-
gram (question 1; anchors ranging from 0: bad idea to 100: good idea); to what degree 
they thought that it would be a good idea for the bully to be required to participate 
in the program (question 3); to what degree they thought that it would be a good idea 
for children, identified by a test to be at higher risk of being bullies in the future, to 
be required to participate in the program (question 5); to what degree they thought 
it would be a good idea for all children to be required in the program, given that the 
program increases empathy (question 6); to what degree they thought society would be 
better off if the general population was required to participate in the program (ques-
tion 7; anchors ranging from 0: much worse off to 100: much better off ); and to what 
degree they would be willing to participate in the program themselves (question 8; 
anchors ranging from 0: entirely unwilling to 100: entirely willing). 
In the second part of the experiment, we asked participants to read a second vignette 
describing the same 13-year-old child bullying another student at school (either their 
child as bully, or their child being bullied), but this time is being required to participate 
in an the alternative empathy-enhancing program: participants who were initially presented 
with a program that involved taking a pill daily for four weeks, were now reading 
about an alternative program that involves playing a video game for four weeks – and 
vice versa. We presented them with the rating they gave in response to question 3, and 
asked them to what degree they thought that it would be a good idea for the bully to 
be required to participate in this alternative program. 
We asked participants to explain the rationale for the answers they had given to ques-
tions 1, 3, and 9, in open response boxes (questions 2, 4, and 10), which were coded 
using Contrastive Quantitized Content Analysis (Cabrera & Reiner, 2016). A comprehen-
sion check probed whether participants remembered whether the vignette described 
their own child engaged in bullying of their own child being bullied at school. Finally, 
a pair of questions asked participants to optionally tell us whether they or their family 
members had been bullied or been bullies themselves.
The vignettes and questions can be found in ix B. The University of British Columbia’s 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board approved the study. 
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Sample population and survey format
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Paolacci et al., 2010; Rouse, 
2015). Participants provided informed consent, and after completion of the survey 
were compensated $0.50. Surveys were administered using Fluid Surveys, and survey 
responses were collected online on June 6, 2016.
Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS. Quantitative questions were analyzed using a two way 
independent Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to identify significant main and interaction 
effects of the two independent variables on vignette measures. We analyzed significant 
effects with independent sample t-tests. Descriptive statistics were used to character-
ize the composition and properties of the sample. The datasets generated during and/
or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on 
reasonable request. 
Answers entered into the free-response box in question 2 were analyzed using the 
mixed-methods strategy called Contrastive Quantitized Content Analysis (CQCA) (Ca-
brera & Reiner, 2016). The technique provides a mechanism for quantifying the content 
of participants’ answers and comparing them across contrastive conditions. Answers 
to the open-ended questions following questions 3 and 9 were included, but the data 
did not appear to be different so analysis of these responses is not presented here. In 
order to mitigate experimenter bias, we first randomized the full set of comments 
and blinded the coder to the particular experimental vignette read by the participant 
who offered a given comment. We then carried out traditional content analysis of the 
blinded comments, developing themes iteratively. An initial subset of ~50 comments 
was analyzed by two coders, and disagreements were discussed until consensus was 
reached. Each theme was treated as a binary variable, and each comment received 
either a 1 when the theme was present or 0 when the theme was absent. Once all 
comments were coded, the data were unblinded and the frequency with which any 
theme emerged in the comments was compared across contrastive conditions, with 
inferential statistics (Pearson Chi-Square) used to explore if any observed differences 
were meaningful. The code sheet used in contrastive quantitative content analysis for 
question 2 can be found in Table 4 (Appendix C, p. 146).
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Results
Sample and demographics
A total of 384 participants from the United States completed the survey; 91 participants 
failed the comprehension test resulting in a final sample of 293 respondents from 38 
states and the District of Columbia (missing were: Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming). 
The mean age was 35.7 years old (with a standard deviation of 11.8 years). Frequencies 
of sample demographics are summarized in Table 5 (Appendix D, p. 147).
Do means matter morally?
An often-cited argument as to why we should explore the possibilities of moral bio-
enhancement is the lack of effectiveness of so-called traditional methods of moral 
enhancement, such as upbringing, socialization, and education (Ingmar Persson & 
Savulescu, 2008; but see Harris, 2011; Zarpentine, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014). A related 
argument is that there are little principled differences between employing traditional 
and potential biomedical methods of moral betterment in terms of their ethical ac-
ceptability (Levy, 2007; Pugh, 2017). David DeGrazia, for example, contends that many 
arguments against biomedical means also apply to traditional, non-biomedical means: 
“one should not inculcate moral values that are wrong, so how can a parent be sure 
that she or he is justified in providing a particular type of moral instruction? Also 
facing this challenge are public school teachers who attempt to inculcate in students 
certain moral virtues such as civility, respect for differences and concern for the poor” 
(DeGrazia, 2014, p. 363). Likewise, according to the so-called ‘companions in innocence’ 
line of reasoning (Walker, 2009, 2010), any principled argument against the attempt to 
making people morally better using genetic means, will also apply to educational and 
socialization efforts.
Other commentators have argued that there are in fact morally relevant differences be-
tween traditional and biomedical moral enhancement, for example because education 
is characterized by a fundamental moral equality between educator and educated, an 
equality that is lacking in the case of biomedical interventions aimed at reshaping the 
moral agency of others (Sparrow, 2014a, p. 26). Or, along these same lines, because the 
distinction between (direct) biomedical (neurological, pharmacological) interventions 
and (indirect) traditional interventions tracks a more fundamental distinction between 
reason-responsive and reason-bypassing interventions, or between interventions that 
allow for active involvement of the person undergoing the intervention and those 
interventions that do not (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015). 
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In this study, we hypothesized that members of the public would be less supportive 
of pharmacological than of non-pharmacological programs, even if in the programs 
were described as being equally safe and effective. Moreover, we expected that the 
public would be uncomfortable with mandating moral enhancement interventions 
and with mandatory pharmacological moral interventions in particular. We tested these 
hypotheses with an escalating series of morally challenging questions.
The first question we posed asked whether it was a good idea for the bully to participate 
in the program as described in the vignette. A two way independent ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of version of program (F(1,289)=141,57, p<0.001). An independent 
sample t-test revealed that respondents were significantly more supportive of an anti-
bullying program that involved playing a video game than one that involved taking a 
pill (Mdiff=42.39, 95%CI [35.32, 49.45], p<0.001, d=1.38) (Fig. 1, Participation). 
Fig. 1 Mean ratings for participation, mandatory, and preventive empathy-enhancing anti-bullying 
programs and for empathy-enhancing programs for all children. Error bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals
We then asked respondents whether it would be a good idea for the bully to be required 
to participate in the program, using the same 101-point scale. A two way indepen-
dent ANOVA showed a significant main effect of version of program (F(1,289)=147.26, 
p<0.001). An independent sample t-test revealed that respondents were more sup-
portive of a mandatory anti-bullying program that involved playing a video game 
than of a mandatory program that involved taking a pill; Mdiff= 44.68, 95%CI [37.30, 
52.05], p<0.001, d=1.39 (Fig. 1, Mandatory). Thus, respondents were significantly less 
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supportive of a mandatory pharmacological than a mandatory non-pharmacological 
anti-bullying program. 
Next, we asked respondents to rate their support for a mandatory preventive program 
for children who were identified as being at higher risk of being bullies in the future. 
A two way independent ANOVA showed a significant main effect of version of pro-
gram on the support rates for the preventive anti-bullying program (F(1, 289)=51.702, 
p<0.001). An independent sample t-test revealed that respondents supported a preven-
tive anti-bullying program that involved playing a video game more than a program 
that involved taking a pill; Mdiff= 27.21, 95%CI [19.77, 34.65], p<0.001, d=0.84 (Fig. 1, 
Preventive). People were less supportive of empathy enhancement within the context 
of prevention of future immoral behaviour as compared to support for empathy 
enhancement in cases where immoral behaviour (bullying) has already manifested 
itself. This is of interest for debates on “public health approaches to preventing crime” 
and growing attention for early identification and prevention of antisocial behaviour 
(Glenn & Raine, 2014; Horstkötter, 2015; Munthe & Radovic, 2015).
Subsequently we asked respondents about empathy enhancing programs that go be-
yond bullying in schools, specifically whether it would be a good idea for all children 
(not just bullies or potential bullies) to be required to participate in the empathy-
enhancing program. A two way independent ANOVA showed a significant main effect 
of version of program on the support rates for a mandatory empathy-enhancing program 
for all children (F(1,289)=131.005, p<0.001). An independent sample t-test showed that 
respondents supported a mandatory preventive empathy-enhancing program for all 
children that involved playing a video game more than one that involved taking a pill; 
Mdiff= 43.13, 95%CI [35.70, 50.57], p<0.001, d=1.33 (Fig. 1, All Children). Thus, respon-
dents were significantly less supportive of requiring all children to participate in a 
mandatory pharmacological empathy-enhancing program compared to their support 
for required participation in a non-pharmacological program. 
Taken together these results indicate that across a range of questions people were 
consistently more troubled by pharmacological than non-pharmacological moral en-
hancement interventions. 
The distinction between self and other
The second hypothesis driving this study is that people rate an empathy-enhancing 
program differently depending on whether they are imagining that their own child 
or someone else’s child is participating in the program. A previous study found that 
people employ double standards when thinking about the fairness of cognitive en-
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hancement in situations where they would cognitively enhance themselves versus situ-
ations where others would do so: people perceive the same enhancing interventions 
as less ethically acceptable when other people use them than when they themselves 
use them (E. F. Williams & Steffel, 2014). Because a similar asymmetry may influence 
people’s reasoning about moral enhancement interventions, we explored the effects of 
vignettes which compared the distinction between self and other. 
We tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, in contrastive versions of the vignettes 
respondents were asked to imagine either that their own child is bullying another stu-
dent in school (own child), or that their own child is being bullied by another student 
in school (other’s child). Second, we compared responses to two questions in which 
we asked respondents about their support for a population-wide empathy-enhancing 
program (everyone else) and their willingness to participate in such a program them-
selves (self ). 
We first analyzed the data to see if there was a difference between vignettes in which 
the empathy-enhancing program was to be administered to one’s own child who had 
been a bully (own child) versus those in which someone else’s child had been bully-
ing the respondent’s child (other’s child). Two way independent ANOVAs demonstrate 
that there was no significant main effect of closeness to subject on the support rates 
for either participation (F(1,289)=.451, p=.502), mandatory participation (F(1,289)=1.473, 
p=.226), or preventive approaches to the anti-bullying program (F(1,289) =.994, p=.320) 
(Fig. 2). 
There was a significant interaction (F(1,289)=4.4611, p=.033) between version of pro-
gram and closeness to subject when the respondents were probed on children being 
required to participate in the program, indicating that the mean difference between 
other’s child and own child differs depending on whether the program involves a pill 
or a video game. Pairwise comparisons using an independent sample t-test revealed 
that people were more supportive of a mandatory empathy-enhancing program that 
involved taking a pill when they imagined the child participating in the program to be 
an other’s child rather their own child; Mdiff= 12.55, 95%CI [1.77, 23.32], p=.023, d=0.38 
(Fig. 2, Mandatory).
In one of the first articles discussing moral enhancement, Thomas Douglas argued that 
unlike other types of enhancement, moral enhancement primarily benefits others: 
“on any plausible moral theory, a person’s having morally better motives will tend to 
be to the advantage of others” (Douglas, 2008, p. 230). Others have speculated about 
potential societal benefits of moral bioenhancement, arguing that, “they may, through 
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contributing to civic virtue, help to secure the good functioning of our political insti-
tutions and processes. One way they could do this is by facilitating the dispositions 
towards cooperativeness and trust that plausibly underpin social solidarity” (Jefferson 
et al., 2014). 
Fig. 2 Mean rating for participation, mandatory, and preventive pharmacological and non-phar-
macological empathy-enhancing anti-bullying programs for own child or other’s child. Error bars 
represent (95 %) confidence intervals
However, as “the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than 
on those who are enhanced” (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015, p. 140), the need to balance 
potential risks to the one subjected to the program with benefits to others is arguably a 
central challenge when discussing moral enhancement. A fundamental question is how 
to weigh the interests and preferences of the individual and the interests of others (in 
view of public safety and managing public risk) (Specker & Schermer, 2017). 
To address this, we asked participants whether they thought that society would be bet-
ter off if the general population was required to participate in an empathy-enhancing 
program. As with the results presented earlier, a two way independent ANOVA showed 
a significant main effect of version of program on the support rates for a mandatory 
population-wide empathy-enhancing program (F(1,289)=67.808, p<0.001). An indepen-
dent sample t-test revealed that respondents supported a mandatory population-wide 
empathy-enhancing program that involved playing a video game more than one that 
involved taking a pill; Mdiff= 30.72, 95%CI [23.27, 38.20], p<0.001, d=0.82 (Fig. 3a, General 
population). Subsequently, we asked whether respondents would be willing to partici-
Public attitudes towards moral enhancement 139
pate in the empathy-enhancing program themselves. A two way independent ANOVA 
showed a significant main effect of version of program on willingness to participate 
(F(1,289)=93.432, p<0.001). An independent sample t-test revealed that respondents 
were more willing to participate in an empathy-enhancing program that involved play-
ing a video game than one that involved taking a pill; Mdiff= 39.02, 95%CI [31.11, 43.51], 
p<0.001, d=1.13 (Fig. 3b, Self ). 
Finally, we asked whether participants had a history of bullying, either as perpetrators 
or victims of bullying. We found that 33.8% (n = 99) of the respondents indicated that 
they had been bullied in the past to such a degree that it interfered with their daily 
activities. 64.8% (n = 190) indicated that they hadn’t been bullied (to such a degree), and 
1.4% (n = 4) chose to not answer this question. 7.8% (n = 23) of the respondents indicated 
that they had bullied in the past to such a degree that it interfered with someone else’s 
daily activities. 89.8% (n = 263) indicated that they hadn’t bullied someone else (to such 
a degree), and 2.4% (n = 7) chose to not answer this question. Age, gender, and whether 
participants had been bullied or were bullies themselves had no influence on any of 
our parameters. 
 
Fig. 3a and 3b Mean ratings for pharmacological and non-pharmacological empathy-enhancing 
programs, either with respect to the “degree society would be better off if the general population 
was required to participate in the program” and “degree you would be willing to participate in the 
program yourself.” Error bars represent (95%) confidence intervals
Reasons offered for attitudes towards empathy enhancement
After rating the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program described in the vignette on 
a sliding scale ranging from good to bad idea (question 1), participants were asked to ex-
plain why they answered as they did in a free-response format (question 2). Responses 
were analyzed using contrastive qualitative content analysis (see methods). The themes 
that emerged represented reasons that fell into four main categories: Good idea, Bad 
idea, Ambivalent, and Appropriate reaction to bullying (see Table 4 in Appendix C for the 
code sheet (p. 146) and Table 6 in Appendix E for the overall coding results (p. 148)). 
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Fig. 4 Reasons why the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program is a Good idea (n=230). Frequency 
of the theme as mentioned in comments (total number of comments, n=620)
Good idea
In the Good idea category, the following reasons in support of the empathy-enhancing 
anti-bullying program were given most frequently (cumulatively, across all versions of 
the vignette) (Fig. 4): the program’s EFFICACY (n=106, 46.1 %), the program’s SAFETY 
(n=50, 21.7 %), the notion that the program provides a GOOD ALTERNATIVE to other 
approaches (such as ignoring the problem or punishment) (n=22, 9.6 %), the idea that 
the OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES MEANS (in spite of potential negative effects) (n=17, 7.4 %), 
the program’s POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE BULLY (as it will give him better chances in 
life, make him a better person, or will increase his flourishing) (n=15, 6 %), and the idea 
that the PROGRAM IS ENJOYABLE (and that this will motivate the bully to participate) 
(n=12, 5.2 %).
The program’s EFFICACY (χ2=57.49, df=1, p<0.001) and SAFETY (χ2=2.239, df=1, 
p=0.012), the notion that the program provides a GOOD ALTERNATIVE to current in-
terventions (χ2=7.166, df=1, p=0.007), and the notion that the PROGRAM IS ENJOYABLE 
(χ2=12.598, df=1, p<0.001) were significantly more commonly mentioned in support 
of the non-pharmacological than the pharmacological program. No difference was 
found between version of the program and the following reasons in support of the 
program: the notion that the OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES MEANS (χ2=3.111, df=1, p=0.078), 
the program’s POSITIVE IMPACT on the BULLY (χ2=3.494, df=1, p=0.062). We found no 
relationship between reasons in support of the program and closeness to subject (own 
child or other’s child), even when accounting for version of the program (pill or video 
game). 
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Bad Idea
In the Bad idea category, the following reasons against the program were given most 
frequently (Fig. 5): the notion that DRUGS SHOULD NOT BE USED (because they are 
artificial, because behavioural problems should not be remedied by taking drugs, or 
because there is nothing medically wrong with the child) (n=68, 33.7 %), the program’s 
SUPERFICIALITY (as it addresses symptoms and not underlying causes, or because it 
offers no durable solution) (n=36, 17.8 %), EFFICACY DISBELIEF (disbelief that the pro-
gram will effectively lower the bullying, or disbelief that increasing empathy will lower 
the bullying) (n=32, 15.8 %), the notion that ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES should be tried 
FIRST (and that the program should be a last resort) (n=31, 15.3 %), SAFETY CONCERNS 
(concerns about side-effects, long-term effects, and concerns about addiction) (n=16, 
7.9 %). 
The following concerns were more commonly brought up against the pharmaco-
logical program compared to the non-pharmacological program: the notion that DRUGS 
SHOULD NOT BE USED (χ2 = 87.949, df=1, p<0.001), the SUPERFICIALITY of the 
program (χ2=12.513, df=1, p<0.001), the notion that ALTERNATIVES should be tried 
FIRST (χ2=18.909, df=1, p<0.001), and SAFETY CONCERNS (χ2 = 16.809, df=1, p<0.001). 
No difference was found between versions of the program for EFFICACY DISBELIEF 
(χ2=2.307, df=1, p=0.129).
Fig. 5 Reasons why the empathy-enhancing anti-bullying program is a Bad idea (n=202). Frequency 
of the theme as mentioned in comments (total number of comments, n=620)
Chi-squared tests were performed to determine whether there was a relation between 
reasons why respondents rated the program as a bad idea and their imagined closeness 
to the bully (own child or other’s child). We found no significant relationship between 
closeness to subject (own child or other’s child) and particular reasons provided against 
the program without stratifying for version of program (pharmacological or non-phar-
macological). However, the notion that ALTERNATIVES should be tried FIRST (χ2=5.930, 
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df=1, p=0.015) and SAFETY CONCERNS (χ2=36.886, df=1, p=0.049) were more commonly 
mentioned as reasons against the program when the program described in the vignette 
was a pharmacological program intended for one’s own child. Moreover, we found that 
comments by respondents imaging their own child participating in a pharmacological 
program were more often coded as AMBIVALENT (χ2=4.848, df=1, p=0.028).
Respondents appear to perceive a difference in safety between non-pharmacological 
and pharmacological programs, in spite of the fact that the empathy-enhancing 
program was presented as equally safe and effective in contrasting versions of the 
vignettes. When confronted with a non-pharmacological program, many respondents 
indicated that the program’s safety was an important reason for their support of the 
program, whereas respondents who had read a vignette that described a pharmaco-
logical program mentioned concerns about safety as a reason against the program. 
Moreover, concerns about safety were more commonly mentioned in response to 
pharmacological programs intended for own child than for other’s child. 
Appropriate reactions to bullying
In their answers, respondents oftentimes not only provided reasons for or against the 
program, but also explained what they considered to be an appropriate reaction to bul-
lying. Appropriate strategies to alleviate bullying that were mentioned by respondents 
were: TEACHING (n=48, 31.4 %), EMPATHY (n = 41, 26.8 %), UNDERSTANDING (n=35, 
22.9 %), HELP (n=19, 12.4 %), PUNISHMENT (n=8, 5.2 %), and moral AGENCY (n=2, 1.3 %) 
(Fig. 6).
Fig. 6 Appropriate reactions to bullying (n=153). Frequency of the theme as mentioned in com-
ments (total number of comments, n=620). (Inner circle = pill, outer circle = video game).
Moreover, respondents frequently made explicit whether they thought the program 
as described in the vignette indeed consisted of the strategy to alleviate bullying that 
they preferred or found to be most promising (Fig. 7). Chi-square tests were performed 
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to determine whether there was a relationship between what respondents considered 
an appropriate reaction to bullying, and version of the program (pill or video game). 
Respondents more commonly reasoned that the bully needed HELP when confronted 
with a pharmacological rather than a non-pharmacological program (χ2=4.493, df=1, 
p<0.034) (data not shown). We found no significant relation between version of pro-
gram and respondents indicating that the bully needed TEACHING, EMPATHY, UNDER-
STANDING, PUNISHMENT, or AGENCY. 
Fig. 7 Does the program provides an adequate reaction to bullying or not (n=153). Frequency of the 
theme as mentioned in comments (total number of comments, n=620).
When the program described in the vignette consisted of playing a video game, re-
spondents more commonly expressed that they considered the program an adequate 
reaction to bullying (χ2=8.502, df=1, p=0.004), while when the program involved taking 
a pill, respondents more commonly indicated that they did not consider the program 
an adequate reaction to bullying (χ2=23.298, df=1, p<0.001) (Fig. 7).
In conclusion, the difference between self and other (either between one’s own child 
and an other’s child, or between the general population and oneself ) influences the 
public’s support for moral enhancement. For the pharmacological empathy-enhancing 
program, respondents were more critical when they imagined their own child rather 
than an other’s child to be the one subjected to the program. They more often ex-
pressed ambivalence, mentioned safety concerns, and argued that alternatives should 
be tried first. And as regards the pharmacological program, respondents were more 
open to requiring the general population to participate in the program, but were less 
willing to participate themselves. However, the difference between self and other was 
largely absent for vignettes describing a non-pharmacological program, suggesting that 
this distinction is morally salient only when safety and risk concerns come into play.
Discussion
This study provides empirical evidence that means matter morally. For when it comes to 
moral enhancement, members of the public generally eschew pharmacological moral 
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bioenhancement yet are open to non-biomedical means to attain moral enhancement. 
Both the quantitative and the qualitative data confirm that the public disapprove of 
biomedical interventions for moral enhancement. These findings were confirmed 
convincingly across a range of questions and in all versions of the vignettes. 
These findings are in line with previous research demonstrating a considerable bias 
against or mistrust of “pills” in general (Bergström & Lynöe, 2008; Partridge et al., 2014; 
Schermer, 2016). The added value of this study is that it sheds light on what kind of 
reasons members of the public have for their dislike of pharmacological interventions. 
Interestingly, when reflecting on the non-pharmacological program, many respon-
dents explicated their support by reference to the fact that the program is described 
as safe and effective in the vignette. However, respondents who had read a vignette 
about the pharmacological program were often sceptical about the program’s safety 
and effectiveness, even though the program was described as equally safe and effective 
in the vignette. Again, as might be expected based on earlier research, respondents 
argued that pills are bad because they are artificial or unnatural, expressed concerns 
about safety and undue medicalization (over-medicalization) of behavioural problems 
(Summers & Caplan, 1987; Mcleod et al., 2004). In addition however, many respondents 
reasoned that the pharmacological program offered no “real” solution to the problem; 
they were sceptical about the long-term effectiveness of the program and expressed 
concerns about the pharmacological program being too superficial and not adequately 
addressing underlying causes of the bullying behaviour. With the video game, respon-
dents were more optimistic about its lasting effects. 
Moreover, many respondents explained that the reason why they did or did not sup-
port the empathy-enhancing program in the vignette was related to whether or not 
they were under the impression that the program offered an appropriate pedagogical 
response to the problem behaviour (bullying). This might be interpreted as an indica-
tion that the public values fostering in children deeper understanding of and insight 
into why certain behaviour is morally wrong rather than mere conformity to (moral) 
rules. The public appears concerned not only about effectiveness (will an intervention 
reliably lower the immoral behaviour?) but also about whether the one participating 
in the program will, as a result of the intervention, have learned something on a deeper 
level and in the longer run.
One important consideration in interpreting these results is the fact that the scenario 
in our vignettes concerns bullying by a 13-year-old child. People might be particularly 
resistant to giving pharmacological substances to children, and different ethical con-
siderations may come into play, for example about the responsibility of parents and 
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schools. However, comments given in the open-response boxes indicate that the con-
cerns respondents have go beyond mere ‘pills are bad’-considerations. Moreover, next 
to empathy enhancement in children, we also asked respondents about their support 
for empathy enhancement for the general population and for themselves. 
Concerns about the importance of doing the right thing, period as opposed to doing the right 
thing for the right reasons are also raised in the ethical debate on moral bioenhancement. 
Douglas (Douglas, 2014c, pp. 1241-1243) discusses so-called “superficiality concerns” 
about forms of non-cognitive or reason-bypassing interventions that directly alter emo-
tions. These interventions can be considered brute as opposed to deliberate (Danaher, 
2013), because they directly alter emotions without requiring the exercise of delibera-
tive faculties, such as “moral reasoning, introspective reflection on one’s moral fail-
ures, or calm moral discussion with others” (Douglas, 2014b, p. 79). Douglas argues that 
these kinds of interventions are sometimes permissible (Douglas, 2008); Persson and 
Savulescu even argue that moral bioenhancement might be morally obligatory (Ingmar 
Persson & Savulescu, 2017). Other commentators disagree and reason that pharmaco-
logical or neuro-scientific interventions fail to produce deep moral understanding and 
deep moral improvement because these kinds of interventions fail to provide any moral 
content.23 
Harris maintains that to be a moral agent is to consider moral reasons for action. He 
argues that direct, reason-bypassing interventions “might well take the conduct of the 
affected individual beyond moral review and certainly out of the realm of things that 
might be right all things considered” (Harris, 2012, p. 269). Fabrice Jotterand stresses 
that on a virtue ethical account, both moral emotions and moral reasoning are es-
sential for autonomy and true moral agency: 
On my analysis, I conclude that moral neuroenhancement is unlikely to morally 
enhance people in the true meaning of the word. The development of neurotech-
nologies will allow us to control moral emotions but not to generate any content 
for moral reasons for actions. Without a systematic reflection on the nature of the 
good, the right and the just, one would end up, using MacIntyre’s language, in bad 
character because of intellectual blindness. Moral agency requires understanding 
and the formation of right moral emotions. (…) The hope of controlling human 
moral emotions is insufficient for the formation of virtuous people. Moral agents 
23 Bernard Baertschi explains that these disagreements can partly be attributed to different (i.e. cognitivist 
versus sentimentalist) meta-ethical positions (Baertschi, 2014).
146 Chapter 6
are not engineered but trained through the development of a vision of the good life 
and an understanding of human flourishing. (Jotterand, 2011, p. 8)
These comments suggest that at least some philosophical positions in the ongoing 
debate align with public opinion. Indeed, the reasons participants offered in their free 
responses reflect to large extent key themes discussed in the neuroethics literature. 
Furthermore, it is one thing to argue eloquently for or against the propriety of such 
things as mandatory biomedical moral enhancement and quite another to accept that 
mandate for yourself, or even more importantly for your children. Except under the 
auspices of a totalitarian state, the prospect of widely disseminating moral bioenhance-
ment depends entirely upon the accession of the public. Our data demonstrate quite 
clearly that support for such a project is absent, even though advancing the moral 
skills of the populace enjoys widespread support. 
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Appendix B
Vignettes and questions
PHARMACOLOGICAL/
OTHER’S CHILD BULLIES 
PHARMACOLOGICAL/
OWN CHILD BULLIES 
Imagine that your 13-year-old child was 
being bullied by another student at school. 
The school has a program that has been 
shown to be effective in reducing bullying 
in carefully carried out studies. 
The program involves the following: over 
the course of 4 weeks, each day the bully 
takes a pill that increases empathy for 
others. The pill is based on the natural 
hormone oxytocin, and improves the 
bully’s ability to understand what other 
people are feeling. Studies have shown 
that the program reduces bullying by 
40%, with no side effects. The reduction 
in bullying persists for 6 months after the 
program is complete. [104 words] 
Imagine that your 13-year-old child was 
bullying another student at school. The 
school has a program that has been 
shown to be effective in reducing bully-
ing in carefully carried out studies. 
The program involves the following: over 
the course of 4 weeks, each day the bully 
takes a pill that increases empathy for 
others. The pill is based on the natural 
hormone oxytocin, and improves the 
bully’s ability to understand what other 
people are feeling. Studies have shown 
that the program reduces bullying by 
40%, with no side effects. The reduction 
in bullying persists for 6 months after 
the program is complete. [102 words] 
NON-PHARMACOLOGICAL/ 
OTHER’S CHILD BULLIES 
NON-PHARMACOLOGICAL/ 
OWN CHILD BULLIES 
Imagine that your 13-year-old child was 
being bullied by another student at school. 
The school has a program that has been 
shown to be effective in reducing bullying 
in carefully carried out studies. 
The program involves the following: over 
the course of 4 weeks, each day the bully 
plays a video game that increases empathy 
for others. The video game is based on best 
educational practices, and improves the 
bully’s ability to understand what other 
people are feeling. Studies have shown 
that the program reduces bullying by 
40%, with no side effects. The reduction 
in bullying persists for 6 months after the 
program is complete. [105 words] 
Imagine that your 13-year-old child was 
bullying another student at school. The 
school has a program that has been 
shown to be effective in reducing bullying 
in carefully carried out studies. 
The program involves the following: over 
the course of 4 weeks, each day the bully 
plays a video game that increases empa-
thy for others. The video game is based on 
best educational practices, and improves 
the bully’s ability to understand what 
other people are feeling. Studies have 
shown that the program reduces bullying 
by 40%, with no side effects. The reduction 
in bullying persists for 6 months after the 
program is complete. [103 words] 
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Q1. To what degree do you think that it would be a good idea for the bully to partici-
pate in a program like the one described above? 
0 100
Bad idea Good idea
Q2. Please tell us why you answered as you did.
Q3. To what degree do you think that it would be a good idea for the bully described 
above to be required to participate in the program? 
0 100
Bad idea Good idea
Q4. Please tell us why you answered as you did.
Q5. If there was a reliable test that identified children who are at higher risk of being 
bullies in the future, to what degree do you think that it would be a good idea if 
they would be required to participate in the program?
0 100
Bad idea Good idea
Q6. Given that the program increases empathy, to what degree do you think it would 
be a good idea for all children (not just bullies or potential bullies) to be required 
to participate in the program?
0 100
Bad idea Good idea
Q7. If this program increased empathy in everyone, to what degree would you think 
that society would be better off if the general population was required to partici-
pate in the program? 
0 100
Much worse off Much better off
Q8. To what degree would you be willing to participate in the program yourself ? 
0 100
Entirely unwilling Entirely willing
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Q9. 
There is an alternative program that is 
equally effective in increasing empathy 
for others, but involves the following: 
over the course of 4 weeks, each day the 
bully takes a pill that increases empathy 
for others. The pill is based on the natu-
ral hormone oxytocin, and improves the 
bully’s ability to understand what other 
people are feeling. Once again, studies 
have shown that the program reduces 
bullying by 40%, with no side effects. 
The reduction in bullying persists for 6 
months after the program is complete.
There is an alternative program that is 
equally effective in increasing empathy for 
others, but involves the following:  over 
the course of 4 weeks, each day the bully 
plays a video game that increases empathy 
for others. The video game is based on best 
educational practices, and improves the 
bully’s ability to understand what other 
people are feeling.  Once again, studies 
have shown that the program reduces 
bullying by 40%, with no side effects. The 
reduction in bullying persists for 6 months 
after the program is complete.
Given that this alternative program exists, to what degree do you think that it would be 
a good idea for the bully described above to be required to participate in this alterna-
tive program? 
[Your rating for the original program was XX.] 
0 100
Bad idea Good idea
Q10. Please tell us why you answered as you did.    
Q11. In the vignette described above you were asked to imagine that  
 Your 13-year-old child was being heavily bullied by another student at school 
 Your 13-year-old child was heavily bullying another student at school  
Q12. Have you or any of your family members ever been so substantially bullied that it 
interfered with your daily activities? [optional question]
 Yes / No 
Q13. Have you or any of your family members ever been so much of a bully that it in-
terfered with someone else’s daily activities? [optional question]
 Yes / No 
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Table 4: Code sheet
Prefer Use  Safe: this code captures comments that the program is safe. 
Effective: this code captures comments that the program is effective or that mention 
the degree of effectiveness of the program.  
Objective justifies means: this code captures comments that in spite of potential 
negative effects, the program is justified or worth trying given the negative effects of 
bullying.  
Positive Impact bully: this code captures comments that the program will likely 
benefit the child that is bullying (will give him more chances in life, will make him a 
better person, will increase his flourishing). 
Positive Impact victims: this code captures comments that the program will likely 
benefit the child that is bullied. 
Program is enjoyable: this code captures comments that the bully likely would enjoy 
the program, be motivated to participate in it, and that this would make it more likely 
that (s)he will stick with it.  
Good alternative to present approaches: this code captures comments that the 
program provides a good or viable alternative to present approaches to bullying (such 
as ignoring the problem, or punishment), and that the bullying behaviour needs to be 
addressed, that something needs to be done to stop the bullying.  
Pill not bad: this code captures comments that there is nothing (inherently) wrong 
with taking a pill.  
Against Program 
because 
Safety Concerns: this code captures comments about side effects and safety concerns, 
about risk of becoming dependent or addicted, and comments that express disbelief 
that the program has no side effects, or no side effects in the long term. 
Efficacy Disbelief: this code captures comments that explicitly express disbelief that 
the program will be effective in reducing bullying (for example because ‘once a bully, 
always a bully’, or because increase in empathy will not decrease bullying).  
Drugs should not be used to remedy behavioural problems in children/ concerns 
about medicalization of normal child behaviour: this code captures comments that 
behavioural problems should not be remedied by taking drugs, comments that there 
is nothing medically wrong with the child/ no medical condition/ no acute medical 
condition, general comments that drugs are bad, wrong, or should not be used, as 
well as concerns that the program is artificial or not natural (e.g. chemical feelings, 
hormones).  
Need for (more) permanent and less superficial solution: this code captures 
concerns that the program offers no permanent or durable solution to the bullying, 
and/ or that the program should not sidestep the real issues, that it should address 
underlying causes, not symptoms, as well as comments that express disbelief that the 
program will be effective after six months, after the program stops, in the long term, 
etc.  
Alternatives First/ last resort: this code captures comments that other ways of dealing 
with the bullying child need to be tried first, as well as comments that the program 
should be a last resort, or only be used for the most grave instances.  
Autonomy: this code captures comments that the bully should have the right to 
consent to the program, or that the program infringes on his autonomy. 
Identity, personality, fundamental changes to the self, diversity: this code captures 
comments that a person should not be asked, or forced to change his personality, as 
well as comments that ask who should decide what kind of changes in personality 
would in fact be desirable, and comments that people differ and that diversity in 
personality traits should be embraced instead of eliminated.  
Parents should decide: this code captures comments that parents should be consulted, 
and consent to the program. 
Doctor should be consulted: this code captures comments that a doctor needs to be 
consulted. 
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Ambivalent  Ambivalent: When it was overtly stated one or more reasons for and against the 
program, or that the commenter was unsure. 
Appropriate 
reaction to 
bullying/ 
The problem 
underlying 
bullying that 
needs to be 
addressed is
Bully needs to be taught: this code captures comments that the bullying child needs 
to be taught.
Bully needs to understand: this code captures comments that the bullying child needs 
to understand why bullying is wrong. 
Bully needs to empathize with victims: this code captures comments that the bully 
needs to empathize with victims, and feel and understand how his actions hurt other 
people. 
Bully needs punishment: this code captures comments that the bullying child needs 
punishment. 
Bully needs help: this code captures comments that the bully needs help, that he likely 
has problems, is a victim himself. 
Bully needs to take responsibility/ agency: this code captures comments that 
the bully needs to bear the consequences of his (past) behaviour, needs to take 
responsibility for (future) behaviour. 
Program provides 
an appropriate 
reaction to 
bullying 
Program provides:  this code captures comments that program is an adequate reaction 
to bullying.
Program does not provide: this code captures comments that the program is not an 
adequate reaction to bullying. 
Unclear whether program provides: this code captures comments where it is unclear 
whether the program provides an adequate reaction to bullying. 
Appendix D
Table 5: Sample demographics
Characteristic % (n)
Gender
Male 50.9% (149)
Female 49.1% (144)
Age (groups)
18-30 41.6% (122)
31-45 38.9% (114)
46-65 18.1% (53)
>65 1.4% (4)
Education (groups)
Some high school 0.3% (1)
High school diploma 13.0% (38)
Some college 31.1% (91)
College degree 43.0% (126)
Some post-graduate 2.7% (8)
Post-graduate degree 9.9% (29)
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Table 6: Overall coding results
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GOOD Efficacy 106 22 *84 9 13 39 45 48 58
GOOD Safety 50 17 *33 9 8 15 18 24 26
GOOD Good alternative 22 5 *17 1 4 6 11 7 15
GOOD Objective justifies means 17 5 12 2 3 4 8 6 11
GOOD Positive impact bully 15 4 11 0 4 8 3 8 7
GOOD Other
GOOD Program enjoyable 12 0 *12 0 0 7 5 7 5
GOOD Positive impact victim 5 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3
GOOD Pill not bad 3 3 0 1 2 0 0 1 2
BAD Drugs are bad 68 *68 0 36 32 0 0 36 32
BAD Superficiality 36 *28 8 17 11 1 7 18 18
BAD Alternatives first 31 *27 4 *18 9 1 3 19 12
BAD Efficacy disbelief 32 12 20 3 9 12 8 15 17
BAD Safety concerns 16 *16 0 *11 5 0 0 11 5
BAD Other
BAD Fundamental changes to self 5 1 4 1 0 2 2 3 2
BAD Parents should consent 7 5 2 3 2 0 2 3 4
BAD Autonomy 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2
BAD Doctor should be consulted 4 4 0 3 1 0 0 3 1
Ambivalent 35 17 18 *12 5 9 9 21 14
Overall FOR 139 31 *108 7 *24 52 56 59 80
Overall AGAINST 111 *94 17 45 49 7 10 52 59
Overall UNCLEAR 9 6 3 4 2 2 1 6 3
NEED FOR Teaching 48 30 18 15 15 8 10 23 25
NEED FOR Understanding 35 17 18 5 12 11 7 16 19
NEED FOR Empathy 41 *20 21 9 11 13 8 22 19
NEED FOR Punishment 8 4 4 1 3 1 3 2 6
NEED FOR Help 19 *14 5 8 6 2 3 10 9
NEED FOR Agency 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
YES, program provides 46 14 *32 4 10 18 14 22 24
NO, program does not provide 49 *40 9 20 20 3 6 23 26
UNCLEAR whether program provides 7 3 4 3 0 3 1 6 1
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Psychopaths and God Machines: A deeply provocative and 
puzzling debate
The end of human civilization is nearing, as a consequence of a toxic mix of rapid 
technological developments, an outdated moral psychology, and an evil minority that 
is capable to cause ever greater – even existential – harm. Our only hope in stopping 
climate change, preventing terrorism, solving global injustices, in short, in averting 
disaster, is to find ways to change no less than the moral character of humanity. In 
fact, there is such an abundance of evil, and the urgency is so great, that the develop-
ment and implementation of state initiated, mandatory bioenhancement programs is 
justified.24 Quietly awaiting people to acknowledge and change their flawed natures 
themselves is simply not an option. 
This assessment of the apocalyptic character of (parts of ) the debate on moral enhance-
ment might seem a bit of a caricature. Still, in writing this thesis, many a time I have 
marvelled at the unworldly nature, and at times even silliness, of the debate. To borrow 
the words of Harris Wiseman: 
The scope of moral bioenhancement is great: presented by some in terms of pure 
fantasy, by others as hard-hitting real future prospects and as offering remedies for 
every last moral concern from all our petty and mostly harmless vices and to vari-
ous addictions and all sorts of “undesirable behaviours” up to the ultimate fate of 
humanity and moral bioenhancement’s apparently salvatory promise for humanity 
against its own inner biological evils. (Wiseman, 2017, p. 398)
My main motivation in writing this thesis has been to understand in what ways the de-
bate on moral enhancement can be relevant for and could impact on existing or emer-
gent human practices – and the other way around. Some authors express scepticism 
towards the potential real world relevance of the debate and have posed the question 
whether “moral enhancement is ever to gain relevance apart from merely theoretical 
interest” (Beck, 2015, p. 234)? In this final chapter, contrary to such scepticism, I will 
take the claim that a range of present and emerging practices already contain ele-
24 In Savulescu and Persson’s God Machine thought experiment, such a large scale project is described 
as follows: “The Great Moral Project was completed in 2045. This involved construction of the most 
powerful, self-learning, self-developing bioquantum computer ever constructed called the God Machine. 
The God Machine would monitor the thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions of every human being. 
It was capable of modifying these within nanoseconds, without the conscious recognition by any hu-
man subjects.” (Savulescu & Persson, 2012, pp. 412-413) See the introduction of this thesis for a more 
extensive discussion of The God Machine thought experiment. 
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ments of “moral enhancement by proxy” (Wiseman, 2016, p. 219) as a starting point. I 
continue to understand moral enhancement as formulated in the working definition in 
the introduction, to include biomedical and non-biomedical interventions, and assume 
that in principle, both of these merit equally intense ethical scrutiny. 
As technological possibilities (and perhaps public and political willingness) to influ-
ence and alter moral behaviour and moral capacities increase, the responsibility to 
make explicit this moral enhancement dimension in our current practices, and to 
think carefully about the associated ethical issues, increase as well.
Evaluating moral enhancement
As discussed before, this thesis aims at formulating conditions for ethically justifiable 
moral enhancement practices, and focuses to a lesser degree on analysing particular 
moral enhancement technologies. This represents a choice, based on the observation 
that at present there are very few concrete moral enhancement technologies available 
– or at least, that there is little consensus on the criteria to decide which technologies 
would in fact constitute moral enhancement technologies. The choice is also based 
on the observation that there is little agreement on what would be a suitable evalua-
tive framework to analyse moral enhancement, and what kind of elements should be 
included in it. 
Before formulating conditions for ethically justifiable moral enhancement practices, 
first some questions need to be addressed and some distinctions made.
Do we know or simply assume the alleged positive and negative effects of 
potential moral bioenhancement technologies?
Commentators in this debate have, to a lesser or larger extent, assumed moral bio-
enhancement to take certain forms, be focused on certain capacities, to have certain 
effects; and from those implicit or explicit assumptions, have taken up a position to-
wards moral bioenhancement. For example: Harris argues that moral bio-enhancement 
interventions will necessarily impede on human freedom, because he assumes that 
moral enhancement will bypass or distort reasoning, and therefore interfere with 
ethical analysis rather than enhance it. Likewise, Reichlin claims that biotechnological 
means will have serious negative effects on moral agency and capacity of authentic 
moral behaviour: “biotechnological ways of producing moral progress (…) risk having 
serious negative effects on our moral agency, by causing a substantial loss of freedom 
and capacity of authentic moral behaviour, by affecting our moral identity and by 
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imposing a standard conception of moral personality” (Reichlin, 2017). These assump-
tions about the effects of emerging or fictitious moral enhancement interventions are 
not necessarily warranted.25 
It has been argued, for example, that neuromodulation techniques can have disrupting, 
restorative, or enhancing effects on autonomy, depending on the context, the exact ef-
fects, and the person in question (Schermer, 2015). Moreoever, there are no guarantees 
that traditional procedures, like talk therapy, to name one example of a nonbiomedical 
intervention, will necessarily foster autonomy or other morally relevant capacities – it 
could do the exact opposite. Rather than differentiating ethically appropriate from 
ethically worrisome means, it is preferable to explore the conditions under which a 
particular intervention is most likely to undermine human freedom or human agency 
– and whether there are measures that would minimize these risks – and, vice versa, 
the conditions under which an intervention can restore or enhance them. The poten-
tial – positive or negative effects – of moral enhancement interventions should not be 
assumed, but be considered as largely open questions, which can only be answered in 
relation to a specified context or practice.
Distinguishing moral self-enhancement from moral other-enhancement
Can we imagine there ever to be a commercial market for moral enhancers, resembling 
current (semi-legal) markets for cognitive enhancers? Is it likely that there will be do-it-
yourself communities experimenting with moral self enhancement, similar to current 
communities that are experimenting with neurostimulation for self-improvement 
purposes (Wexler, 2015, 2017)? Are people in fact interested in morally enhancing 
themselves, or do they think that morally enhancing others should be prioritized?26 
These are, to a certain extent, empirical questions with regard to which the jury is still 
out – as is true for many questions surrounding the debate on moral enhancement.
Everyday experience suggests that behaving morally, and being motivated to do so, is 
not out of the ordinary. People are prone to reflect normatively, behave altruistically, 
and sacrifice themselves for what they consider good causes. For her book Strangers 
Drowning: Grappling with Impossible Idealism, Drastic Choices, and the Urge to Help, Larissa 
25 Horstkötter and colleagues caution against undue “bio-exceptionalism” and the apparent gap between 
the intensity of ethical scrutiny life sciences approaches (to antisocial and criminal behavior) receive as 
compared to psychosocial approaches (Horstkötter, Berghmans, & de Wert, 2014).
26 Persson and Savulescu argue that those most in need of moral enhancement, are least likely to pursue 
it: “If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use 
should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take them are least 
likely to be inclined to use them” (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2008, p. 174).
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MacFarquhar portrays a range of people who, in different ways, go at great lengths 
to do good (MacFarquhar, 2015). Being motivated to better oneself morally is also not 
uncommon. To give but one example, the so-called Effective Altruism movement de-
scribes the most effective ways of doing right for people who want to do better but do 
not know how (Singer, 2015). The Giving What We Can charity and the 80.000 Hours 
movement encourage people to donate at least 10% – and then gradually more – of 
their income, and to choose the most high-earning career (not the profession one has a 
passion for) in order to be able to give away as much as possible.27 
Research shows that people consider moral traits to be central to their identity, and 
suggests that they consider them equally or even more important than other mental 
faculties, such as (emotional and autobiographical) memory, lower-level cognition, and 
perception (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). At the same time, studies show that most 
people (irrationally) believe themselves to be morally superior to the average person: 
Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the aver-
age person as distinctly less so. (…) virtually all individuals irrationally inflated 
their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality 
was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. (…) Taken 
together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and 
prevalent form of “positive illusion.” (Tappin & McKay, 2016, p. 623)
If people care about their moral qualities, yet tend to overestimate them, this raises the 
question whether and to what extent people indeed consider themselves to be a candi-
date for moral enhancement. A study by Jason Riis and colleagues confirms that people 
consider morally relevant traits such as empathy and kindness fundamental to their 
self, but are least willing to pharmacologically modify these morally relevant traits 
compared to other traits they considered less morally relevant, such as wakefulness 
and reflexes, possibly precisely because these traits are so closely related to personal 
identity (Riis et al., 2008). 
Chapter 6 of this thesis suggests that in general people are open to morally improving 
themselves (in terms of increasing their empathy for others), but that they care about 
(and change their preferences based on) the process, or means by which this change 
in their moral capacities comes about (Specker et al., 2017). Participants’ willingness 
27 See the website of the Oxford based Centre for Effective Altruism: https://www.centreforeffectivealtru-
ism.org/; the website of Giving What We Can: https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/; and the 80.000 Hours 
Organization: https://80000hours.org/.
General discussion 161
to participate in an empathy-enhancing program themselves was greater for the non-
pharmacological as compared to the pharmacological program. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that people are open to morally improving themselves, but that wide-
spread willingness to participate in moral self enhancement by means of biomedical 
interventions is lacking.
Arguably, the distinction between moral self enhancement and moral other enhance-
ment is relevant when ethically evaluating (potential) moral enhancement practices 
(see chapter 3 and 6). As we have seen, a central and recurring question in the moral en-
hancement debate is what the need for and objectives of developing and implementing 
moral enhancement interventions are. These needs and objectives are often described 
in terms of potential advantages to others (reduction of harm) or society (significant 
overall decrease in criminal, violent, or otherwise antisocial behaviour).28 Indeed, in his 
first article on moral enhancement, Douglas argued that because moral enhancement 
benefits others, it compares favourably to other forms of enhancement: 
Unlike the most frequently mentioned varieties of enhancement, enhancements 
satisfying this formula for moral enhancement could not easily be criticised on the 
ground that their use by some would disadvantage others. On any plausible moral 
theory, a person’s having morally better motives will tend to be to the advantage 
of others. (…) One could not object to moral enhancement on the ground that it 
would systematically impose morally gratuitous disadvantage on others. (Douglas, 
2008, p. 230)
With respect to moral self enhancement, the decision to pursue moral enhancement 
and to determine the goal and appropriate means of doing so, is to a large degree up 
to the person herself, provided a number of safeguards are put in place. It is the re-
sponsibility of those offering potential ‘moral enhancement’ interventions, programs, 
and courses, to safeguard that what they offer is safe and effective, and to provide 
ample opportunity for informed consent.29 Doing so yields many challenges in and of 
itself, comparable to the challenges faced by anyone offering counselling, training, or 
therapy in the medical or semi-medical domain to people who come to them with a 
28 DeGrazia provides the following rationale for why moral bioenhancement needs serious consideration: 
“because the status quo of moral behaviour is deeply problematic and traditional means of moral 
enhancement may prove inadequate to achieve needed improvements—notwithstanding the phenom-
enon of moral progress. The status quo is deeply problematic because there is such an abundance of 
immoral behaviour, with devastating consequences, and serious risk of worse to come.” (DeGrazia, 
2014, p. 362)
29 In principle, this is equally important for biomedical and nonbiomedical interventions and programs.
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request for help. It may also be comparable to the challenges faced by regulators and 
scientists who are trying to design sensible regulations and robust safety standards 
for direct-to-consumer personal genome testing (Bunnik et al., 2014) or home use of 
neurostimulation (Fitz & Reiner, 2013). For example, ethicists have called on scientists 
and journalists to balance their enthusiasm about the promises of new brain stimula-
tion technologies with restraint, and to provide realistic information about potential 
harmful effects as well (Fitz & Reiner, 2013, p. 411).
Clearly, in the case of moral enhancement of others, there are additional and much 
larger responsibilities to justify the need, objectives, and procedure and the means 
employed, as well as the balancing of potential benefits and harms. This is true espe-
cially in the case of interventions that are initiated, incentivized, or mandated by a 
state or state body.30 If we take proponents of moral enhancement at their word, at 
least some of their proposals would involve some sort of moral enhancement program. 
Mark Walker’s proposal for a Genetic Virtue Program “to reduce evil in our world” by 
“engineering genetic virtue” might serve as an example (Walker, 2009, 2010).
Distinguishing between different target populations
As was discussed in chapters 3 and 4, in order to determine a suitable target population 
for moral enhancement programs for others, for example in terms of who will benefit 
most from a specific intervention, or of which individual or groups need to be targeted 
to optimize societal benefit, some form of screening will be necessary (Specker & 
Schermer, 2017). Moreoever, specific concerns are associated with implementing moral 
enhancement interventions in particularly vulnerable target gourps.
In children, there might be unique (but oftentimes unknown) effects on the developing 
brain (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2016)31, challenges surrounding decision-making processes 
and consent (Focquaert, 2013; Maslen et al., 2014), and potential effects on a child’s 
future (and developing) autonomy. Concerns about negative effects of screening and 
selection apply to educational contexts, with regard to programs aimed at lowering 
or preventing a particular kind of problem behaviour (e.g. the example of bullying in 
chapter 6). One potential risk is that children or youngsters, who are at risk and in 
need of help, but exhibit internalizing rather than externalizing problem behaviour, 
30 Sarah Carter discusses ethical issues surrounding incentivizing programs for moral enhancement (S. 
Carter, 2015). In addition, considerable attention has been devoted to the distinction between voluntary 
and mandatory moral enhancement (Rakic´, 2014b, 2014a; S. Carter, 2015; Baccarini & Malatesti, 2017; 
Rakic´, 2017).
31 Again, in principle, this applies to potential effects on the developing brain of both biomedical and 
nonbiomedical interventions.
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risk staying out of sight. In these contexts especially, the best interests of all children 
should be of concern of educators, social workers, and policy makers, and an exclusive 
focus on ‘troublemakers’ is not justified (Kaltiala-Heino & Eronen, 2015).
The group of forensic psychiatric patients is also vulnerable,32 for example in terms of 
concerns over coersive measures (Nedopil, 2016) or so-called coercive offers, and the 
question whether people in forensic psychiatric care contexts can ever truly give their 
informed consent (McMillan, 2013, 2014; Ryberg, 2015; Adshead & Davies, 2016) (see 
chapters 3-5 for more extensive discussion of the specific challenges associated with 
the forensic field).
Conditions for ethically justifiable moral enhancement practices
Proponents of enhancement in previous debates have often defended and shown a 
strong, even libertarian, commitment to individual liberty and freedom of choice. How-
ever, in the debate on moral enhancement, a number of central commentators appear 
to depart from this commitment, when they advocate for mandatory, population-wide 
moral enhancement programs, aimed at solving societal problems like climate change, 
war, and social evil by changing individual biology.33 
Those who advocate population-wide, mandatory moral enhancement programs would 
have to convincingly argue that the need for such large-scale programs is so great, that 
abandoning central and quite basic principles of liberal democracy is warranted.34 In 
addition, they would have to show that their proposed solution – correcting individual 
moral deficiencies – in fact meets that urgent need adequately and effectively. 
In addition, a range of regrettable historical as well as current examples caution 
against putting the full force of the state behind moral enhancement programs aiming 
to change a person in such a way, as to make her conform to (or refrain from) what in 
the eyes of those that order it, is (un)wanted or (im)moral. An often discussed example 
32 “In the emotionally (and politically) charged context of crime, the imposition of unproven technical 
“fixes” on the always unpopular class of “criminals” seems quite plausible” (Greely, 2007, p. 1129).
33 Stefan Schlag argues that Persson and Savulescu misunderstand the nature of collective action problems: 
“The argumentative difficulties possibly arise because the authors misunderstand the basic problem 
of the tragedy of the commons. Social dilemmas are not caused by individual moral deficiencies but 
are rooted in the problematic structure of human interaction. Neuroscientific interventions into the 
biological basis of human behaviour are fundamentally inappropriate means to solve problems of this 
type” (Schlag, 2016, pp. 11-12).
34 One such a fundamental liberty is the right to privacy – which Persson and Savulescu recognize as 
a legal but not a moral right, and for that reason should not stand in the way of implenting moral 
enhancement programs (Ingmar Persson & Savulescu, 2012; but see: Bublitz, 2016). 
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concerns homosexuality, which has long been criminalized (and still is in large parts 
of the world), and which has been classified by the American Psychiatric Association 
as a mental disorder until 1973 and as a sexual orientation disturbance until 1987 
(American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses 
to Sexual Orientation, 2009). Various sexual orientation change efforts are still applied 
today. 
These kinds of examples show the importance of freedom and diversity of thought, 
civil disobedience, and ‘praise for defiance’ (Arnold, 2015; Ripley, 2016). Instead of 
imposing a particular comprehensive moral doctrine, a fundamental recognition of the 
worth of value pluralism and of moral disagreement and debate should be at the fore-
front of any moral enhancement program. From this recognition it follows that in line 
with the views from moral progressivists (chapter 3), an important ‘guiding concern’ 
in implementing potential moral enhancement programs is to focus on enhancing 
morally relevant capacities, not on moral conformity. 
Moral conformity could be described as the conformity of human behaviour with social 
or moral norms (Civai & Ma, 2017). Instead of focusing on changing a person in such 
a way as to make her conform to social or moral norms, arguably a more promising 
approach is to focus on what it means to ‘be better at being good’, and what kind of 
capacities are needed to become ‘better at being good.’ Such a capacitarian and devel-
opmental approach focuses on the set of capacities that “mature moral functioning”35 
(Narvaez, 2010) or “moral intelligence”36 (Tanner & Christen, 2014) presuppose, and 
asks what kind of environments would foster these capacities. 
To conclude, a focus on (present and emerging) moral enhancement practices invites 
reflection on a range of questions that are largely missing from the current debate on 
moral enhancement: What goal/ purpose does the intervention serve? What political, 
sociological, institutional context are we dealing with? Who will likely benefit and in 
what way(s)? Who will risk harm, and what kind of harm? What kind of background 
theory of moral development and moral growth is referred to? Is the intervention justi-
fied in terms of benefits to the individual undergoing the intervention, or in terms 
of benefits to relevant others/ public safety/ common good – or both? Are all those 
35 In short, mature moral functioning refers to “individual capacities for habituated empathic concern and 
moral metacognition—moral locus of control, moral self-regulation, and moral self-reflection—com-
prise mature moral functioning, which also requires collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral 
institutions” (Narvaez, 2010, p. 163).
36 Tanner and Christen define moral intelligence as “the agent’s capacity to process and manage moral 
problems” (Tanner & Christen, 2014, p. 120).
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involved aware of the attempt to morally enhance, especially the person undergoing 
the intervention; has the person given her informed consent? Do all those involved agree 
with the goal and the means, especially the person undergoing the intervention? Will 
the person undergoing the intervention as a result of the intervention most likely be 
better at being good, or will he more reliably do the good thing? 
The reader might find these questions slightly banal and deceptively simple. Yet, in 
order to focus attention on the fundamental issues concerning individual freedom and 
right to self-realisation that are at stake in current or emerging moral enhancement 
practices, these are, I think, exactly the kinds of questions that need to be asked. 
Strengths and limitations
As both the debate and the implications of the science of morality are far from settled, 
it is also far from clear what the central moral issues are. In imagining potential do-
mains in which elements of moral enhancement are recognizable, the main goal of this 
thesis has been to identify ethical issues that are not central in the debate now. 
In response to an article in which we suggested a number of domains that we think 
are relevant for the debate on moral enhancement (chapter 3), bioethicist Bert Gordijn 
has formulated a range of reservations with respect to our suggested set of practices 
(Gordijn, 2017). His main concern is that the success of our strategy “is predicated 
on the correctness of suppositions about future moral bioenhancement scenarios. 
Unfortunately, however, these assumptions are inherently speculative. It is fundamen-
tally problematic to determine in which contexts moral enhancements might first be 
implemented. It is equally challenging to identify contemporary domains that might, 
in their central aspects, be comparable to future moral bioenhancement practices” 
(Gordijn, 2017, p. 427).
Gordijn is correct that we cannot know for sure whether the domains we have identified 
will indeed be relevant for future moral enhancement scenarios. Our choice of prac-
tices might indeed turn out to be irrelevant for future moral enhancement scenarios. 
However, Gordijn does not go into the question why our particular choice of practices 
is wrong, or unlikely to be relevant for moral enhancement in the future. We have 
argued that elements of moral enhancement/improvement are present within current 
forensic practices, depending on how one defines moral enhancement – Gordijn has 
not refuted that. Moreover, our central claim and position that moral enhancement 
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should be analysed contextually and in relation to particular practices, still stands, even 
if our choice of practices turns out to be mistaken.
Without any doubt a range of other practices might be relevant and worth considering 
further. “Impartiality” moral enhancement, for example, could be offered to those 
who are in a position of power or fulfil an influential role, with the aim of nullifying 
implicit biases.37 Douglas discusses studies of biological influences on fairness related 
behaviour (Douglas, 2015, p. 31). One often-cited study shows that judges’ parole deci-
sions vary dependent on extraneous variables, like for example how long ago the judge 
had a (food) break, letting the authors conclude that “justice is what the judge ate for 
breakfast” (Danziger et al., 2011). Neutralizing these extraneous influences would argu-
ably make judicial sentencing fairer. Whether judges would in fact voluntary seek such 
impartiality enhancing interventions, or whether some sort of persuasion or coercion 
would be necessary (and justified) merits further discussion. Moreover, one would still 
have to determine who would be the fairer judge: the hungry of the satisfied one?
An additional potential concern is the fact that the working definition of moral en-
hancement as it was formulated in the introduction is very broad and remains silent 
on a number of arguably important distinctions. As the debate itself was the main 
subject of research, I did not want to exclude potential perspectives and practices in 
advance. However, such a broad interpretation has disadvantages as well. For example, 
a consequence of analyzing a diversity of practices through a moral enhancement lens 
might be that conceptualizing these practices as ‘moral enhancement’ practices could 
unintentionally promote their acceptance (chapter 5). 
Concluding reflections and suggestions for further research
To enhance the debate, in my opinion it would be necessary to direct further research 
towards the following themes and questions:
Medicalization of immoral behaviour
Approaching violence (D. J. Williams & Donnelly, 2014) or other examples of arguably 
immoral behaviour from a health instead of a criminal justice lens, is an example 
of medicalization: quite literally, ‘to make medical.’ Medicalization is understood as 
the process by which previously nonmedical problems become defined and treated 
37 One could think of judges, business and political leaders, parents, police and military personnel, pro-
grammers, American presidents, etc.
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as medical problems, usually as diseases or disorders (Conrad, 2013, p. 196). Another 
example concerns the question whether addiction should be considered an illness or 
a moral failing (Wiseman, 2016). Although processes of medicalization often elicit a 
negative connotation the concept is, in principle, value neutral. There are both (so-
ciological) studies describing processes of medicalization as well as critical analyses of 
instances of over- or under medicalization, and merely coining the term does not in 
itself differentiate between good and bad forms of medicalization (Conrad, 2013, pp. 
1199-1200; Parens, 2013, p. 28; Horstkötter et al., 2015). 
In the case of medicalization of violence, problematic, violent behaviour is defined, or 
redefined, as a medical problem (as a psychiatric disorder for instance). Medicalization 
of deviant or violent behaviour can have positive and negative effects. On the one 
hand, it can open opportunities for adequate care and treatment, where these were 
previously lacking. Instead of responding to this kind of behaviour with indignation 
and punishment, the objective of treatment is to address underlying illness or disorder 
and to limit chances of reoffending. 
A possible worry is that by viewing (potential) offenders foremost from a medical angle, 
they are more likely to be viewed as basically incompetent, or at the mercy of forces 
beyond themselves: 
When we argue, say, against the medicalization of badness – e.g., against treat-
ing criminal behaviour as the symptom of a psychiatric disorder – we are arguing 
against the view of ourselves as objects at the mercy of forces beyond ourselves, and 
for the view of ourselves as subjects who can choose. (Parens, 2013, p. 29)
Another concern with respect to health approaches to violent behaviour concerns 
individualization: the risk that causes are (quite literally) sought within the individual, 
as a genetic, neurological, biological disorder, and to a far lesser extent in social, in-
stitutional, familiar, or other environmental circumstances. Further conceptual and 
ethical research is necessary here to consider the justification, and the benefits and 
risks of medicalization of ‘badness’. Such research should ideally be performed by psy-
chological and psychiatric forensic scientists and professionals, in close collaboration 
with ethicists, anthropologists, and sociologists.38
38 The perspectives of offenders themselves should also be included. Jeremy Dixon (Dixon, 2018) (Glover, 
2014)
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The roles and responsibilities of medical doctors. What should doctors do?
The debate on moral enhancement has proceeded without much attention for the kinds 
of institutional contexts in which moral enhancement would be implemented – or is 
already implemented – and the implications of those contexts in terms of professional 
responsibilities of those who would be responsible for the implementation.
On the one hand, perhaps biomedically trained professionals (‘clinical technicians’) 
could administer and monitor the technical aspects of certain interventions. At the 
same time however, focussing on the technical aspects exclusively, might come at the 
expense of attention for more comprehensive care aspects of the interaction. Perhaps a 
new sub discipline would emerge, in which hybrid doctors would move in between the 
domains of medicine (neuroscience, psychiatry), public health (prevention of health-
related risks, safety, monitoring), and public policy (safety, crime prevention). Such a 
professional would be well-established in a diversity of domains, and would ideally be 
able to do justice to the specific responsibilities flowing from these diverse domains. 
There is a risk, however, that these diverse domains yield dual, multiple roles, and dif-
fuse responsibilities (chapter 3 and 5). The merging of care and safety responsibilities 
warrants more fundamental reflection on the roles and responsibilities of medical pro-
fessionals, as well as on the limits of those roles. This is true for forensic professionals 
in particular. Yet, forensic medical practice has thus far not received as much attention 
from medical ethics as would be warranted by the moral complexities of this practice. 
Changing the individual, and/or changing the environment? Parallels with 
other debates
In order to stimulate people to act morally, or in accordance with social norms, a 
diversity of strategies can be employed. The debate on moral enhancement focuses 
on strategies that are aimed at changing the person herself (Klincewicz, 2016). Glenn 
Cohen for example tentatively considers the option of changing the biological makeup 
of human beings in such a way as to reduce serious human rights violations. He argues 
that “instead of merely crafting laws and setting up structures that get human beings 
such as they are to respect human rights, that the human rights approach should also 
consider embracing attempts to remake human beings (and more specifically human 
brains) into the kinds of things that are more respectful of human rights law” (Cohen, 
2015, p. 1). In various other debates a variety of strategies that focus on changing the 
environment are discussed.39
39 These strategies could be used together, in concert, as is often done, for example in public health, where 
interventions are targeted at both the individual and the environment. 
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There have been proposals to change the so-called ‘choice architecture’ of the environ-
ment in order to ‘nudg’ people towards pro-social instead of egoistic choices (Capraro 
et al., 2017)40, for instance by designing robots to serve as “moral nudgers” in order 
to foster “socially just” tendencies in humans (Borenstein & Arkin, 2016). Ismaili 
M’hamdi and colleagues have coined the concept of “other-regarding” nudges, in other 
to describe cases where “the principal but not necessarily sole beneficiary of the nudge 
is not the nudgee,” but someone else (Ismaili M’hamdi et al., 2017, p. 702). Another 
example is the field of robot ethics, debating attempts to design “morally competent 
robots” (Malle, 2016).41 Comparable to discussions about to who responsibility should 
be assigned to when a self-driving car ends up in an accident – the driver/passenger or 
the driver/car – one can ask who is responsible when a morally enhanced person goes 
astray. Who is responsible when the God Machine derails?
Another example concerns speculations about (and first experiments with) using so-
called wearables to provide persons with insight as to biological processes underlying 
their activities and behaviour. The Empatica wristband for example supposedly can 
provide biofeedback about actual aggression and stress levels. This information can be 
used for self-regulation purposes, but could also be used for monitoring and surveil-
lance, for example in secure prison contexts (de Kogel & Cornet, 2016; van Hintum, 
2018). Such proposals should be reflected on in relation to existing efforts to monitor 
behaviour. To give one example, the Chinese government is experimenting with a so-
cial credit scheme through which citizens can earn (and lose) points and accompanying 
privileges based on online and offline behaviour (Creemers, 2017).42 Data sources that 
are included in the current experiments include online behaviour, financial informa-
tion, and behaviour in traffic and in public transport gathered by face-recognition 
40 Nudges has been defined as “approaches that steer people in particular directions” (Sunstein, 2017, p. 4) 
while preserving freedom of choice. 
41 In thinking about what a morally competent robot would look like, this field of robot ethics proves 
an interesting testing ground for thinking about the elements that are needed for “full” human moral 
agency.
42 “an ambitious proposed social credit scheme is intended to create a range of benefits and sanctions for 
online and offline behaviour. According to State Council plans, it is intended that social credit informa-
tion will be connected with individuals’ identity card numbers, creating unique and traceable files that 
can be used to facilitate citizens’ access to financial and government services. At the same time, the 
plan called for the introduction of real-name identity-based appraisal and scoring of individual online 
comportment, as well as of blacklists for those perpetrating various kinds of fraud, deception and ‘harm 
to others’ lawful rights and interests’. In other words, it is not unlikely that undesired behaviour online 
may affect citizens’ ability to gain a livelihood, find schools for their children or take out insurance.” 
(Creemers, 2017, p. 97) See this webpage for a game that simulates the workings of the social credit 
scheme: https://app.nos.nl/social-credit-score/index.html.
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cameras (Nieuwsuur, 2018). It is not unthinkable that future social credit schemes 
would include biomedical data as well.43 
The common denominator in these discussions is reflection on a broadening range 
of technologies that are or can potentially be used to make people behave in accor-
dance with social norms. In light of these parallel debates, one important direction 
for future research would be a more comprehensive ethical analysis of the diversity or 
“omnipresence”44 of ways in which societal actors can stimulate, incentivize, nudge, 
or force persons towards certain behaviour, and the accompanying ethical concerns. 
All these emerging practices require moral scrutiny, and many of the relevant consid-
erations will be common to all these debates. The ‘moral enhancement debate’ can 
function as a useful resource here.
Challenges and the relevance of the new sciences of morality
I find the findings of the new sciences of morality fascinating, in particular the ways 
this new and rich landscape of empirical studies on animal and human morality can 
challenge and enrich both philosophical and folk understandings of morality. These 
disciplines presuppose, paint, promote, and also undermine certain ideas of human 
nature. The debate on moral bioenhancement in a way represents an extreme example 
of this challenge: Is human morality to be understood on individual/biological level, 
and should neuro/bio-insight be taken to imply that our self-understanding needs an 
‘upgrade’, and if so, in what ways? 
It is notable that images of man and of human nature as they are usually being painted 
by proponents (e.g. transhumanist) of human enhancement are generally rather 
positive. They tend to focus on fundamental human capacities for imagination, self-
creation, and empowerment. Proponents of moral enhancement on the other hand 
tend to depart from this positive depiction of human nature, and stress the ways hu-
man moral nature is fundamentally defective and for that reason needs a (preferably 
quick) ‘fix’. The truth no doubt lies somewhere in the middle.45
43 See (Singh & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014).
44 Such a comprehensive analysis is comparable to the argument that the ethical evaluation of health 
checks should go beyond weighing the harms and benefits of individual tests, but should take into 
account the potential beneficial and harmful effects of what has been termed an “omnipresence of 
health checks” (Stol et al., 2017), that is, the combined effects resulting from the multitude of tests on 
offer. 
45 Are human beings inherently and thoroughly selfish, with morality only being an after-thought or thin, 
cultural layer of “veneer” around a corrupt core; or are human capacities for morality antique and part 
of our genetic inheritance (de Waal, 2009, pp. 7-12)? 
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We should do justice to human capacities for giving and exchanging reasons for ac-
tions (Sie, 2014), holding and giving responsibility, while at the same time “biting the 
bullet” by acknowledging the diversity of challenges (Levy, 2006). Despite a range of 
challenges, based on fascinating studies explaining the varieties of ways human moral 
behaviour, moral thought, and moral emotions are influenced by situationalist, envi-
ronmental, genetic, and biological influences, we should be careful to not rush towards 
– debunking – conclusions.46 Humans arguably have evolved into the kind of beings to 
whom ‘moralizing’ comes natural; we tend to evaluate ourselves and others in moral 
terms. As Harris writes; “We have certainly evolved to have a vigorous sense of justice 
and right, that is, with a virtuous sense of morality” (Harris, 2011, p. 104). To reconcile 
these different ways of thinking about human morality is a challenge for science and 
philosophy: for the explanatory models and their underlying presuppositions. But it 
is a challenge also for folk conceptions of the moral self/ moral identity. Along with 
providing new input or challenges to various conceptual and scientific puzzles, studies 
on human morality arguably can impact the way we view ourselves as moral agents as 
well. 
To the extent that ‘the new sciences of morality’ indeed open up ‘the black box’ of 
human moral psychology, the question is how we want to use this new, evolving body 
of knowledge. If we truly are coming closer to understanding the many influences on 
human moral decision making and behaviour, the question is how this knowledge is 
interpreted and translated. What in my view is paradoxical is that in many discussions 
we quickly move in the direction of applications where the insight is not distrib-
uted more widely/ democratically, but is apparently limited to an unidentified ‘we’, a 
small group (scientists, moral philosophers, bioethicists), who discuss how that new 
knowledge can be used to change ‘people’. Many of the applications that are discussed 
(nudging, using robots, environmental intervention, virtual reality, etc.) seem to be 
conceived, designed from ‘above’, with little consideration of the possible ways in 
which people themselves could (or would like to) benefit from this knowledge. Future 
research should focus on ways in which the new sciences of morality could indeed 
empower people to become better at being good. 
46 Why is it that the realization that we typically/ often ‘bypass reasons’ often perceived as disturbing? 
Because, philosopher Regina Rini argues; “Doxastic embarrassment results from my awareness of a 
gap between the considerations that seem correct to me in my conscious thought, and the factors that 
actually drive my automated moral beliefs. What psychological research exposes is a form of disunity 
in my functioning as a moral agent. My conscious, reflective self is not appropriately unified with my 
automated, effective self” (Rini, 2016, p. 1449).
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Summary
Since 2008, the so-called ‘moral enhancement debate’ asks whether we should actively 
pursue the development of moral enhancement technologies, and whether it would be 
permissible – or even obligatory – to put them to use, provided that these interventions 
would be effective and safe?
Whereas ‘traditional methods’ of moral betterment (such as upbringing, socialization 
and education) are arguably as old as humanity itself, the debate on moral bioenhance-
ment focuses on the desirability of methods based on novel biomedical insights and 
the use of biomedical methods. The debate follows a significant rise in fundamental 
research on the (neuro)biological and genetic underpinnings of morality. Potential 
interventions that are being discussed range from various types of psychopharmaceu-
ticals, neurostimulation, and genetic selection and engineering.
Until now, the theoretical debate on moral (bio)enhancement has a strong specula-
tive character and mostly precedes and runs ahead of realistic scientific possibilities. 
Moreover, to date, the debate risks lacking focus and real world impact, as different 
commentators fail to agree on how to understand and define moral enhancement. 
This under-examination of potential practices of moral enhancement is significant because 
without specifying intended users, contexts of implementation, and the goals and 
objectives of developing and applying potential biomedical possibilities for optimizing 
morally relevant capacities, it is not clear who should be concerned about this debate. 
At the same time, existing or emerging practices that already contain elements of 
‘moral enhancement’ but as yet lack ethical attention and ethical scrutiny, risk staying 
out of sight. 
In order to address this problem, this thesis focuses on (present and emerging) moral 
enhancement practices, in order to identify ethical issues that are not necessarily part 
of the current debate on moral enhancement. Rather than distinguishing in a blanket 
fashion desirable from undesirable moral enhancement technologies, this thesis intends 
to formulate conditions and ethical requirements for ethically justifiable moral en-
hancement practices.
On the basis of a systematic clustering of ethical arguments that emerge in the moral 
enhancement debate (based on a systematic search of the literature), it is concluded, 
first, that there is little discussion on what distinguishes moral bioenhancement from 
treatment of pathological deficiencies in morality (chapter 2). Furthermore, remark-
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ably little attention has been paid so far to the safety, risks and side-effects of moral 
enhancement, including the risk of identity changes. Finally, many authors overesti-
mate the scientific as well as the practical feasibility of the interventions they discuss, 
rendering the debate too speculative.
Subsequently, a number of contexts or domains in which (future) moral bioenhance-
ment interventions possibly or most likely will be implemented are investigated 
(chapter 3). By looking closely at similar or related existing practices and their relevant 
ethical frameworks, we identify ethical considerations that are relevant for evaluat-
ing potential moral bioenhancement interventions. Domains that are examined are, 
first, debates on the proper scope of moral education; second, proposals for identifying 
early risk factors for antisocial behaviour, and third, the difficult balancing of the best 
interests of the individual and third party concerns in (forensic) psychiatry.
In a series of interviews we asked forensic practitioners about the prospects, threats, 
and limitations of integrating neurobiological and behavioural genetic interventions 
in forensic psychiatric practices (chapter 4). Potential applications that were included 
were potential biomedical possibilities to lower aggression, the possible usage of 
neuroimaging in assessing legal responsibility, and the potential use of biomarkers in 
assessing risk for future violent and antisocial behaviour. 
In addition, these interviews explored to what extent forensic practitioners consider 
moral development and moral growth to be a part of their current professional prac-
tices and to what extent they think that stimulating moral development is a legitimate 
objective in the context of forensic psychiatric treatment (chapter 5). Finally, we asked 
how forensic practitioners balance public safety and risk management concerns with 
the interests and wellbeing of the individual patient.
To gain insight into the reasons that the public may have for endorsing or eschewing 
pharmacological moral enhancement for themselves or for others, we used empirical 
tools to explore public attitudes towards these issues (chapter 6). We found that people 
were significantly more troubled by pharmacological as opposed to non-pharmacologi-
cal moral enhancement interventions. The results indicate that members of the public 
for the greater part oppose pharmacological moral bioenhancement, yet are open to 
non-biomedical means to attain moral enhancement.
The final chapter starts from the observation that a range of present and emerging 
practices already contain elements of moral enhancement. As technological pos-
sibilities (and perhaps public and political willingness) to influence and alter moral 
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behaviour and moral capacities increase, the responsibility to make explicit this moral 
enhancement dimension in our current practices, and to think carefully about the 
associated ethical issues, increase as well.
When ethically evaluating (potential) moral enhancement practices, the distinction 
between moral self-enhancement and moral other-enhancement is relevant. With 
respect to moral self-enhancement, the decision to pursue moral enhancement and to 
determine the goal and appropriate means of doing so, is to a large degree up to the 
person herself, provided a number of safeguards are put in place. Clearly, in the case 
of moral enhancement of others, there are additional and much larger responsibilities 
to justify the need, objectives, and procedure and the means employed, as well as the 
balancing of potential benefits and harms, especially in particularly vulnerable target 
gourps.
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Samenvatting
Sinds 2008 staat binnen  het zogenaamde ‘moral enhancement debat’ de vraag centraal 
of we de ontwikkeling van technologieën ten behoeve van morele mensverbetering 
actief moeten nastreven en of het toegestaan  of zelfs verplicht zou zijn om ze in te 
zetten, op voorwaarde dat deze interventies effectief en veilig zijn.
Terwijl ‘traditionele methoden’ van morele mensverbetering zoals opvoeding, soci-
alisatie en onderwijs, waarschijnlijk net zo oud zijn als de mensheid zelf, richt het 
debat over morele mensverbetering zich op de wenselijkheid van interventies die 
zijn gebaseerd op nieuwe biomedische inzichten en op het gebruik van biomedische 
methoden. Het debat volgt op een aanzienlijke toename van fundamenteel onderzoek 
naar (neuro-)biologische en genetische verklaringen van moraliteit. Potentiële inter-
venties die worden besproken variëren van verschillende soorten psychofarmaca, 
neurostimulatie tot genetische selectie en manipulatie.
Tot nu toe heeft het theoretische debat over morele mensverbetering een sterk specula-
tief karakter en loopt het ver vooruit op realistische wetenschappelijke mogelijkheden. 
Bovendien dreigt het debat focus en daadwerkelijke impact te ontberen, omdat ver-
schillende commentatoren het niet eens te worden over hoe morele mensverbetering 
begrepen en gedefinieerd dient te worden.
Het gebrek aan onderzoek naar potentiële praktijken van morele mensverbetering is 
problematisch, omdat zonder de context, doelgroep en doelstellingen van het toepas-
sen van potentiële biomedische mogelijkheden voor morele mensverbetering te ex-
pliciteren, niet duidelijk is wie zich van dit debat iets zou moeten aantrekken, terwijl 
bestaande of opkomende praktijken die al elementen van morele mensverbetering in 
zich dragen juist teveel buiten beeld dreigen te blijven. 
Dit proefschrift richt zich daarom op (huidige en toekomstige) praktijken van morele 
mensverbetering, met het oog op het identificeren van ethische kwesties die niet nood-
zakelijk deel uitmaken van het huidige debat over morele mensverbetering. In plaats 
van onderscheid te maken tussen wenselijke en ongewenste technologieën voor morele 
mensverbetering, beoogt dit proefschrift voorwaarden te formuleren voor ethisch ver-
antwoorde praktijken van morele mensverbetering.
Op basis van een systematische clustering van ethische argumenten die naar voren 
komen in het debat over morele mensverbetering, wordt in de eerste plaats geconclu-
deerd dat er weinig discussie is over het onderscheid tussen morele mensverbetering 
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en de behandeling van psychische stoornissen of tekorten (hoofdstuk 2). Bovendien is 
tot nu toe opvallend weinig aandacht besteed aan de veiligheid, risico’s en bijwerkin-
gen van morele mensverbetering, waaronder het risico op identiteitsveranderingen. 
Ten slotte overschatten veel auteurs zowel de wetenschappelijke als de praktische 
haalbaarheid van de interventies die zij bespreken, waardoor het debat te zeer een 
speculatief karakter heeft.
Vervolgens worden een aantal contexten of domeinen onderzocht waarin (toekom-
stige) morele mensverbeteringsinterventies mogelijk ingang zullen krijgen (hoofdstuk 
3). Door vergelijkbare of verwante bestaande praktijken en hun relevante ethische 
kaders nauw te bestuderen, kunnen ethische overwegingen worden geïdentificeerd die 
relevant zijn voor het beoordelen van potentiële morele mensverbeteringsinterventies. 
Domeinen die werden onderzocht zijn, ten eerste debatten over wat geschikte doel-
stellingen van morele opvoeding zijn; ten tweede, voorstellen voor het identificeren 
van risicofactoren voor antisociaal gedrag, en ten derde, de moeilijke afweging in de 
(forensische) psychiatrie tussen de belangen van het individu en die van derden. 
In een reeks interviews vroegen we forensische artsen naar de vooruizichten, bedrei-
gingen en beperkingen van integratie van neurobiologische en gedragsgenetische 
interventies in forensisch psychiatrische praktijken (hoofdstuk 4). Toepassingen 
die werden besproken betroffen potentiële biomedische interventies om agressie te 
verlagen, het mogelijke gebruik van beeldvormend onderzoek bij het beoordelen van 
verantwoordelijkheid en het mogelijke gebruik van ‘biomarkers’ bij het bepalen van 
risico op toekomstig gewelddadig en antisociaal gedrag.
Daarnaast hebben we door middel van deze interviews onderzocht in hoeverre fo-
rensische artsen morele ontwikkeling en morele groei als onderdeel van hun huidige 
professionele praktijken beschouwen en in welke mate zij denken dat het stimuleren 
van morele ontwikkeling een legitiem doel is in de context van de forensisch psychi-
atrische behandeling (hoofdstuk 5). Daarnaast vroegen we hoe forensisch specialisten 
overwegingen rondom openbare veiligheid en risicobeheer afwegen tegen de belangen 
en het welzijn van de individuele patiënt.
Door middel van empirisch onderzoek hebben we getracht inzicht te krijgen in de 
redenen van het publiek om het gebruik van farmacologische middelen ten behoeve 
van morele mensverbetering voor zichzelf of voor anderen te steunen of af te wij-
zen (hoofdstuk 6). We zagen dat mensen significant meer problemen hadden met 
farmacologische in vergelijking met niet-farmacologische morele mensverbeterings-
interventies. De resultaten suggereren dat het publiek zich grotendeels verzet tegen 
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farmacologische middelen, maar open staat voor niet-biomedische middelen om 
morele mensverbetering te bereiken.
Het laatste hoofdstuk vertrekt vanuit de observatie dat zowel een aantal bestaande als 
opkomende praktijken al elementen van morele mensverbetering bevatten. Naarmate 
technologische mogelijkheden om moreel gedrag en morele capaciteiten te beïnvloe-
den en te veranderen toenemen, en tegelijk wellicht ook de publieke en politieke 
bereidheid om die mogelijkheden daadwerkelijk te gebruiken, neemt ook het belang 
van het verhelderen van deze elementen van morele mensverbetering toe, alsmede 
de noodzaak, om zorgvuldig na te denken over de daarmee samenhangende ethische 
kwesties.
Voor deze ethische analyse is het onderscheid tussen morele zelf-verbetering en mo-
rele verbetering van anderen relevant. De beslissing om morele zelf-verbetering na te 
streven is primair aan de persoon zelf, mits aan een aantal voorwaarden is voldaan. In 
het geval van morele verbetering van anderen bestaat er een veel uitgebreidere verant-
woordelijkheid om de noodzaak, doelstellingen, procedure, en de gekozen interventie 
te rechtvaardigen, zeker in het geval van kwetsbare groepen. 
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